Category Archives: Political Science/General

Rescission of the Constitution for the United States of America — To enable better “securing the Blessings of Liberty”

[A PDF version of this article, including the footnotes thereto, may be downloaded from here.]

On November 3, 2020, I transmitted the following message to my State Senator, along with a suggested application bill:

“Subject : Article V Convention Application Bill

On this Election Day it seemed to me that perhaps the best mode for participation, given the regrettable apparent irreconcilability in our nation, would be to propose the submission by you of a Bill for a Convention of the States, pursuant to US Const, Art V.

Accordingly, I submit the attached for your consideration and potential action.”

A suggested application in generic format can be downloaded from here.

As many conceive and as the author reluctantly concurs, there then existed a “regrettable apparent irreconcilability in our nation”; this assessment was articulated by diverse voices, from across the spectrum consisting of both liberal and conservative proponents, from “elite” and from “ordinary” exponents. This irreconcilability has only been accentuated during the ensuing fifteen months.

While the polarization is between both various segments within society as well as government units of the nation, the author apprehends that the catalyst is an excessively-powerful National government. Rather than restrict itself strictly to the enumerated powers granted to it, it has expanded its reach to innumerable arenas of the liberty, and even of the freedom, of its citizens. Accordingly, the possibility of a radical restructuring of the National government should be seriously considered; by this I suggest the repeal of the Constitution for the United States of America and its replacement by a new instrument of government.

* * * * * * *

The evolution of the settlement of our Nation essentially followed the historical course of community formation. Initially, local enclaves were established; most of these habitations though were pursuant to commercial grants from the English Crown rather than autonomous individual and group migration into virgin territory. Many of these grants allocated territory to these adventurers greatly in excess of those enclaves first inhabited.

Initially the magistrates of those enclaves only governed locally since habitation had not expanded beyond their limited peripheries. Yet, as the magistrates’ authority extended to the boundaries of these grants and various inhabitants of these enclaves migrated to new localities within those boundaries, their authority likewise expanded to encompass them — resulting in a commonwealth embracing numerous communities and the subordination of the initial enclave thereto. Thus, though the inaugural local body polities constituted the foundation of these commonwealths, they did not remain as the predominant civil order but rather were incorporated within and subject to the commonwealth.

This then resulted in the Colonies, and eventually the States, being the sovereign bodies. We then are compelled to consider the powers and remedies available within the context of State jurisdiction rather than local jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, in assessing whether fundamental changes to governmental structure are necessary, as well as the parameters thereof, we must constantly remember core concepts and axioms. For these constitute the foundation upon which any governmental edifice must be structured; repudiation of these concepts and axioms, and substitution instead of an artificial composition will only introduce fragility and the failure and destruction of the edifice.

The author conceives these concepts and axioms to consist of the following:

  • Neighborhoods initially were, and remain still, the core unit of habitation. (This was propounded in the first volume of the author’s Interstice Amid the Fabric of Life essay, The State of Primordial Mankind.) The most-frequent interactions transpire between persons in close physical proximity and regular intercourse with each other and from which their identities are embellished.
  • Neighborhoods then are described and delineated by the radius of normal interaction between the majority of contiguous inhabitants. This interaction will allow the development of common identities and a network of mutual supply of physical necessities and reciprocal assistance and support, both physical and moral.
  • The smaller the political entity, the less the diversity of its inhabitants.

Thus, though we are compelled to recognize the States as the operative entity, we are also compelled to recognize the surpassing importance of the local civil orders and their utilization as the primary expression of the civic will. The justification for this assertion is further confirmed by an examination of the purpose and limitations of these civil orders.

* * * * * * *

The initial stage of the inquiry is the consideration of the inextricable limitation on their authority; for the prime proscription on their powers consists of those inherent rights of its inhabitants which are beyond their capacity to invade. As argued previously by the author, no person, individually or collectively, has the authority to alienate his Primary Natural Rights. Only Secondary Natural Rights are capable of alienation; even then the alienation must be express, unambiguous and unqualified, and restricted to the context which induced the alienation thereof.

Therefore, if the inhabitants of a locality elect to establish a commonwealth for it, the only powers they can grant to it are the powers to regulate Secondary Natural Rights. The necessary corollary, since a commonwealth can only exercise the powers granted to it, is that its powers then are limited to the regulation of these Secondary Natural Rights; even then the regulation of those rights must be both uniform and subject to the express and innate restrictions upon those powers.

Thus, governmental powers are inherently and inextricably limited. The initial and basic limitation consists of the scope of power delegation, for the state cannot exercise a power that it was not granted. This scope is inextricably proscribed as the citizens of a commonwealth are entitled to delegate to a government only those powers whose exercise will generally restrict the Civil rights of at least a majority of the citizens of the commonwealth. In addition to the prohibition against a government exercising power that would restrict the Primary Natural Rights of its citizens, it is limited to regulating only the portion of those additional Civil rights, viz, those which do not constitute Primary Natural Rights, that also constitute Civic rights. There, however, are further reasons for this conclusion.

A more-important, albeit conceptual, limitation consists of the role of a commonwealth and the powers it is entitled to exercise in the performance of this role; if we first isolate the basic purpose of the commonwealth then we better delineate this role. The basic purpose of a commonwealth is to prevent, as far as practicable, an abbreviation of the scope of Liberty available to each individual in the natural order. Hence, the role is to eliminate, or at least ameliorate, conditions that adversely affect at least a majority of its citizens, viz, constitute general problems within the commonwealth.

By this formula the powers that can be exercised gradually diminish, in both scope and degree, the greater the population and geographical extent of the commonwealth — as within the most geographically-restricted commonwealth the impact that any target condition may exert upon the citizens will be more general and tend toward commonality due to the relative homogeneity of those citizens, while within the most geographically-expansive commonwealth (“federal commonwealth”) any target condition that may exert general impact upon the citizens will be few and extraordinary due to the relative diversity of those citizens. The most local commonwealth then is implicitly granted the greatest quantum of power to eliminate or ameliorate adverse conditions within its boundaries, whereas the federal commonwealth is implicitly granted the least quantum of these powers.

Hence, the powers to which the commonwealth is confined — and which constitute the limit of those delegated to it, unless indisputable evidence to the contrary is tendered by it — are those proper and necessary for the performance of this role and the discharge of this function. In this performance and this discharge, the commonwealth is obliged to ignore problems that are only transient and limited within the body of citizens for which it was instituted. Any other standard would implicate the commonwealth intervening in a myriad of potentially-minuscule controversies, with any boundary line beyond which it should refrain being difficult to define and envision.

Objection will presumably be made that this standard will allow the abuse of, by potential abbreviation of rights that should be afforded to, minority segments of the citizenry. Facially this objection would be well-taken. The solution, however, is the formation of a multi-tiered framework of commonwealths, progressively devolving as far as practicable to the most localized jurisdiction. By such a framework those minority segments will have the capacity to constitute a majority in a localized commonwealth and thereby preserve the rights afforded to them.

* * * * * * *

Does the current structure or practices of government in the United States of America conform to the foregoing standards? Clearly they do not.

By virtue of historical development the States have paramount jurisdiction over the local civil organs; the latter, except for limited functions are wholly subordinate. Instead, the author has proposed that it is the local civil organs that should perform the majority of proper and necessary functions and hence possess most governmental power. Nevertheless, given this historical development, there is little present recourse other than to accept the States as the primary unit.

However, the question of the National government is wholly of another class. The extent to which it has grossly exceeded its constitutional limits and eclipsed the status and roles of the State and local civil organs is malevolence indeed. By endeavoring to do too much, it has necessarily antagonized large swaths of the diverse segments in the country; for while policies can contain various exceptions, any policy has to be essentially uniform and general — and no policy can be sufficiently uniform and general to accommodate such disparate diverse segments.

Hence, a dramatic restructuring is in order. Of what form might it consist?

It is supposed that numerous alternative might be suggested. But the author is bold enough to propose one possibility that, it seems to him, should revert inter-governmental relationship closer to the design originally envisioned, and thereby better “secur[e] the Blessings of Liberty”.

This proposal consists of:

  • the passage of bills by two-thirds (2/3) of the States applying for a Convention of the States;
  • the calling by the U.S. Congress of a convention pursuant to these applications;
  • the convening of the convention;
  • the proposal at and approval by the convention of an amendment rescinding The Constitution of the United States, thereby reverting the several States to their full sovereign capacities, or the approval of a new Constitution that provides for and thereby constitutes an amendment rescinding The Constitution of the United States;
  • the formation of a minimum of, say, nine (9) federations between contiguous States, which could conform to:
    • historical, cultural, or unique geographical characteristics, such as, for example:
      • New England,
      • the Mid-Atlantic States,
      • the South,
      • the Northwest Territory States,
      • the Louisiana Purchase States,
      • the Mexican War States, and
      • the Western Coast (including Alaska and Hawaii); or
    • the current divisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeal; or
    • other combinations not yet identified.
  • the formation of a confederation between these various federations.

The chronology of the foregoing stages of this proposal might be differently manipulated. However, it is tendered that this is a framework that ought to be given serious consideration.

* * * * * * *

In 1787 there admittedly were significant differences between the States. These were the result of various factors, including the different groups of adventurers who founded the colonies as well as the divergent religions to which the respective inhabitants adhered.

Nevertheless, as the substantial majority of the immigrants to the colonies were of British origin, these citizens perceived they were endowed with the inherent and established rights of Englishmen. As a result of this common historical knowledge and perception, the similarities between them were more profound than their differences and effectively submerged, or at least subordinated, any dissimilarities.

Hence, a National government was not regarded as likely to be oppressive since there would exist a common body of citizens of similar mind and experience ready and prepared to resist any tyrannical encroachments. Moreover, there was significant dispersion of the inhabitants within the various States. This relative isolation of the citizens, from each other and from the seats of government, constituted substantial obstacles to any effort to infringe the Liberties of them by any particular factions or control by the respective governments.

These conditions, however, soon experienced eradicable alteration — compromising these protections and, ultimately, these principles. The initial, as well as ultimate, cause was the vast accretion of territory controlled by the United States of America. This geographical expansion, proceeding at various times and occasioned by a variety of circumstances, permanently corrupted the carefully-designed polity.

By enabling the multiplication of the number of potential States it presented the specter of lessened cohesion between the existing and new States; for the lesser the number of jurisdictions the greater the capacity for them to unite on proposing or opposing certain policies, with the converse situation the greater the number of jurisdictions. This then presented both the opportunity and justification for the National government to expand its role and power by entry into this void. Thereby was the equilibrium in the Federal system, between the National government and the State governments, imbalanced.

These new territories also provided the opportunity and incentive for new and expanded immigration into the country, as the new regions and resources enticed the settlement and exploitation of them. This immigration exponentially increased the number of citizens of the country in the aggregate; moreover the diversity of the nationalities, and their accompanying national experiences and heritages, of the citizens was necessarily increased. As a result of this increased quantity and diversity the prospect of uniting on proposing or opposing certain policies was impeded, inasmuch as, one, a greater mass of persons always renders accedence to a common position more difficult and less likely, two, these greater dissimilarities rendered consolidation into a uniform position more difficult, and, three, these different traditions introduced the factor of willingness, or at least accentuated the volume of adherents thereto, in acceptance of, rather than resistance to, authority. Thereby, with reduced meaningful opposition, was the continued momentum of the juggernaut of National authority unabated.

The augmented national territory augmented also its power, both in isolation and relative to other countries. The first effect thereof was to induce it to expand its defense establishment and capabilities. As a normal consequence it was then induced to exercise this capability relative to other countries.

The exercise of this capability resulted in the international expansion of the country, both in the form of new territories — some by conquest and some by the exercise of monetary might incident to economic and military might — and the permanent presence within other countries. The latter is exhibited both in the economic influence over and foreign military establishments in numerous countries by the United States of America.

By all of these factors the authority of the National government was expanded to gargantuan proportions. We are now Reaping the Whirlwind. The cavalier and virtually uninhibited exercise by the National government of its Article I and Article II powers, whether real, presumed, assumed, or seized, has strained the fabric of the country with the resulting tension approaching or being at the breaking point.

Accordingly it appears to more than a few isolated malcontents that a dramatic reconfiguration of this country is necessary. The within proposal is but one of many that could be a solution by which retrenchment of concentrated central power is realized. It though appears to the author that the necessity of this retrenchment is beyond cavil.

A sufficient number of Federations of various States — with substantial powers reserved to those States, and a substantial portion of those powers progressively reserved to the local jurisdictions therein — would not only enable geographical segmentation of diversity in those jurisdictions and thereby obstruct suppression of it by more populous segments of different characteristics in different jurisdictions, but would preserve Liberty by this division of power. A Confederation of these federations would maintain national unity, albeit of a more-restricted scope and a more-restrained National government.

The author does not contend this is an ideal framework; but nothing designed by mortal man is ever ideal. It is anticipated though, that under the conditions of 2022 as contrasted with those of 1787, this general skeleton would constitute a vast improvement of the corrupted evolution that has transpired over the intervening two hundred thirty-five (235) years.

While careful design of the structure of the Confederation will of course be necessary, it is anticipated that conceptually the functioning thereof should not be problematic. Conceptually, though, the functioning of the Federations could pose some consideration.

There theoretically is the danger from a smaller federation that its officials will have greater opportunity to interfere in the liberty of its citizens as a consequence of the government having fewer responsibilities and fewer disparate segments of society to distract itself. However, this may be sufficiently offset by its capacity to craft tailored rules for its fewer discrete segments rather than general rules which, by necessity, will not be able to accommodate all of a broad range of segments.

In any event, a solution of this type should obviate many of the problems, Nay, the evils, that exist presently. It is left to abler minds than that of the author to refine this solution more perfectly.

WAYNE A. SMITH
Sanilac County, Michigan USA
26 February 2022

The Improvidence of Disproportionality in Governmental Policy

[A PDF version of this article may be downloaded from here.]

The COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic has spawned many public and private avoidance efforts. It has also spawned many antagonistic perspectives and attitudes as a consequence.

The divergence between them, and the objectives that they propound, make it difficult to evaluate which should prevail. It is submitted that perhaps use of the Liberty-Freedom Dichotomy might assist in this effort.

As has been posited by this author, Liberty is the Prime Natural Right as it is affirmative and affords the right to initiate action. However, as the exercise of this right is most likely to affect others — whereas Freedom is passive and affords the right to refrain from action — it is the right with which a public body has the legitimate power to circumspectly constrain.* The question here then is not what actions a public body may require an individual to perform but what actions a public body may legitimately constrain an individual from performing.

In the context of various restrictions imposed by governments during this pandemic some may say the distinction is immaterial. I tender it is not.

All potential actions are impacted by various factors that necessitate assessment of the relative importance thereof in determining the beneficial or adverse consequence of the action. In addition, there are numerous possible consequences of each potential action, of which the likelihood and effect thereof (on future potential actions) has to be projected. Thus, all decisions to initiate or refrain from action are impressed with certain risks.

The author concurs that we are obliged to avoid needless risks, in order to optimize our time and hence opportunities for attaining further objectives, those beyond the objective envisioned by the immediate proposed action.** However, these should be substantial, demonstrable risks. We cannot eliminate all risks with which we may be confronted, and it would be perilous to even endeavor to do so.***  While there conceivably are numerous reasons, two of them are paramount.

First, it would promote an even-further deterioration in intellectual capabilities. We are endowed, by Nature or by God (as one’s perspective chooses), with rational, abstract capacity, and it is our duty to preserve and deploy these capabilities whenever possible. As already observed, this process entails assessing various factors in each situation which we confront, and determining those most relevant to and beneficial for an intended course of action prior to formulation of the decision as to the choice to be made. Each situation has various nuances and requires intensive examination to identify and analyze these nuances in order to determine what action, if any, is appropriate to avoid and ameliorate the risks incident to alternative courses. Discouraging employment of this process would result in superficial and careless reasoning. All approaches constitute precedents that have the potential to be ingrained; an absence of meticulous consideration then has the potential to be a “foundation of sand”, to our future detriment — by failing and even refusing to make adjustments where circumstances warrant or even require them. Thus, retention of risks is beneficial, as providing challenges that require mental acuity.

Second, and most importantly, an extreme risk-aversion preoccupation deemphasizes the role and supremacy of both God and the Creature. The secular aspect of this proposition derives from the necessity of this preoccupation assigning to some corporate body the function and right of determination of the existence and degree of risks. Who would be this corporate body? Some discrete or obscure body of “experts”? Some singular governmental body? In any event, thereby would be established an oligarchy entitled to control decisions rightfully belonging to the individual; this is contradictory to and destructive of individual responsibility and moral choice. By being subjected to acute situations requiring critical decisions, the individual is compelled to experience moral growth and a sense of his responsibility for making these crucial decisions. This process leads to virtue and righteousness, the abandonment of which would only be at our peril.

The sacred aspect of this proposition derives from the absence of control by humanity, in contrast to the potential control by God, over conditions and events; while God has the power of absolute control, it is only periodically exercised and therefore potential. Scripture repeatedly acknowledges that retribution for vice is suffered by the offenders through their own actions, with rewards for righteousness being but occasional and not linear. It is only through the supplication of prayer that God’s intervention can be enlisted. The world then is, by First Cause design, a deterioration into chaos; God created order as the natural condition, but also created other factors (including humanity) that permitted irretrievable devolution into corruption. Though humanity then is by nature of limited power and competency, yet some apparently perceive that virtual elimination, and not merely minimization, of risk is an attainable objective; they believe by their intervention they can remold the world, through the elimination of the risk incident to disorder, rather than seek God’s intervention. By not trusting in God are we not treading on dangerous ground, by pretending to usurp His power?****

Government then should be cautious in the exertion of any power which is granted to it. It should only exercise this power when clearly necessary to protect vital interests. This then requires:

  • First, assessment of the severity of a risk, and if it is deemed sufficiently-substantial the gradual implementation of restrictions to minimize it; and

  • Second, if restrictions are deemed necessary, the tailoring of them so that there is a reasonable fit between the rules and the objectives thereof; this then requires recognizing the differences between the circumstances of the persons who will be affected thereby.

In most instances there was no compliance with the conditions of the posited first stage. Simply by virtue of its designation as a “novel coronavirus” it was established that there was no clinical data to determine its transmissibility or its virulence. While it appears to be undisputed that its transmissibility is greater than normal, it yet remains doubtful whether its virulence is such. Accordingly, no justification existed for initially imposing draconian measures as opposed to gradual implementation of them if proven necessary — particularly as experience and logic both confirm that it is more difficult to revise and remove restrictions than it is to expand them later.

The second stage implicates another basic principle of not only our jurisprudence but of core justice, viz, Equal Protection. Equal Treatment can be either a just requirement or an unjust burden, depending upon the circumstances. In many contexts it prevents unjust discriminatory treatment, as when its absence would deprive certain individuals or classes of persons of rights afforded to others. But in other contexts it will deprive certain individuals or classes of persons of liberty that the circumstances do not justify. The latter was the consequence of many of the governmental initiatives during this pandemic.

Those restrictions which imposed isolation, because of the circumstances of some classes of people, were to their benefit. The same restrictions, because of the circumstances of other classes of people, were unnecessary and therefore to them a burden. Thus was imposed unequal treatment.

Moreover, certain of these restrictions — a regime that was a burden upon all — were accompanied by benefits that redounded but to some.*****  These benefits, designed to partially alleviate those burdens, were thus unequally distributed. This was further manifest error as awarding benefits to certain classes of persons but not others demonstrates (or at least implies) that the latter are disfavored and disadvantaged.******  Thereby was afflicted further injustice as governmental action should not burden but some and thereby require them to palpably suffer and experience inequity.

Rather, burdens should be imposed only where the substantial liberty of some is being directly threatened by the liberty exercised by others, consisting of clear jeopardy to the former and not merely speculation. Thus, imposed restrictions on liberty are not justifiable but under circumstances of clear and present danger.*******

The author does not dispute that there are certain situations that entailed increased risk, such as population density, frequency of circulation outside of the domicile, circulation outside of their community (community being capable of a flexible definition depending upon common characteristics of susceptibility or lack thereof), age, and preexisting health conditions. Application of restrictions to persons and areas subject to these conditions are justifiable. General restrictions applied to persons and areas not subject to these conditions, but rather composed of different characteristics, however are not; and the more persons or areas differ the greater the burden on a government to justify them.  They are particularly unjustifiable when applied to institutions historically and by intrinsic nature antagonistic to government — the Church in particular.*******

Justifiable measures restricting liberty ought then to have focused upon isolation of those most at risk. But does imposing protection measures on those at risk justify doing so on those not at risk? Is not this a case of the onerous, and thus erroneous, application of equal treatment? If classes of persons are unlikely to injure others, then no justification exists for imposition of restraints on their liberty, much less constraints on their freedom. Rather, if classes of persons are more likely to be injured by others, then it is proper only to devise protection measures to impose on those at risk of being injured.  This then preserves the Freedom of those not at risk while only limiting the Liberty of those at risk and those persons in contact with them to the extent necessary.

But the regimes that have been imposed have been contrary to this principle. Rather they have yielded benefits to some and burdens to others.*********  As a result those benefited acquire greater Liberty and hence more Power as the increased rewards yield greater opportunities for initiating activity, and these opportunities will enable, if rightly pursued, the acquisition of more power. Those without those opportunities will have little, if any capacity for acquiring power.

Increased, and hence inequality of, power is always malevolent. For Power is a variable in the equation of the amount of Liberty bestowed upon a person. One might devise the following formula:

L = ((Σ-Δ)/Σ) x ((Ω/(Ω-P))
where
L = Liberty Coefficient
Δ = Government Expenditures
Σ = Gross Domestic Product
P = Median National Wealth
Ω = Total National Wealth

or, alternatively,
L = ((Φ-Ψ)/Φ) x ((Ω/(Ω-P))
where
L = Liberty Coefficient
Ψ = Government Employees
Φ = Total Population
P = Median National Wealth
Ω = Total National Wealth

By these formulae a Liberty Coefficient is calculated with the greater the product of the calculation demonstrating a greater level of Liberty in a nation.**********  While the author believes either formula is a valid demonstration of a level of Liberty, he apprehends that the first equation may be preferable.

In either event, assuming the validity thereof, the greater the intrusion of a government and the greater the wealth inequality, the greater the power afforded to only certain classes and the less the liberty afforded to the citizens in general. Either variable, viz, the dominance of government or the concentration of wealth, has egregious effects; when combined they are intolerable.***********

* * * * * * *

To the author the current pandemic regime has disclosed all of these pernicious factors and effects. It has paralyzed many without reason, but with atrocious effects. It is an apt study of the obscene dangers of power in government and society. Whence has gone the ascendancy of the Individual and of Freedom?

WAYNE A. SMITH
Sanilac County, Michigan USA
06 October 2020


*   Liberty is exercised, consisting of activity initiated by a person, and thus is anticipated to, and usually has, an effect beyond the person exercising it. Therefore, it normally will have some constraint upon the Liberty of another. Accordingly, certain constraints by government on Liberty are permissible.
Still, the imposition of constraints has to be circumspect, viz, only when this Liberty will either substantially and materially affect a sufficiently-substantial number of persons or will deprive an identifiable class of persons, even if not of a substantial number, of a Primary Natural Right; while deprivation of a Primary Natural Right from even a single person is to be regretted, this factor alone does not justify prohibition of a constraint per se since a magistracy of the size necessary to identify and prevent any abuse by a constraint would jeopardize all Liberty.
Freedom, though, is an absence of compulsion by another to initiate a specified action and thus its preservation will have no effect other then the failure of the effort to compel; the person who is the object of the inchoate compulsion will be unaffected though the person endeavoring to compel will be affected only by the failure of his effort and, thus, a negation of his activity. Therefore, since the preservation of Freedom will have no effect extending beyond the person asserting it, its orbit has a diameter shorter than the diameter of an orbit of Liberty. Accordingly, restriction of the orbit of Freedom is always unjustifiable.

**   These further objectives may be of disparate quality, depending upon the framework of principles of each person. They may be, inter alia, to: enhance personal reward; benefit mankind or some segment thereof; or serve and glorify God.

***   The peril would consist of constant inaction, as every action entails certain risks and their elimination is impossible. Concern about these risks then would paralyze all decisions and actions. But to avoid action, one then denies the very quality of life and existence — as it is a constant progression from one stage to another and, finally, to the ultimate stage of life.

****   It is my conclusion that the Church, in both its abstract and institutional sense, is theoretically and historically in an adversarial relationship with Government. I consider the Biblical authority to be consistent. For example, compare: 1 Samuel 8:7; John 18:36; Acts 5:29; and Matthew 22:21.

***** These consisted, inter alia, of monetary benefits to replace lost income, paid leave to accommodate family circumstances, and adjustment of the working environment to allow telecommuting. Because not all classes of persons had regular income, were blessed with a family, or could perform their work in isolation, only certain classes were afflicted with substantial burdens.

****** Extending benefits to some may expand their liberty, but should it prejudice people to whom these are not awarded and whose liberty is thus not benefited?

******* The standard of “clear and present danger” admittedly originated in a different legal context. Nevertheless, the author posits that its application is appropriate here as only demonstrable and immediate substantial injury should be a justification for restricting Freedom.

******** In addition to these restrictions being antagonistic to the limited role that God has assigned to government, there is the additional protection afforded through our jurisprudence by virtue of the Free Exercise Clause. We are enjoined by Scripture to celebrate the Lord’s Last Supper and to praise God through joyful song. Yet governmental restrictions in many jurisdictions restricted observance, and thereby enjoined the faithful to violate their sacred duties. To paraphrase Jesus’ command, many were compelled to “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that Caesar allows.” Thus, was God, in this core function of the life of many, subordinated to government rather than government subordinated to God.

********* Some of those disproportionate in benefits have already been mentioned. However here a different disproportion surfaces; this is the disproportion in burdens. For each if gross burdens on all are equivalent, some will be benefited thereby while others will not. Thus the net burdens are not equivalent.

********** Other more refined and sophisticated formulae can be devised and likely are more demonstrable and better proof of this question. Yet, while the author only expended limited time in devising them, he still believes they are valid and can be legitimately applied in analysis.

********** Preliminary calculations seem to indicate that these two variables have equivalent negative effects; thus submission to one while limiting the other is a Pyrrhic solution as it will still yield an equivalent loss of liberty. Rather, both are subjects for constraint.

 

Civil Society, rather than the State, as the Incubator of Life

The primary subject of this comment will be one of the matters to be addressed by my second (2nd) volume, The Nature of Mankind and Government, in my series Interstice Amid the Fabric of Life. But my rereading of Plato’s Crito — it having been more than fifty-five (55) years since I first studied it, and I deemed a refreshing to be beneficial — inspired me to presently endeavor to distinguish the State from the organic and essential assemblages of Mankind.

I was cruising along with Plato’s reasoning but then suddenly [at 50 – 51] I came upon the Athenians’ arguments anticipated by Socrates and was repulsed by them. These arguments, with which Socrates (and, by extrapolation, Plato) agreed, were that:

it was through the laws of Athens that Socrates’ father married his mother and conceived him,

the city thereby gave birth to him,

he was raised and educated because of its laws directing a certain program of education,

since by virtue of he thereby being “born and brought up and educated … [he was then the] offspring and slave [of Athens] from the beginning, both [he] and [his] ancestors”,

consequently “the homeland is deserving of more honor and reverence and worship than [Socrates’] mother and father and all of [his] other ancestors”, and

he therefore “should show her more respect and compliance and obedience than [his] father, and either convince her or do what she commands, and suffer without complaining if she orders [him] to suffer something … whether it is to be beaten or imprisoned, or to be wounded or killed if she leads [him] into war …”.

It seemed incredulous that anyone could adopt this perspective! Now it admittedly is somewhat ameliorated by the rejoinder that:

Athens granted the power, to any citizen of discretion and experience with its affairs and laws who is not pleased with them, “to take his possessions and leave for whatever he wants”, yet

if such a citizen having cognizance of its laws and other civic matters remains in Athens, then the citizen “by his action has now made an agreement with [the city] to do what [it] commands him to do.”

Asserting that an individual can enter into a political contract by his affirmative conduct (and the necessary inferences therefrom) is well-taken. Yet the question remains as to what are the contours of such a political contract, and whether those contours can be concluded to vitiate the volitional nature of the individual’s consent.

For a person can be rightfully deemed to have intelligently acquiesced in the abbreviation or even surrender of certain secondary rights in exchange for the greater security of his primary rights. But can a person be deemed to have knowingly and willingly compacted when the nature of the political contract conceives the State to not only have the capacity to adjust and reconcile, but be the very source of, primary rights?*  Such a construction is so at variance with both Mankind’s experience and innate principles that it must be concluded that any adhesion to such a contract was only the result of compulsion or duplicity.**

These types of questions compel an examination into the origin, nature, and legitimacy of the nebulous creature known as the State.

The concept of the composition of a State as a discrete entity has been considered and analyzed over the millennia. But have these analyses been retrospective or prospective in perspective? Have they accepted the political structures into which they were born and matured as axioms and then applied them to primordial existence?

Many, if not most, of those discussions treat the State as an elemental structure in social life. However a State is not a natural structure, much less elemental, but rather an artificial construct.*** By nature it experiences transmutation and metamorphosizes into new combinations. Let us then now consider what is contended to be the composition of a State.

Of what does one conceive constitutes a State? Though the required components might be similar, it would seem that various differing perspectives do or could exist, depending upon which facet is deemed most central. Nevertheless, one could describe a State as

a distinct territory encompassed by defined borders,
permanently occupied by a static, or semi-static, population:

manifesting and conforming to various cultures
espousing various sets of mores
organized by an organic social structure
engaged in regular and continual economic interactions

promulgating and subjecting its population to certain laws, and

establishing and employing a governmental structure for the administration of those laws.

Further analysis of these components demonstrate that the State, as conceived, interposes a layer that only subordinates, nay subjugates, civil society to a formal hierarchy and imposes a rigidity that complicates rending of these shackles.

These components can and should be considered in order.

Geographical expanse and boundaries provide no innate definition of uniqueness. History is replete with examples of accretion of territory to nations, as well as of divestiture of regions from them; just to consider the most recent, there was: the annexation of Silesia and much of Poland by Germany prior to, and then the divestiture from it of those regions as well as East Prussia following, World War II; the annexation of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China; the division of Eastern European countries after 1989, consisting of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; and, prehaps most dramtic, the division of the Soviet Union (followed by de facto reincorporation of a number of the former regions into Russia’s sphere of influence). Moving from the specific to the general, we have already hypothesized how even within neighborhoods themselves mitosis and division is a natural dynamic; how much more than is it natural the larger the combination — there by definition being far more differences in a more populous and expansive nation, and hence occasions for dissension and rancor. This, then, provides no foundation for the erection of the additional layer of the State.

The culture and mores of the nation derive from the various neighborhoods that compose the polity. They are the product of the unique experiences, thereby forming the traditions, of the unitary, and then extended, families forming those neighborhoods.

They thus by nature precede any State, are deployed and employed independent of it, would survive its abolition, and cannot be enhanced, but only infringed, by it. Moreover, the larger the nation, the greater the volume and diversity of each set of culture and mores. Thus, endeavoring to define the character of a State by them only yields confusion and complication.

The social structure of any region not only has primordial roots, but fundamentally originated from and consists of individual person-to person interactions. These bilateral interactions then provide the foundation for and evolve into more-complex multilateral interactions.

Though these relationships then are constantly evolving they still depend upon the needs, decisions, and actions of each individual as they regularly engage with other individuals. The focus of daily life then is horizontal rather than vertical. The influence of the aggregate set of interrelationships composing a State then is but irregular.

The economy is perhaps the most fundamental, as well as essential, development in any society. It originates in the first person’s search for and acquisition of food, clothing, and shelter. It of course then develops in complexity as population expands.

Still economic interaction may be one of the limited arenas in which a State has a role. For it may be able to encourage efficiency, and limit (or eliminate) inequities, in the distriubtion of goods or services. Nevertheless, this role is an ameliorative, rather than formative, function — only being exerted upon the fringes, rather than the core, of an economic structure already in operation.

In conceiving the State as a fundamental entity, it is tendered that the theorists concentrated their attention upon the laws promulgated by it. This it is conceded is one of the indicias of a political entity, and a necessary development in any society. For as complexity increases, the necessity of promulgating and executing specific rules to govern the new relationships produced by this complexity also increases.

Yet, prior to Positive Law there were already standards imposed and observed. The fundamental standards were those imposed by Natural Law.****  Supplementary ones were the product of what the earliest combinations in society deemed just and beneficial. Thus, while it is not disputed that Positive Law (at least to some extent) is necessary, it was not the foundation nor the essence of the principles regulating personal interaction. Moreover, this Positive Law, as demonstrated by history and theory, is not static; they are periodically revised, modified, and supplemented. If so, then, it is impossible to define a State by them since a defintion is static by nature but the state of Positive Law is dynamic.

The laws of a community then are reactive rather than proactive, and do not constitute the foundation of a nation. By extrapolation a State likewise must be deemed a gloss upon the foundational, constituent neighborhoods that compose the community.

The final component to be considered is the governmental structure of a political entity. This likely was the element which proccupied the theorists in their conception of a State. It is the most visible facade of a nation as being the most articulated. By its very nature and necessity this structure must be meticulously defined, else it leads to tyranny and slavery. Further, how can it be effective and perform its intended function if neither the magistrates nor the populace understand its powers and restrictions?

Yet, simply because this structure is the most obvious and known component of a nation does not mean it is organic, much less the most important. For its purpose is but to enact Positive Law when it is required, to enforce it, and to adjudicate whether the enactments and enforcements were permissable and proper. Accordingly, if Positive Law is only of peripheral concern for and effect on the vast majority of personal interactions, then the government structure which is its source and sanction is likewise only peripheral; and the above demonstrates that the lack of centrality of the State to those interactions.

Rather, instead of the State, the only ineluctable structure is the Unitary Family; even it — in practice, even if contrary to precept — transforms not infrequently. Immediately beyond this is the Extended Family but it, because of its greater volume and diversity, is regularly subject to disputes between and division of its members. Even more are the larger combinations — neighborhoods, communities, regions and nations — subject to turmoil and dissention.

The Civil Society is inherently without conscious or deliberate organization. Its members interact, but this interaction is by nature organic. It thus experiences growth, mutations, and death. These changes may be as to the organism as a whole or in sets of its members only. These developments may be prolonged or rapid.

Civil Society then is continually, if not constantly (always, or even usually), in flux. Its composition and character may be stable, but of a different composition and character. Rather, its stability is a function and consequence of its transformation by adaptation; for it marginalizes or, when necessary, expels those members that exhibit or engage in rancor or disunity and integrates new members.

A State though, as defined and examined, is a natural appendage to Civil Society. For, as the result of the necessity of dispute resolution that exists at all stages, it first utilizes the inherent household mechanisms therefor and then expands and refines it as the inhabitants of the neighborhood, and then community, increase. Then, as the community further increases, in inhabitant volume and geographically, it then is compelled to establish defined, specific rules for the new contingencies and situations it did not previously confront.*****  Finally, the proliferation of further new contingencies and consequent rules necessitates a separate body for the administration and application of them. The community thus experiences the necessity of the formation of a Proto-Judiciary, then a Proto-Legislature, and, later, a Proto-Executive. The Civil Society then grafts these appendages onto itself. While adaptations thereto may later be necessary and then effectuated, they retain their character as but an adjunct of Civil Society.

A State then is not a natural creature, but an artificial embodiment of the precursive organism. Civil Society, as an infinitely-varied entity (depending upon the median mores, culture and experiences of its members), cannot have perceived any necessity for a duplicative definition of it; a State would be but an exact overlay of it, yielding no benefit but rather only confusion. From the perspective of a government, though, such a concept would be beneficial, by rendering its existence inviolable and transforming its position to be the root of the community. But this reverses the chronology and its status as but a branch of Civil Society. And it cannot be otherwise — for their natures are singular.

Civil Society is a flexible transmuting organism. It is dynamic, not static.

A State, though, is a formal entity with an integrated structure. While it might be altered (even dramatically), the new pattern will still be formal and integrated.

The one then is alive and the other is subject to atrophy. This being so, only Civil Society can give birth to the future, open vistas for the energies and talents of its members, provide the arena for the interactions of these energies and talents, and bestow the reciprocal rewards therefor.

Consequently, with all due respect to Plato and Socrates, I retain my incredulity at their proposition.


*  Primary natural rights are, by their very designation, primary. They are essential to the survival and autonomy of each individual. As such, the loss, or worse the deprivation by another, of them would result in the destruction of the individual. As destruction of another person is an indisputable violation of Natural Law, the loss or deprivation of Primary natural rights is likewise a violation of Natural Law and is forbidden. No person, then, may abridge, alienate, or surrender his Primary natural rights, either to a State or to another Unitary Family or Extended Family; only Secondary natural rights — when essential, in adequate exchange for greater security of or enhanced power to exercise a Primary natural right, and for a limited duration — can be abridged.

Yet, in the case of a State, even the right of alienation of Secondary natural rights to it is problematic since as the State has been conceived (at least by some) as a permanent entity and resistant to the removal of powers once granted, it could jeopardize the exercise of those rights by later generations; and no person has the right to deprive later generations of Secondary, much less Primary, natural rights. (The alienation of Secondary natural rights to another Unitary Family or Extended Family is less problematic since, as discussed herein, their composition and duration is dynamic and constantly in flux ¥ yielding the opportunity to be released from his alienation of those rights.)

Further we should consider, as is elaborated in this essay as well as established a priori, Civil Society is antecedent to and developed independent of any State. Yet Primary natural rights were antecedent to Civil Society. They thus are ingrained in all persons and inherent in all interrelationships. Being then elemental and antecedent, any State is subject to them. Thus, while a State may have the residual power to adjust and reconcile Primary natural rights, this power must be restrictively interpreted and extraordinarily exercised. For otherwise the very survival of every member of the community would be in constant and ultimate jeopardy.

**  Natural Rights are a component of Natural Law, and Natural Law is integral to Nature, Nature being the totality of all existence and life. As each person is born into Nature, by virtue of thereby being a part of existence and life, Mankind is a part of Nature and Natural Rights hence are a part of each person; they are bestowed at birth and are innate to each individual.

These rights may be either Primary and Secondary. The difference between them is that the former are required for survival of the individual and thus cannot be alienated; for since his birth was not his choice nor the result of his actions, no person has the right to abandon his life. Moreover, as the instinct to perpetuate life is natural and any inclination to abandon life is unnatural, any putative choice to the contrary must be presumed to be misapprehended and the result rather of external forces; else the gate allowing oppressive and tyrannical power to enter is opened. (As life was a gift bestowed upon him, all persons have a duty to preserve it and engage in activities for their own benefit. Moreover, as life is not solitary — save for the hermit who lives his life in isolation and thus is without impact or effect in his time or after his demise — he has a duty also to engage in activities that may potentially or will directly benefit others.)

Thus, abridgment, much less surrender, by any person of their Primary natural rights would constitute repudiation of the natural order, much less his inherent rights and natural instincts. Therefore, any acquiescence in the loss thereof must be deemed inconceivable and not the result of his knowing and volitional choice.

***  A State could not exist in a different spatial sphere than the community with which it is associated and purportedly serves. Yet, as has been demonstrated both theoretically and historically, a community is subject to both merger and division. If then a community as constituted is a temporary creature, then so must a State be deemed, not merely a temporary, but an artificial construct — as its structure and jurisdiction is not merely derivative but unsubstantial.

****  Positive Law is both historically posterior and subordinate to Natural Law and its associated Natural Rights. Moreover, both the community and its Positive Law are transitory whereas Natural Law is unalterable and enduring.

*****  We today characterize these rules as Positive Law, viz, Constitutions and Statutes.


WAYNE A. SMITH
Sanilac County, Michigan USA
04 Apr 2020

Another Example of the Prudence of Minimal Governmental Intervention

The outrageous tragedy at the Tree of Life Congregation synagogue in Pittsburgh on October 27, provides another example of the vital importance of governments, particularly at the national or international level, maintaining a “skinny agenda”.

It appears that his hysteria on the Immigration issue was the ultimate motivation of the unspeakable villain, Robert Bowers, in his evil attack at the synagogue.  Forming a conclusion that the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society was engaged in activities on the opposite side of the divide on the issue, he lashed out at innocents who he identified with it.  (This in no way implies any justification for his heinous actions but is only intended to provide the context for below perspective — as his psychopathic behavior was not inspired only by personal animus but by positions on public policy.)

The question of Immigration policy has of course been one of the most hotly-disputed current issues. It has inflamed people and occasioned excessive incendiary rhetoric on both sides of it. The polarization on the question has resulted in a constantly-spiraling descent in inflammatory rhetoric by both sides.  (At the risk of inspiring ire by paraphrasing POTUS’ inarticulate comments on the 2017 Charlottesville Virginia rancor, there are, in addition to good people, also bad people, on both sides of an issue.)  Certain people are deranged by this rancor.

On any issue there are discrete groups of people with contrary opinions.  On both sides one will find tiers of these groups, consisting of:

  • good people espousing rational arguments,
  • good people espousing irrational arguments,
  • bad people, and
  • evil people.

If an issue is sufficiently detached from immediate interest and impact on most people, the persons involved in expressing and effectuating an opinion on these issues will generally be only those upper tiers.  However, as the impact from it becomes more direct and significant, as well as the rhetoric surrounding it becoming more incendiary, then the lower tiers will begin emerging from the woodwork.  Then the threat of intense conflict and violence accelerates.

Wisdom and prescience are always in short supply.  The inability to accurately assess and evaluate an issue curses the vast majority of the decisions of everyone.  Therefore, maintaining flexibility and humility in formulating, expressing, and effectuating one’s opinions is of paramount importance; for the most confident anyone should be is that the contrary opinion of another may be the correct one.

Unfortunately, in the context of government, this is usually an impossible challenge.  Both historically and by theory the vast majority of decisions are decided by the will of a simple majority.  This necessarily then excludes a substantial portion of the people within its jurisdiction, and imposes a policy contrary to their opinion.  This policy will necessarily, proceeding from the decision by only a portion of imperfect persons, fail in attaining its intended objectives.

The more a government attempts to intervene in the regular activities of its citizens, the more intense will be the reaction of those who disagree with and oppose the policy.  Rancor will then result, and the tiers of bad people and evil people will swarm into the controversy.  Thus, the skinnier the agenda, the less likelihood of intervention in common activities and the inspiring of hostility by those affected.

Admittedly, Immigration policy might be a poor example upon which to base this characterization.  This policy is not only one that can only be determined and administered by a national government but is a basic function thereof — as well as one which was required to be performed not only by the current administration but by all previous ones.  Yet, if government had not intervened on many other issues that are justly outside of its jurisdiction — thereby introducing an environment of hostility and conflict — the impact and effect from the controversy on Immigration policy might have been minimal.  For the less a government causes irritation among its citizens, the less sensitive will they be to policies with which they disagree, and less susceptible to agitation by malefactors.

Thus, government structure, when conforming to this “skinny protocol”, can be envisioned as a pyramid, with the national government at the top pursuing the narrowest agenda, and downwards gradually expanding into broader agendas at lower levels, with the broadest being at the local level.  With local units that are, by chance or choice, more homogenous in their citizen composition, then even broad agendas will be unlikely to inspire hostility and conflict.

WAYNE A. SMITH
Sanilac County, Michigan USA
30 October 2018

NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW & NATURAL JUSTICE — A Theoretical Construct

[A PDF version of this post may be downloaded from here.]

[The following is the first draft of Appendix C to the Second Edition of my Interstice Amid the Fabric of Life / Volume 1 : The State of Primordial Mankind (Print on Demand edition and Nook® ePub or Kindle® ePub editions) essay.  As I will for awhile be in the process of finalizing the second edition, I provide this as preliminary notice of this addition thereto.
UPDATE:  The later version of the following, in addition to its inclusion as an appendix to the Second Edition of the aforesaid volume, is also incorporated into the text of Chapter One and Chapter Four of the succeeding volume of the essay, Volume 2 : The Nature of Mankind and Government, (Print on Demand edition, and Nook® ePub or Kindle® ePub editions.)]

These three principles are basic premises, and essential to the perspective, of this essay. Accordingly, inclusion in this edition of this discussion was deemed essential.

However, as they are the premises and perspective, it was considered that insertion of them in the text — the suggested chronological narrative of the development of civil society and its support institutions — would cause disruption in the “narrative flow”. Therefore, even though this development could only have transpired within the context of the operation of these principles, this construct is assigned to an appendix instead.


Origin and Character

When the first inhabitant appeared he was unrestricted — other than by his personal mental and physical limitations, as well as by his locality’s geographical features — in his liberty of choice.1 He was endowed with the right to select the course of his life, those means and devices to utilize in order to preserve it, the area of habitation for it, his food for survival during it, and the labor to be performed to secure those goals. These then were his Natural Rights.

Exercise of these Natural Rights though was not random. As Liberty is an active state, it entails conscious, intentional behavior. However, as all energy is finite, and particularly that available to any individual, in a natural state there must be a direction and vector for this behavior; otherwise the energy that would be utilized to enable performance will be dissipated and no longer available to that individual.2 This dissipation of energy then would restrict the capacity of the source individual in the exercise of his Natural Rights.

But such a consequence would constitute a deprivation of these Natural Rights. And the endowment of these on all persons is an axiom. Thus, since such a state is inconceivable as it would destroy the system, there must exist certain principles for the guidance and regulation in the exercise of these Natural Rights. In these principles then is the basis and substance of Natural Law.

Natural Law then consists of original, inviolable, universal principles governing and directing human conduct.3 Any violations, much less repudiation, of Natural Law necessarily leads to social decay and destruction. For as they are integral to the system, the system cannot survive without observance of them.4

Not only the inaugural inhabitant but all successive inhabitants were likewise unrestricted, endowed with these Natural Rights and subject to this Natural Law — of the same degree and equivalence, as if they had been the inaugural inhabitant. For it was the system which invested them and subjected them, and not their predecessors. Therefore it was beyond the power of any predecessor inhabitant, either individually or collectively, to alter either.

Only when contact occurred between these inhabitants did the necessity arise for mutual restriction of the scope of their liberty. And even then the degree of this restriction was only in proportion to the duration of the contact, whether temporary or permanent.

Only in community did each of the members of it voluntarily abridge their Natural Rights — and then only some of them and only to the extent necessary to remain in community. By mutual concurrence upon appropriate and necessary restrictions in response to exigencies encountered in community, gradually considering alternate solutions to each unique circumstance, uniform standards of fairness and equity were identified.5 This then was Natural Justice.

As civil society enlarged, further adjustments to practices, in order to preserve peace and order, were required. These however, since Natural Rights, Natural Law and Natural Justice existed before any inhabitant, much less community, emerged, did not and could not redefine, much less abrogate, them.

Attributes

Natural Rights
These original rights are inherent in and implicit to nature. While these rights can be codified, as they are integral to the system of life, they then need not be made explicit, and any absence of codification cannot be construed to abrogate or restrict them in any degree. None are displaced by any delegation of authority to anyone else unless possibly by explicit and unambiguous surrender.6

These original rights consist of those which are primary and secondary. Primary original rights cannot be divested, though secondary original rights, for predominant reasons and with unambiguous consent, can be potentially and partially divested. Those primary original rights, ones which cannot be divested, consist of the following:
–  life
–  self-defense
–  a domicile and shelter within its curtilage
–  food
–  performance of productive labor
Those secondary original rights, ones which can be potentially and partially divested, consist of the following:
–  movement
–  clothing
–  procreation

Natural Law
Natural Rights and Natural Law, being integral to the system, originate concurrently. However, as Natural Rights can be exercised in isolation, Natural Law, or at least a segment of it, initially remains inchoate. Yet, even if partially inchoate, Natural Law always remains present and active.

For, as already observed, mankind in its natural state were endowed with certain essential rights. When exercised in isolation, and thereby under the control of a sole individual, order is present. However, when exercised in sufficient proximity to another individual as to limit the other person’s liberty, then disorder is introduced.

This is the consequence of Natural Rights being of equivalent characteristics and with equivalent orbit in their effects when exercised. Accordingly, when an individual no longer exercises these rights in isolation, the orbit of their effect will overlap the orbit of another. But since no two properties can occupy the same space, collision between these sets of rights — even if not necessarily conflict between the individuals — is inevitable.

Accordingly, a mechanism must exist to enable order.7 Otherwise chaos would have ultimately ensued incident to this clash of orbits of Natural Rights, with all inhabitants subject to endemic war and insecurity. But entropy is not the natural state of a system, but rather is only its end, deteriorated state. Consequently, it would be impossible for disorder to be the natural state of mankind; ergo, it must be concluded that conditions promoting and constituting order were originally present. These conditions were the principles of Natural Law ensuring survival of mankind.

What is the nature of Natural Law? In analyzing it let us look at the prime Natural Right, viz, Liberty. Liberty endows each person with the right of choice. It is therefore individually-oriented, with the choices reflecting the person’s unique psychological composition. As these psychological compositions are unique, the choices of any set of various persons will then proceed in disparate directions8; ultimately they will converge on each other. These multiple and conflicting vectors though are contrary to order, the innate quality of the natural state.

Natural Rights thus require direction. Natural Law directs the proper exercise of these Natural Rights. Natural Law then is mandatory in character.

Now, what are the principles of Natural Law? Being integral to the system, these principles are not merely inviolable but fully and perfectly integrated. But Mankind’s comprehension is congenitally limited and imperfect — demonstrable not merely empirically but as Mankind is but an addition to and component of the system and therefore subordinate to it. Therefore, these principles are essentially incognizable and imperceptible.

Yet, the core principle is manifest. The function of Natural Law to institute and maintain order. Thus, the core principle is harmony. From this core are radiated the corollary principles.

Unlike Natural Law, the scope and elements of Natural Rights are known. Each person then knows he is endowed with them. Therefore, he knows that all other persons are likewise endowed with them.

In a state of harmony there is understanding of and appreciation for the conditions and circumstances of the social environment, including the knowledge of this universality of Natural Rights. They thereby are then mandated to observe respect for the Natural Rights of each other inhabitant. Respect for the Natural Rights of others then is a prime sequential mandate of Natural Law.

Nevertheless, a course of activities by one will necessarily intrude upon the course of activities by another.9 Thus, some exercises of Natural Rights by one person will necessarily infringe upon some exercise of Natural Rights by another.

This infringement, though, is in conflict with the mandated respect for the Natural Rights of others. How then to resolve this conflict? One can only do so by structuring the activities in which they engage so that these observe the Natural Rights of the other inhabitants. To do so, they are mandated to mutually cooperate with any inhabitant who is affected by any of their activities. Mutual cooperation then is another prime sequential mandate of Natural Law.

Further, if a given inhabitant is more adept and successful in accumulating resources, they are mandated to share those resources with those inhabitants who are less privileged — as the inequality between them will, to some degree, produce disharmony; the occasion and extent for this assistance, though, remains an election and exercise of choice by the more-privileged inhabitant, as he remains endowed with his Natural Right of Liberty. No inhabitant is compelled by any collective body of society to perform these acts of charity, but rather only compelled to so by Natural Law. Charity then is one more prime sequential mandate of Natural Law.

Other prime and corollary principles must exist but, not only are they beyond the ken of this writer, they are by definition not fully cognizable. Rather, only the failure to observe these principles is always cognizable; for any neglect in adhering to these principles will result in disharmony in the community — and this will be the evidence and the proof that the community is instead engaged in violation of Natural Law.

Thus, many of these principles will be discoverable only by observation of the effects in pursuing contrary principles, and not by means of a priori knowledge. These then are revealed empirically, during the process of resolution of a conflict between the apparent Natural Rights of disputant inhabitants, in determining the equitable and harmonious solution. In doing so the community then effectuates Natural Justice.

Natural Justice
Natural Justice is a standard that is constant. For the cornerstone of its precepts and its application is a respect for Natural Rights and an observance of Natural Law.10 Yet, while it does not arise out of but precedes civil society, it is a standard that remains inchoate without civil society.

Justice is the moral consequence of an unjustified act or failure to act. While it can occur in isolation — such as, for example, a person neglecting to perform some necessary labor, and rather remaining lounging somewhere, as a consequence of which a rotten tree limb falls on him, injuring or killing him — it almost invariably occurs relationally, in determining which of two acts (or failures to act) was morally justifiable and then sanctioning the person who performed unjustifiably.

Thus, justice almost invariably depends on the existence of interactions between people. And, consequently, civil society is a prerequisite for the materialization of an understanding of what justice consists. Natural Justice is the version of justice which optimally preserves Natural Rights and employs the principles of Natural Law. Just as civil society is essential for the emergence of Natural Justice, so Natural Justice is essential for the preservation of civil society. If so, then, the revealing of Natural justice is also essential.

Just as mankind is endowed with superior analytic intellectual capabilities — and the ability to make critical discernment — it is endowed with a sense of the contours of Natural Justice. A component of this sense of Natural Justice, and parallel to our superior critical capabilities, is the capacity to discern between actions and policies that are either just or unjust.

If we are able to discern actions that are just and unjust, then we likewise are endowed with the capacity to choose between them. For an element of discernment capacity is the employment, or non-employment, of that capacity — ergo, the capability of choice.

Integral to, and a component of, this choice and free will capacity, is the ability to choose evil acts. Therefore, while all mankind may be naturally endowed with a sense of righteousness, they are also subject to committing acts of unrighteousness. Thus both righteousness and unrighteousness dwell within each individual simultaneously and concurrently. Consequently, in these interactions between people there always will be some acts that are just and some that are unjust.

Moreover, there may be some corresponding actions by multiple people that are both just, but of a varying degree of justness. In these situations in particular the discernment capability is most crucial.

For it is in those complex and challenging contexts that the character and mandates of Natural Justice emerge. For Natural Justice is disclosed and defined as situations which require its explication arise.

As civil society develops and becomes more complex, the quality and extent of interactions between its members will expand and evolve. This though does not suggest that the inherent nature of Natural Justice evolves, but rather that its contours become more delineated, as well as more comprehensive. For the essential and common interactions between people have been and remain constant and omnipresent, and the lessons of Natural Justice learned from them are extrapolated to these emerging contexts in order to reveal and maintain its symmetrical contours.

In this Natural Justice effectuates Natural Law and preserves the harmony of civil society. Nevertheless, civil society will experience conundrums in its development where the unabbreviated exercise of Natural Rights interjects certain tensions in civil society. For this it will conclude that certain human-inspired rules are required. Hence, Positive Law is introduced.11

The Role of and Limitations upon
Positive Law

Introduction and Role of Positive Law
In the extended family and neighborhood stages, elementary application of Natural Justice was easily administered, since: first, the disputes were, in this sparsely-settled environment, relatively-infrequent; second, the disputants were more likely to be familiar with each other, and thus more inclined to assist in amicable resolution; third, the circumstances of the disputes were relatively-uncomplicated; and, fourth, the adjudicator could have the advantage of familiarity with the parties and circumstances.

Eventually, though, as the community emerged with its greater expanse and concentration, the volume and complexity of interactions proliferated, resulting in more disputes, the greater likelihood of minimal familiarity between the disputants and adjudicator, and increased factors for consideration in crafting a solution. In addition, the proliferation of interactions occasioned a greater intertwining of them, thereby, both in the dispute and its resolution, incidentally impacting other members of the community — injecting further factors for consideration.

Thus, the promulgation of subordinate rules to account for and prioritize these myriad factors was deemed to be of utility. Thus was introduced Positive Law.

Limitations upon Positive Law

Positive Law though is preceded by Natural Rights, Natural Law and Natural Justice. It is also an invention of human ingenuity rather than an inherent quality. It thus must be limited in its authority. Those limitations then should now be addressed.

Subordination to Natural Law
The nature and foundation of Natural Law is a foundation, a structure, albeit an intangible structure. An action either conforms to and matches the structure or it is incompatible with it.

Righteous actions and unrighteous actions thus can exist in the state of nature. If a person by his actions conforms to Natural Law, even if in ignorant of its requirements and mandates, then he may be deemed to act rightly.12

A known code of conduct, against which to measure an action, then is not required for it to be classifiable as righteous or unrighteous. Its success or failure to conform to the structure and standard of Natural Law then may be unknown — but for the stability or instability flowing from it, by which fruit it then will be known.

In the state of nature, then, an action either preserves harmony or promotes disharmony. It is the impact, or lack of impact, upon the social order then which qualifies it as righteous or unrighteous. As there is no code of conduct, there is no commendation for or penalty against the actor.

Without Natural Justice or Positive Law, then, an action will not be classified as wrong. However, since Natural Law is omnipresent, a wrong action, even if not explicitly prohibited, may still yield adverse consequences.13

Natural Justice, in determining the character of various actions, then (to analogize from quantum mechanics) collapses the question, by determining which action (or set of actions) is righteous. Yet, in a more-complex society where actions have proliferated (and necessarily then where wrong actions have also proliferated), advance guidance and classification was deemed prudent.14 Thus, Positive Law identified, and imposed penalties upon, unrighteous actions. Its function was to endeavor to codify the process and results which would have been employed and attained by Natural Justice.

While Positive Law then endeavored to perform the function of Natural Justice in a more complex and dispersed society, we should also consider its interaction with Natural Law. Natural Law provides mankind a direction toward which it must conform; and to conform, there are actions which it is directed to perform. Positive Law is not authorized — as it is inferior, being later in origin and of human invention — to conflict with or counter Natural Law. Therefore, Positive Law then is prohibitory in character.

It formally articulates the elements of unrighteous actions which Natural Justice revealed were implicitly prohibited by Natural Law. In conjunction with identifying those elements, it also imposes penalties upon the person performing these unrighteous actions. In this its prohibitory tenor is demonstrated and proven.

Positive Law then, to the extent it performs its assigned role, encompasses those actions which Natural Law implicitly prohibited. In this it parallels Natural Law, but as the analogue thereto.

But what if it does not? What if instead of promulgating the implicit prohibitions of Natural Law it conflicts with it? It would then yield an unjust society; for justice consists in what Natural Law decrees to be righteous. How then to minimize conflict between Positive Law and Natural Law?

Positive Law that mandates certain actions by individuals will obviously conflict with liberty, for it constricts the scope of choice which would otherwise be within the discretion of the individual. Positive Law that prohibits certain actions by individuals will likewise constrict liberty but, if in accordance with the strictures of Natural Law, would be a permissible restriction. Positive Law which expands prohibitions beyond those implicitly enjoined by Natural Law will, as indicated, produce injustice in the community.

Justifying an expansive application of Positive Law then is problematic. Rather, a narrow scope to Positive Law then would appear prudent — if not required. Nevertheless, certain conflicts will be expected to arise that would seem to require the attention and guidance by Positive Law; yet, the promulgators of it should be cautious in the imposition of it.

Perhaps, any Positive Law proposed for promulgation also should be deemed to be of temporary duration, to avoid both misconception of the prudence of it, and also to avoid binding descendants of the current generation to standards for which it is inapplicable in a new context. (The conundrum posed by conflicting considerations pertinent to this issue will be addressed in a succeeding sub-part.)

Finally, we began with the acknowledgment that Positive Law is of course subordinate to Natural Law. Another palliative might be a duty upon Positive Law promulgators to delineate any potential conflicts between them, enable these conflicts to be apparent to observation by the members of the polity through explicit notice thereof, and a duty to repeal any Positive Law proven by experience or manifest opposition to be in conflict with Natural Law (as well as to establish the mechanism therefor).

Restriction by Limited Government Powers
The pervasive cause of excessive, and potentially unrighteous, Positive Law is attributable to a misconception of the power of government. A crucial, if not primary, corrective to the danger of such Positive Law consists of a constant recognition of and adherence to the proper function of government. Thus, a brief summary of its role would seem to be proper.

It is the duty of civil society to both secure the Natural Rights with which its members were endowed and, in conformity with Natural Justice, resolve any conflicts arising from mutual exercise of them. As it expands, though, those conflicts become more numerous and complex, and eventually, due to the inability of its members to divert sufficient time and energy from their private obligations for the considered resolution of them, government is formed by the members of civil society. Since civil society predates government, its only authority consists of the powers delegated to it by civil society. This delegation consists of only those specifically-enumerated powers granted to it, as a recipient cannot receive, nor claim to have received, more than was given.

Thus, those powers not expressly granted to government are necessarily retained by civil society. For they cannot vanish but must repose somewhere; and as there was no active dispersion of them, civil society is the only possible repository. But these retained powers of civil society are only those granted to it by its members, so that all rights not affected by or subject to those delegated powers are likewise necessarily retained by the individuals composing civil society.15

Natural Rights, and the powers associated therewith, are bestowed on each individual at birth and as a birthright. They can only be vacated by the knowing, voluntary surrender by the individual. The surrender by any individual, or group of individuals, cannot vacate these rights of another.

Thus the powers associated with these rights are not delegated to civil society without the unanimous consent of all citizens of the polity; the withholding by even a single citizen of his consent vitiates the consent given by any (and all) other citizens. For Positive Law is obliged to retain the respect of the citizens and their voluntary compliance with it16; consequently it must eschew any unequal treatment as this would have the general tendency to diminish respect for its provisions.17 Therefore it must be uniform; excluding even one citizen from any particular prohibition requires excluding all citizens from the prohibition.

This framework then requires that the provisions of Positive Law have as limited an ambit as possible and that its effects within this ambit be as limited as possible; in the event of any legitimate doubt as to this question, then the promulgators must refrain from expanding it. Consistent therewith, Positive Law should never suffer any extension by implication; it should rather be construed as narrowly as possible.

Even with these restrictions upon it, there remains yet one more threat from it to consider. This now will be considered in the succeeding sub-part.

Restriction by Duration
We have in the preceding sub-part visited the formative stage of social order in order to define the inherent limits upon Positive Law. Still, as there remains an innate deficiency of Positive Law to consider, let us trod it again to reveal this aspect.

When civil society emerges and then government is formed, all individuals remain endowed with, and without any implied divestment of, their Natural Rights. Only explicit and voluntary surrender of them would allow divestment. But can a person, either individually or in concert, surrender their Natural Rights?

Natural Rights, being an integral component of the natural order, are inherited from Nature. If any person, much less all of the members of a polity, surrendered them it would disrupt the very foundation of the order. This then would inevitably lead to its collapse and chaos.

Still more central to the issue though is the attribute of the prime Natural Right, Liberty. Liberty is exercised affirmatively. Moreover, Natural Law obligations are mandatory in character; to adhere to them requires active engagement with the remainder of mankind, as well as nature.

A surrender of Natural Rights though would narrow the scope of actions which an individual could initiate — and thereby limit his powers. Since as to those surrendered rights and powers he could no longer be active, his respective potential now would necessarily be passive. This however is inconsistent with the character of Natural Rights and Natural Law. Thus, any purported surrender of Natural Rights must be deemed void.

Nevertheless, some limited reciprocal divestment of Natural Rights might be permissible. Once population concentration within a community attains a certain threshold a collision between the exercise of certain rights will necessarily transpire. The respective segment of the particular right being exercised by the affected members might then, voluntarily and with consent, be divested for transfer to the immediate government of these members so that it then could exercise them. This then would would avoid this segment of the right being deemed surrendered, as it would instead be affirmatively exercised by a different instrumentality.

However any such limited divestment would not survive the generation which transferred them — since these rights, including the divested segment, are the natural birthright of all people. As liberty is a birthright, divestment of the liberty naturally conferred upon posterity is impossible. Accordingly, any limited divestment not merely could not survive the extant generation but would have to be consented to by each member of the successor generation — as they cannot in advance be deprived of their birthrights.

Nevertheless even a purported explicit and voluntary divestment of any Natural Rights by an extant generation should be deemed void. An individual might divest himself of a material resource, and thus adversely impact his posterity by diminishing their inheritance. But Natural Rights are not posterity’s inheritance from their antecedents but from Nature.

Thus, any apparent divestment is subject to strict scrutiny as both to the volition of the polity who allegedly exercised it and as to its scope. For even though no individual can engage in a de jure divestment of the powers later naturally bestowed upon posterity, divestment of their own powers might have a de facto adverse effect upon these descendants.

Accretion is an inherent force of existence; dominant structures, until their demise, tend toward accumulation.18 Within an institutional structure, there is a gravitation toward power accretion. If there are a sufficient number of competing institutions, then this dynamic can be counteracted. However, if one institution attains a dominant status, then this dynamic will remain operative.

Accordingly, with this inertial force in institutional practice, disgorgement from it of purportedly-divested powers could be problematic. Thus, not only should surrender never be implied, it would be beyond the power of the polity to engage in any surrender that could divest posterity of a Natural Right. As liberty is the quintessential power bestowed thereby, divestment of posterity’s liberty is impossible.

Strict Construction
All Positive Law then should be cautiously promulgated and, if promulgated, strictly construed. The legislative function should only be employed as necessary and subject to approval by a predominant constituency, both of the legislature and the polity; it should be infrequently and narrowly exercised.

But if exercised, then it should be construed only as much as necessary to attain its initial objective and satisfy its expressed conditions. Rather, Natural Law should be unimpeded in performing its function of ameliorating disharmony in civil society, the use of Positive Law being the exception.


1 As elsewhere contrasted in this essay, liberty is the right to perform an act, while freedom is the right to not perform an act; Liberty then is active, and Freedom then is passive. In the natural state original man was not constrained in his actions by the choices of other inhabitants; only with expansion into the unitary family, extended family and community was there sufficient habitation concentration to result in inhibition and limitation of his choices. Liberty then was the natural state and freedom was only a bulwark erected later, to preserve a certain scope for his independence in choice. Thus, liberty is the prime right.
2 Admittedly this unused or misused energy will not be destroyed, but it will instead migrate to another person.
3 As they channel this conduct in particular directions, they are also restrictive in that they channel conduct from certain directions. However, as Liberty remains the prime right and it is affirmative in character, emphasis should remain on the mandatory nature, rather than prohibitory results in the application, of Natural Law.
4 In the penultimate sentence it is demonstrated that Natural Law is essential to the social order. In this sentence it is demonstrated that Natural Law is essential to the natural order: the world existed before human life; the world in that stage of existence did not expire or devolve into destruction, but rather thrived; a natural order then must have sustained the world; the natural order then must have been sustained by Natural Law; and thus Natural Law predated the social order.
5 These standards were not developed, but rather only identified. For they are not the invention of human intellect but formed by and preexisting in nature, the only function of human intellect being to discover them.
6 While potential surrender is posited here, the theoretical possibility thereof is more complex. This question will be explored later in this Appendix.
7 While Natural Rights are the birthright of every person, they do possess a latent potential toward disorder; this is not their inherent quality but only a product of misuse as the system itself tends toward entropy. The inherent quality of Natural Law is order and, when not obstructed by human intervention, thus operates in tandem with Natural Rights to maintain the integrity of these rights. Therefore the relationship between them is symbiotic, each enhancing and effectuating the other.
8 As each person is imperfect, as well as complex, his various choices will frequently themselves be of disparate quality and effect. This inconsistency will itself produce a certain degree of disorder; but it would be of relative insignificance when the person is operating in isolation. It is when the orbit of the effects of an individual’s actions intersect the orbit of another — and particularly when the orbits of multiple persons intersect — that a propensity to systemic disorder is present. (Despite the deprecation in the first two sentences of this footnote of the significance of disparate individual choices, yet, when isolation ceases, they would have the potential to exacerbate systemic disorder.)
9 Even independent of the influence of randomness, some of the vectors proceeding from a certain point will necessarily intersect some of the vectors proceeding from another point; it is impossible for all vectors from multiple points to be parallel to each other. Therefore, intrusion is an inevitable condition.
10 The term “precepts” is used here in a limited sense, as Natural Justice is applied contextually and thus is inherently relational. Consequently, a set of elaborated, prescribed rules would be an aberration as the contexts are theoretically infinite. Rather, “precepts” contemplates a certain framework for the recognition and application of Natural Justice.
11 The term “Positive Law” is appropriated from, and employed in the same sense as used by, St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae. While St. Thomas’ hierarchy of laws included numerous additional layers, only Positive Law and Natural Law are utilized herein.
12 Acting rightly may or may not yield material benefits to the actor. A direct, personal ramification is not the standard by which to determine righteousness or unrighteousness.
13 It has already been posited that Natural Law is mandatory in character; it directs all people to perform righteously; it only sanctions righteous conduct. A tacit corollary, though, is that it refuses to sanction unrighteous conduct. Therefore, there is an implicit prohibition against unrighteous conduct — even though its explicit principles remain mandatory.
14 This was deemed prudent for, as explained in the text of the essay, the members of the polity — as a result of the deluge upon the community of a profuse volume and novelty of interactions — were suffering increased alienation from the traditional methods of dispute resolution and courses of interaction; more formal tribunals were established, and the persons with whom they interacted were often no longer immediate and direct but rather were often now physically separated.
15 It is to be remembered that a right is the power to initiate or to refrain from action of some type; liberty is the power to initiate, and freedom is the power to refrain. Thus, implicit in and a component of any right is a power. Therefore, even when reference may only be made to a right, it also acknowledges the corollary power.
16 Liberty is the prime Natural Right. Compulsion is inherently anathema to it. Accordingly, for a just society, adherence to Positive Law (excluding consideration of any inveterate malefactors who, by their own actions, have excluded themselves from society) must be voluntary.
17 Different treatment of different classes of citizens could still be consistent with this principle, depending upon the structure of the government. If it is composed of multiple levels with more-extensive powers being exercised by those levels in more-direct proximity to its citizens — such as in the neighborhoods discussed in the text, where there would be greater homogeneity — then acknowledging unique classes within those discrete communities, and exercising different authority over them would not conflict with this injunction against unequal treatment — as the citizens combinations into those discrete communities would be voluntary.
18 If an area has numerous equivalent objects, they will tend to accumulate unattached-substances equally. However, if one of these objects attains an appreciably-greater size, then it will tend to accumulate a disproportionately larger share of these substances. By this,is meant the term “dominant”.

WAYNE A. SMITH
Forester Twp, Michigan USA
08 September 2018

Freedom or Liberty?

Freedom and Liberty are frequently used as interchangeable terms. In this those who do so err.

It is true that both constitute Rights. But these rights are each of a different character, with different ramifications.

Freedom is a passive state, one in which the person has the right not to be circumscribed by external duties, at least within described spheres of action. Those duties to which the individual is not subject can be either mandatory duties, viz, you shall do, or prohibitory duties, viz, you shall not do. The degree of freedom depends upon the quantity and scope of those spheres.

Liberty is an active state, one in which the person has the right to engage in certain activities, at least within described spheres of action. Any duties to which the individual is subject are ones which are only internally imposed, by the individual himself or herself. The degree of liberty depends upon the quantity and scope of those spheres.

Freedom

Freedom and Liberty can exist within the same system and be concurrently available to its member individuals. Because of their different characters, though, they are employed in different contexts and for different objectives.

Freedom is an essential right. It consists of the right to chose what not to do. For certain activities can be detrimental to the individual, either by their immediate material impact or persisting moral impact.¹

However, in comparing it with Liberty, as we shall see, it is more important for the emphasis to be upon Liberty than it is upon Freedom.

Liberty

This is demonstrable since Liberty is not only the right to choose what to do, it also consists, as with Freedom, of the right to chose what not to do. Like as with Freedom, it consists of the opportunity to determine the range of activities in which to not engage — since being compelled to engage in certain activities will obstruct the opportunity to engage in different activities of one’s choice — but also the range in which to engage.

But in what range of activities should one engage? For it is not Liberty to engage in all activities within one’s capacity.

On a reflexive level, some activities appeal to the individual and some don’t; some appeal to certain impulses, some to others. To engage in those which are anomalous to the person and to which he would have a propensity to offer resistance would be to abandon one’s identity and, perhaps, one’s own self. Thus, if one is induced by external influences, rather than one’s own character, to engage in such an activity, the result would be the loss of the person’s liberty.

However, there remains an aspect of Liberty more profoundly significant. It is in the symbiotic relationship of it with Freedom.

For we have already recognized that some activities can have a detrimental effect. These effects can be immediate or persistent. In those which are persistent does danger most lurk.

For engaging in some activities can constrain us from embarking toward other theaters of participation. If then a certain activity or activities are so preoccupying that they captivate a person, one then suffers a loss of their Liberty.

All people are endowed with a certain potential for attainment of productive objectives. The criterion then is whether a certain activity constrains or expands the exercise of the potential for successful attainment of them

While some activities liberate us by activating us toward engagement in further ones, what we choose out of liberty might instead enslave us. The question then is recognizing whether doing something particular harms or inhibits an individual, since if the answer is in the affirmative it is not the exercise of Liberty to do it.

Therefore, True Liberty is refraining from those activities, and rejecting those objectives that can restrain or inhibit us. Thus, a rejection of certain activities or objectives, and a refusal to engage or embrace them, can be Liberty in action.


¹ While the spurned activity is an election by an autonomous consciousness, the impact to be avoided may be one perceived as detrimental not to this particular individual (or at least not solely) but instead to other persons. However, if the danger is the latter, the detrimental impact would concomitantly impinge upon the range of activities otherwise available to these other persons. In this it would potentially impact both their Freedom and their Liberty. Consequently, it would seem that, in order to rigorously distinguish between these two rights, it is suggested that restricting application of Freedom to its impact upon the particular individual is more prudent.

² While the endeavor is usually of an active nature, it can occasionally be of an inactive nature.  For in appropriate situations observation or simply rest may in the aggregate yield expanded constructive attainments.

WAYNE A. SMITH
Forester Twp, Michigan USA
20 November 2017

The State of Primordial Mankind

[This is to be considered a “work in progress”. As indicated by the designation of chapters, it will be supplemented and possibly be the basis of a more-extended work. However, as its development has been in progress for awhile, it was deemed preferable to publish the initial portion, with which the writer is presently sufficiently satisfied, and then to supplement it as he becomes satisfied with the later chapters.]
[Subsequent to my posting of the above explanation, the following text has been revised and incorporated into, as well as expanded by, my Interstice Amid the Fabric of Life / Volume 1 : The State of Primordial Mankind, published in both paperback and Nook® ePub or Kindle® ePub formats. Accordingly, no further additions will be made herein to the following.]

 

INTRODUCTION

At its origin Civil Society was circumscribed and defined, but these attributes have long since dissipated.

As Civil Society developed it became less circumscribed and more complex, albeit with definitions within the complexity. Eventually though — as with all complex systems operating within every sphere of existence and experience — it was doomed to suffer deterioration. This essay is an endeavor to trace this development.

While it is possible with justification to assess that Civil Society is now spiraling into chaos, by necessity no record exists of it at the outset; therefore much of this survey must be a matter of speculation. Yet not infrequently it is possible to arrive at sound conclusions by relying upon and utilizing rational hypotheses emanating from a background of knowledge, sufficient in breadth and depth, of behavior and propensities despite the absence of verifiable data with which to pursue a deductive methodology.

The following then is consequently believed to constitute a fair, defensible outline of these processes. Civil Society emerged, evolved and metamorphosed. During this process Government emerged and interposed between the factions of Civil Society to ameliorate the consequences of friction, and itself evolved and metamorphosed. And while some benefits were yielded during these processes, neither metamorphosis now constitutes a specter to behold with anything but trepidation.

Perhaps this review will assist in identifying those attributes that should be reinvigorated or, if necessary, restored and those features which should be jettisoned.

 

CHAPTER 1

THE INCEPTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

 

Initial Habitation

Every geographical region on Earth is composed of numerous localities. The original locality is theoretically occupied first by a single individual. However, leaving aside the question of the origin of the occupation by the earliest individual, the reality of his presence would have been extinguished but for the production of progeny through the presence also of a mate; for without the production of progeny, or the presence of other persons upon whom he could have had an impact of some nature, his status would be as if he had never existed. Therefore, each inhabitable locality is necessarily populated initially by a single family.

However, unless the family produces, and becomes the core of, an extended family, it will suffer extinction; therefore, expansion of the core family is requisite. The expansion of the family requires introduction of external members by one of two methods: one, a solitary individual or individuals who voluntarily or involuntarily depart from another locality and encounter a core family; or, two, the migration of another unitary family from its own locality and its immigration into the habitat of and its fusion with the core family. (These scenarios ignore the possibility of a hostile, forcible invasion by a predominantly-superior extended family or group of extended families, since the resulting displacement would require tracing the invaders’ posterity rather than that of those who were invaded.)

 

Extended Family Development

The differences in the occasion for development of the extended family betokens potential differences in whether its culture remains static or experiences mutation. In general, though, it would seem the tendency should be similar.

The solitary individual or individuals will be expected to be subject to psychological insecurity, at least to a certain degree. Even if he has certain aggressive tendencies, regardless of whether this condition resulted in his expulsion from his previous locale or provided the motivation for his voluntary departure due to vexation with a contentious environment, he nevertheless is in a state of isolation; thus, he will necessarily be susceptible to real or perceived threats. An individual or individual without these tendencies will even more be in such a state and even more be susceptible. Moreover, by virtue of being solitary, he will be in a numerically-inferior position.

Further, by virtue of the same solitary status, he is unsupported. Consequently, the capacity to secure his necessary resources and perform the essential support functions is less than that of a unitary family. Thus, he will be expected to be subject also to material insecurity.

Consequently, the normal tendency will be for him to be susceptible to and subscribe to the culture, mores and support of the inhabiting family. For by doing so he will escape those insecurities.

While not as consequential, it would seem an immigrating unitary family will tend to be subject to the same influences. Their wandering and consequent lack of a home locale will engender a similar sense of psychological insecurity, though offset somewhat by the recognition of being supported by the other family members; contrariwise, if each member of the immigrating unitary family exhibited this sense, then it could reinforce that of each other and thereby magnify the group insecurity. Confrontation by a residential family could accentuate such a sense, as the latter might be more apprehensive of the immigration of a unitary family than by an individual, express a greater degree of hostility (or, at least, a less degree of receptiveness), and thereby induce a reciprocal anxiety and trepidation.

By virtue of being a unitary family, it would have a presumptive capacity equivalent to that of the residential family to exploit the resources of the locality. However, due to its lack of equivalent familiarity with the nature or location of those resources, the residential family would still prevail in this regard. The level of confidence then would reside with the latter rather than the strangers.

Further, as the residential family might have already experienced the immigration of an individual or individuals and the absorption of it or them therein (though, by definition, this would be the residential family’s first encounter with a unitary family), the residential family might well be more numerical than the migrating family and thereby impose a defensive posture upon the latter. Therefore, similar to the immigrating individual, the new unitary family would be inclined to be submissive toward the residential family, and thereby more inclined to adopt its culture and mores.

There would be instances in which the culture and mores of the immigrating unitary family would predominate. One prominent circumstance might be if the members of the immigrating unitary family had inordinate strength and skill capabilities; this might compensate for the potential numerical superiority of the residential family. It might also have latent aggressive tendencies, which while negative for an individual’s success, could be positive for the larger family assemblage, and could allow it to prevail over the residential family. And the latter, by being sedentary, might have developed greater passive tendencies.

Accordingly, the immigrating family might have the capacity to impose its culture and mores on the residential family. But this would be as a result of force rather than suasion; and such a result would produce an intense environment that could well lead to the destruction of the new unit and its ultimate replacement in the locale by a more durable unit. Therefore, in most situations of continuity in the inhabitation of a particular locale, the general propensity would be for the residential family to enlarge, retain its original culture and mores, and, by protraction, reinforce and perpetuate them.

 

Geographical Expansion

Initially, the flora and fauna in the locality should be sufficient to support the residential family, and, in fact, may flourish and increase. As the family expands, it necessarily initiates the depletion of both flora and fauna resources in the primary locality, though for awhile it may remain in equilibrium with the extended family. Eventually, though, the degree of depletion will be insufficient to support all members of the extended family. Consequently, its geographical range, through the expansion of the periphery of the extended family, then will radiate into a contiguous locality.

The rapidity of this expansion is a function of the wealth of resources in the appended localities, the velocity thereof being in inverse proportion to the volume of those resources. In the event of substantial resources, there is a propensity toward greater extended family density due to the availability thereof. In the event of inadequate resources, there is a propensity toward dispersion into further additional localities.

These expansions then are the result of two (2) factors: one, the physical need for sustenance and materials for shelter from the elements; and, two, an intellectual disposition to investigate and explore. All species have an inclination to utilize the unique capacities with which they are endowed, as these are features with which they are innately familiar, have experienced success in employing, and therefore are motivated to exercise. As mankind is endowed with greater mental capacities than other species, there is an enhanced propensity to utilize this capacity. Thus, curiosity alone would motivate their investigation and exploration of further localities and of what they might consist. This conclusion that primary mankind is endowed with innate curiosity is demonstrable, with his exploration of and expansion into these contiguous localities being just one indicator thereof.

Moreover, the extended family has become accustomed to, and developed habitual practices of, investigation, even if albeit of a rudimentary rather than systematic character. Thereby is its disposition to investigate and explore reinforced; for the influence of an inherent quality can be supplemented by a parallel cultural trait, and thereby enhanced. These dispositions will soon become most material and crucial.

For this expansion by the extended family ultimately results in it advancing into contact with other unitary families or extended families. Whether the latter is a unitary family or extended family will depend upon the longevity of the unit, with both its volume and the resilience of its culture being in direct proportion to its longevity.

In the event of an extended family encountering a unitary family (and hence a unit of relatively-short longevity), there will be a tendency for the unitary family to be assimilated by the extended family, for the same reasons an individual is incorporated into a unitary family. In the event of an extended family encountering another extended family, no such dynamic is likely to operate, either initially or even after an extended duration; for by virtue of their extended family status they each will have acquired longevity and hence display resilience.

These extended families, rather than being repelled by the strange and unknown, are disposed to tentatively interact and familiarize themselves with each other; this process results in each becoming aware of differing, or the possibility of the reinforcement of their equivalent, capabilities. Either would benefit both, since differing capabilities will expand the scope of their commodities whereas equivalent capabilities will increase the volume of output. In the event of such complementariness, recognizing then their mutual self-interest through combination, these families potentially become a symbiotic community.

 

Emergence of Neighborhoods

The extended families begin cooperation by virtue of recognizing, and upon the basis of, mutual self-interest. Otherwise they may remain, except for those areas of cooperation, relatively-isolated. However, if they have or begin to develop sufficient self-identifying characteristics, they might become a neighborhood; this would not cause or betoken the elimination of all cultural or mores differences, but rather only an identity upon those cultural or mores characteristics that would be present in those instances of regular interaction.

Upon first contact it would be expected that the extended families each would establish or maintain secure perimeters for their separate territories: if the contact was by virtue of each expanding their peripheries into new localities, then the effect would be for each to arrest those perimeters at contact; whereas if the contact was by virtue of a migrating extended family encountering a residential extended family, then the former would sequester its settlement, around which it would establish its perimeter. Preliminary contact would only be through envoys, after which more general intercourse might become regular.

Inquiry by the envoys enables a preliminary assaying of similarities or complementation of cultural and mores. However, since the envoy is necessarily limited in the scope of his knowledge and the time which can be expended in observation, general intercourse is requisite for proper appreciation of the possibility of compatibility. The inherent trait of intellectual curiosity will be expected to result in such general investigation, as the members of each extended family will be aware of the presence of the other unit and will not be restrained in pursuing their own efforts simply because of the inquiries of the envoys. However, if the envoys, or one of them, are firmly convinced of patent incompatibility, then this has the capability to obstruct and even bar any general intercourse.

A determination of such incompatibility then can be expected to generate an attitude of hostility between the extended families, each (or at least one) fearing for its safety. Such an attitude likely would have the general tendency to produce conflict and the destruction or assimilation of one of those families. The prevailing extended family would generally be the most aggressive one thereof.

However, if the extended families, through these regular interactions, displayed common or complementary characteristics, then there would be a propensity for them to together form a discrete neighborhood.

 

Chapter 2

Elaboration of Neighborhood Structures

Introduction of a family into a locality, and then its growth into an extended family, has already been discussed. We concluded with recognizing the potential formation of a neighborhood from these extended families. Let us now begin to explore the nature and development of such an incipient neighborhood, its encounter with another neighborhood, and the interactions — some constructive and some destructive — between them.

Isolation Stage

Each neighborhood is initially compact and discrete. However, each will regularly experience population accretion, whether internally or from migration or both.

The usual impact from internal accretion will be to maintain the cultural homogeneity of each extended family therein, as the characteristics of each will tend to be adopted by its new members. This ought not to affect the cohesion of the neighborhood since any potential conflict due to differences between the extended families were already resolved at the time and by virtue of the formation of the neighborhood — and thus the addition of new members to one of them would not insert dissonance.

Nevertheless, the propensity to maintain cultural homogeneity will usually apply also to migration accretion as the normal tendency will be for the migrants to adopt and embrace the characteristics of the original population rather than for the latter to adopt those of the former. This is projected to proceed from two causes: one, the inertia of the original population, resulting from its longer tenure, and its inherent property of resistance to change and adaptation; and, two, the greater numerical size of the original population and the inclination of the migrants to adapt to avoid conflict.

However, there is a different dynamic in operation in the case of migration accretion than in internal accretion, or at least in the case of migrating extended families. The resident extended families already occupy the physical terrain of the neighborhood. Therefore, the migrating extended family will be required to occupy territory along and outside the current periphery, thereby also expanding the neighborhood’s periphery. By necessity this new territory would be adjacent only to one or a limited number of the resident extended families and isolated from the balance.

As noted, the migrating extended family, for many reasons, is in a less-advantageous and less-secure condition. Therefore it will normally select territory adjacent to the extended family whose culture and mores it deems most compatible. This then will potentially cause a latent disequilibrium in the median culture of the neighborhood. And in the formative years of the neighborhood, when it is composed but of a few extended families, it would seemingly have a disproportionate impact and could then lead to dissonance. Yet, since by definition there are but few extended families, the likelihood of irreconcilable discord is reduced as the heads of the extended families then have the greater opportunity for constant communication and thus the greater capacity to directly resolve any possible strife.

In either event, there will be a constant expansion of the number of members of the neighborhood and consequently of the territory occupied by it. Thus the periphery of the neighborhood will be in constant flux and constantly expanding.

This dynamic will occur in all neighborhoods. Ultimately, then, the peripheries of a neighborhood will impinge upon those of another.

Cluster Stage

At this early stage of inhabitation there will be few non-natural obstructions to a given neighborhood in its quest for additional resources. Therefore, the density within each neighborhood will be low. And, as this is but the early stage of inhabitation, the density in the locale in which a given neighborhood is located also will be low. Thus, the inertial force of the neighborhood is toward expansion. Contact then with other neighborhoods is consequently inevitable.

These neighborhoods to which a neighborhood eventually would become adjacent might be ones which display minimally-varying, or might instead display radically-differing, culture and mores. It is indisputable, though, that they will vary and be different.

However, because of the low density in the locale and within each neighborhood, they need not impinge upon each other nor initiate intercourse — even though there accordingly would be minimal obstruction to infiltration into these adjacent neighborhoods. Therefore, there will be minimal perception of challenges or threats to a neighborhood by one in proximity to it even if their respective culture and mores are radically different.

Still, because these neighborhoods would be contiguous, various interaction between them, by virtue of, and upon the basis of, mutual self-interest would be present. This would occur despite the existence of those differing culture and mores that are observable in cases of regular interaction; other differences would abide but would not be revealed in the course of common interaction, and thus would be isolated from corruption and rather preserved. Rather, curiosity being an inherent trait, the interaction would be enhanced because of these differences, as the members would each be stimulated to explore these differences. The existence and maintenance of these differences then would not only not inhibit but would intensify these interactions.

The existence and maintenance of these differences would yield a further benefit. Recognizing their distinctness would imply the value thereof. This should then result in an enhanced self-esteem of the respective members. Such then would lead to greater psychological self-confidence. And such self-confidence would enable greater interaction with other families and neighborhoods, including those, who by definition, would display differing characteristics. All of these factors would reinforce and perpetuate the distinctive culture and mores of each.

As the neighborhoods increase in population density, there would be proliferation of the variety of skills that could be employed in each neighborhood. Further population density would result in specialization within each of those skills. However, in the primitive stage of development, the absence of technological sophistication — technology being used here in its broadest sense, including learning how to start fire with sparks or friction, sharpening stone to form an ax head, identification of edible flora, and the like — would impose a limit on the extent of specialization. Rather, the advance in specialization would be gradual, with each development reaching a plateau at which it would repose for an extended period until a new technological introduction would allow it to advance to a new prolonged plateau.

Thus, during this primordial state, there would eventually be intense, or even fierce, competition between the contiguous neighborhoods due to these conflicting and limited skills. As only limited production from each’s efforts was possible in this primeval state, the resources available would be limited and the relationships between the neighborhoods would be inimical. Disputes would be constant and numerous, and mechanisms to resolve them or propitiate the participants necessary.

Yet the neighborhoods would still be of a limited geographical breadth as well as formed of a limited number of extended families. The most influential extended family in each, and the head thereof, would be known to the other, or at least known by the head of the leading family of each. Therefore, contact, communication and discussion between them would be without complication. Since these competitions and disputes would be adverse to their interests, these extended family heads would form an informal council, to meet sporadically or regularly (depending upon the size and extent of their neighborhoods), to resolve these disputes and eventually set policies to minimize or avoid them in the future.

If this council was successful in these efforts, then a Community of these neighborhoods might be formed. Such a community would not necessarily result in a blending of the culture and mores of the neighborhoods. Rather, since they would be liberated, to a greater or lesser extent, from disputes and animosity between them, they would be free from external aggravation and free to focus internally.

A peaceful relationship between the neighborhoods in the community would tend to result in an enlargement thereof as resources on contests between them would be redirected toward more constructive use, and thus a more attractive locality within which to reside; regardless, the peaceful environment would encourage, or at least eliminate an obstruction, to the greater integration of the community. Thus, an evolution of the council into a formal governmental structure, consisting of separate dispute resolution and policy making bodies, might transpire; such an evolution would be expected to normally occur since any body once formed tends to be possessed of an expectation that it has functions to perform and an obligation to deliberate upon the institution of additional mechanisms to perform those functions.

Eventually, perhaps as a consequence of the elimination of strife as a distraction, technological sophistication would proceed to a “takeoff point” where periodic prolonged plateaus would no longer be necessary or occur. The types and quantities of improvements would proliferate on a geometric basis. Further, as a result thereof, the resources available to the community, and each of the neighborhoods thereof, would likewise proportionately magnify.

As a consequence the conflict between the neighborhoods would diminish, as each (or the majority) of the families would have virtually sole recourse to their own specialized technology, and derivatively greater household resources. Conflicts likely would persist for the most affluent extended families, with each head thereof seeking prestige from his material acquisitions, but these would seem to be beyond the purview of the conflict resolution or policy making mechanisms, would be of little moment to the vast majority of families, and would be resolved again on a bilateral basis. Thus, many of the mechanisms for resolving conflict might be capable of being abandoned and the governmental structure shrunk.

We have in brief considered the development of a neighborhood, its encounter with another neighborhood, and some of the impacts upon and consequences to each as a consequence. Now it is appropriate to explore further neighborhood interaction and possibly consider a different focus.

 

Chapter 3

A Macrocosm Perspective:

Cooperation and Conflict between Neighborhoods

Treatment has been given to neighborhood formation and development, focusing on the microcosms of neighborhoods. These developments though did not occur within a vacuum, but rather as but one component of activity within the larger framework of an entire region. Thus, since those neighborhoods would be impacted by parallel activity within the region, it is necessary now to embrace a broader vista, from a macrocosm perspective.

Cooperation or Conflict are the polar dynamics for interaction between neighborhoods in contact.¹ The direction to be adopted by these neighborhoods will be a function of their respective cultures, resource environment, and neighborhood mores.

Cultures / Diversity or Homogeneity

The peripheries of contiguous neighborhoods will necessarily ultimately experience collision. And because of the likelihood of clash between the cultures of each, there will be a likelihood also of conflict. Nevertheless, after the initial collision, as a consequence of the separation in distance of each periphery from its core, there will be a propensity of these contiguous peripheries to homogenize. This will be the usual result regardless of whether there has been homogeneity between a periphery and its respective core. Thus, viewed solely from the perspective of the peripheries, there exists a dynamic toward reduction of cultural diversity.

Restricted Geographical Region

However, this dynamic would preponderate only in a region that is constrained and confined by peculiar geography. Because of those constraints, only a limited number of neighborhoods would be possible and their separate origin generally would have developed in relative close proximity to each other. As a consequence there would exist a tendency for parallel cultural development and a narrower diversity range.

In addition, as the region would be limited in size, it would also, except for extraordinary circumstances, be limited in resources also. Consequently, the earlier-noted potential for radical cultural adaptation due to enhanced, and aggressive, migration accretion would be minimized. Due to both of these factors there would remain a predilection to stability, both in cultures and cooperation.

Open Geographical Region

In a region of greater geographical expanse, there would be a greater likelihood of neighborhoods developing with sufficient separation between each other. In addition, because of this greater expanse, there would exist the potential for a constant increase in the number of independent neighborhoods being developed. Both factors would enhance the possibility of broader cultural diversity.

A possibility would exist for at least some of these neighborhoods being developed without great separation between them. Yet, as each neighborhood expanded, there would be a necessary greater demand upon the resources available to it. When the resources would become too scare for the population of the neighborhood, then there would occur emigration of some of the families from it to new areas. And, as the scarcity of resources was the catalyst, there would be a predilection for the emigrants to locate themselves at a sufficient distance from any other neighborhood by utilization of the unoccupied expanses, thus also being a propulsion toward exploiting and realization of this potential for a proportionately larger number of neighborhoods.

Admittedly, the potential for homogenization when neighborhood peripheries collide would still be present. But inherent in the larger volume of neighborhoods is also the necessary corollary of a larger volume of neighborhood cores. And as the cores are intrinsically separate from each other core, there would be minimal external forces toward adaptation. Therefore, since a constant increase in the number of neighborhoods would yield also a constant increase in the number of cores, there would result both a greater variety of different cultures, these being maintained within each additional core, and the maintenance of the diversity of these different characteristics.

Resource Environment

The effect of the scarcity or abundance of resources has been briefly mentioned. It should now be more fully considered to identify any possible aberrations from this effect.

If a particular neighborhood was rich in resources, it could experience a dramatic migrant accretion, thus reversing the inclination toward cultural inertia. This could proceed from the expectation of the enhanced aggressiveness of the migrants, due to their avidity for these resources, and the corresponding greater numerical volume thereof. Thus, the homogenizing influence from the original population — or, stated differently, the strength of the inertia effect — will be in inverse proportion to the volume of the migrant accretion or the enhanced radius of the neighborhood due to this accretion.

Nevertheless it would seem that such a scenario would only likely develop if the resources of the neighborhood were uniquely rich, relative to those of the contiguous localities. For in this primordial state where there is low density of inhabitation, any locality would tend to have sufficient resources for one or a few extended families. The incentive then for aggressive migration would be minimal.

In the unusual event of any undue scarcity, this would result in migration, with the migrating individual or family, who would be subject to the aforedescribed dynamics, being in a passive posture. Accordingly, the norm for the aggressiveness of these immigrants or emigrants would usually be inconsequential.

Avidity for the resources of another, then, would require either a more-advanced state of development or a patently-demonstrable substantial disparity in resource allocation. One or the other is a precondition for greed.

Absent one of those conditions, any desire by the migrating famil(ies) for the enhancement of their current resources would present two conflicting factors: their coveting of the resources of another; and the abhorrence of potential destruction, given their (by definition) inferior power, and hence aversion to conflict. This being so, it is to be expected that in the usual context the latter consideration would be of greater weight than the former, and that the migrating family(ies) will experience cultural assimilation.

From this we can conclude, then, that as long as the aggregate resources within and between localities remained of a sufficient volume to satisfy the necessities of the various neighborhoods, then the dynamics toward cultural diversity would continue to exert their influence. However, once these aggregate resources became sufficiently depleted or the population too large for them, then a clash of the cultures would unavoidably ensue. Such a clash would result in the destruction of some of these cultures or at least a radical reduction in their strength. Also, as history demonstrates, once cultures clash there is a lamentable tendency for each to adapt to, and often incorporate the worst characteristics of, the other. From both influences there would now be a potential for diversity to suffer.

There seem to be some conclusions that could be deduced from the foregoing. Since a restricted geographical expanse would seem, at least initially, to be an anomalous environment, there would be default tendencies toward:

  • conscious efforts toward segregation of the neighborhood from those in proximity
  • increased inhabitant density of the neighborhood as a consequence of the segregation policy
  • an above normative level of cultural disputes
  • a below normative level of economic disputes
  • a below normative level of technological development
  • an above normative variety of mores structures

The grounds for those conclusions are:

  • the disparity between the cultures of the respective neighborhoods, resulting from their independent development, would motivate each neighborhood to insulate itself as much as possible from the perceived possible corruption by the other neighborhood
  • as the neighborhood would endeavor to secure an enhanced insular status, it would as much as possible avoid expansion that would result in closer proximity, thereby necessitating increased inhabitant density
  • due to the disparity in cultures, there would be an increased tendency toward cultural conflict
  • both because of their early stages of development and the effort to avoid geographical proximity, there would be reduced appropriation of or at least immediate access to the localities within which are deposited the region’s material resources
  • as there would be less interaction between the neighborhoods, technological development would not have the benefit of efforts in concert but would be independent
  • due to the below normative level of interaction, there would be less occasion or reason for adaptation of a neighborhood’s mores structure

For awhile these tendencies, particularly because of the fourth (4th) and fifth (5th) influences, would be extended in time. The differences in mores structures and above normative level of cultural disputes would reinforce the disinclination for resource exploitation and reduced economic development. Eventually, however, this persistence would dissipate.

For expansion of the neighborhood peripheries would be inevitable, as would be the necessity of utilization of an increased volume of resources. Concomitant with these circumstances would be accelerated technological development.

Accordingly, there would be resonance of these conditions with the propensity of diversity to suffer as a consequence of physical clashes between the cultures. Yet, the potential for abbreviation of cultural diversity could also be instigated by other causes. One concluding instance of those causes should now be considered.

Neighborhood Mores

During the early stages of occupation the inhabitants of each neighborhood in a region are isolated from the other neighborhoods in the region. Even after augmentation of the inhabitants of the neighborhoods they nevertheless remain in relative isolation. Therefore, their behavior, and the mores that are the foundation of this behavior, of each set of inhabitants develop independently without restriction upon or impact by the behavior or mores of proximate neighborhoods.²

As the neighborhoods expand into contact with their proximate neighborhoods, then occasion arises for critiques of the behavior and mores of one by the other. These critiques are the product of the mores of the observer being offended by what is perceived to be the aberrant behavior of those being observed. Their expression of their resentment both promulgates and reinforces their own set of mores, and has the potential to impart a reforming influence by compelling the offender to analyze and reexamine the justifiability of their set of mores and, if necessary or appropriate, the refinement and embellishment thereof.

Nevertheless, since only an accumulation of these critiques will instigate such a possible reformation — due to the effect of psychological inertia to maintain tradition and accepted norms — occasional conflict results therefrom. If the conflicts become sufficiently frequent or contentious, then the neighborhoods are induced, as alluded to in the preceding chapter, to form a council composed of the heads of the largest families to resolve these conflicts. Thereafter, of which brief allusion has likewise been earlier made, further elaboration thereof would be expected to occur.

Those anticipated developments are then to be treated in the next chapter.


¹ While this contact is usually due to, and almost always requires, intimate physical proximity, there theoretically could be a significant geographical distance or obstacle between them if there nevertheless is sufficient functional interaction.

² Mores refers to a unified set of group values, manifested by their interactive, group behavior. In contrast, Culture refers to a compounded set of overt behaviors, combining a variety of solitary behaviors.

 

WAYNE A. SMITH
Forester Twp, Michigan USA
28 September 2017

Social Order — The Counter-Majoritarian Influence

Assailing government as abusive and hostile to the civil society for which it is responsible is not infrequently countered by an assertion that the government is us. This assertion is understood to suggest that the critic ought not to figuratively (or literally) topple government by reviling its essence and deeming it a counterpoint to civil society, but rather satisfying himself with only calibrating its contemporary machinery; for it seems the premise is  that the government is not the enemy, and no presumption should exist that its restrictions or imperatives should be viewed with suspicion or skepticism. With this assertion I am unable to concur.

At least three (3) reasons seem to suggest this conception is without rational support. These can be categorized as follows:

I.  “Government as Us” — The Threshold for Tyranny

First, the oppression of the body polity is a necessary consequence of such a conception. Preliminary to the discussion of the basis for this danger, an explication of the evolution and nature of the body polity ought first be examined. However, as the writer is in the process of gradually developing this thesis, the reader’s indulgence, in permitting later reference thereto as an introduction to the following, is requested. Presently, the writer will address only the state of

Civil Society and Government in Unpeaceful Coexistence

In any community there exist two (2) levels: civil society; and the government which is a creature of it.  Civil society, though, encompasses every facet and component of the activities of the lives of the persons of which it consists — civil society then being vast,  touching all elements of those lives and activities within the geographical boundaries constituting its periphery, and being inseparable from those component lives. These activities, while not technically infinite, are innumerable, consisting of every minor and major solitary action of each person as well as each minor and major interaction they might have with a constantly-varying ensemble on a daily, weekly and annual basis.

Thus, if government is us, viz, civil society, then it would follow that it should be parallel- engaged in every detail of the solitary thoughts and activities of each, and the interaction between every, member of the polity; for, if civil society is not independent and the primary forum for interaction, but rather subordinate or even tangential to a paramount influence upon the polity from government, then must it not mean government is integral and inextricable? But is not this then the very definition of Tyranny?

Such a scenario of course introduces an additional tension. The greater the scope or volume of social interaction that is impacted or regulated by government, the greater the stake in the government of the various power centers; for, in any civil society no matter how primitive or complex, there is a necessary differential in power between self-identifying sets of its members (or, at least, until the theoretical arrival of the state of entropy at the “end of history”) — as constant exact equality of power is impossible to either attain or maintain. And the greater the stake, the greater the propensity of the stakeholder to insert itself into governmental determinations and outcomes — as the greater the level of its power, the more the interest of the stakeholder is impacted by governmental operations. And the more frequent and the more intense the insertion of the stakeholder into governmental determinations and outcomes, the greater the likelihood of corruption of government thereby.

This corruption occurs in two (2) forms and senses: one, the common sense of moral contamination through favors of some sort from a power center; but also, two, the disruption of and diversion from what would have been the prescribed functioning, as measured either by process or outcome, of the governmental personnel or agency. In either sense, though, there will have been a deviation of the focus of its functions and operations toward a subset or subsets of the civil society. Thereby, will the other sets thereof be neglected and, by definition, consequently oppressed.

II.  The Breadth of Civil Society Inherently Inhibits and Restricts Governmental Competence

Second, if we do not view government as essentially isolated from, but rather coexistent with and integrated into the social structure, then it would follow — as above discussed — that it would be expected, if not explicitly sanctioned, to express judgment or opinion, either imperative or precatory, on all aspects of these interactions. But in that event its magistracy would have to be both as numerous and intensely knowledgeable as the number of members of the society. But this, by definition, is impossible.

If the magistracy was of this numerical extent, then it would consist of all members of the polity, and the civil society would be wholly subsumed within and virtually abolished by the government. But government is a creature of civil society and instituted to perform functions of which civil society is incapable of efficiently or expeditiously performing on its own. It then would not only have exceeded its mandate but destroyed the very reason and justification for its existence.

It then must be concluded that preservation of the rationale for government’s existence necessitates some restriction upon and confinement in the growth of its magistracy. In that event, though, this limit on the number of magistrates will likewise limit both its capacity and expertise in the regulation of the full scope of activities of the members of its polity. Instead, its capacity and expertise will be properly confined only to influence or regulate those activities of members that affect, or the impact upon them by, persons with whom they are not in direct contact1 — the original rationale for the creation of a government.

Thus, both by physical principles and to adhere to the purpose for its creation, the competence of government is innately limited and incapable of being treated as other than a subset of “us”.

III.  The Consensus vs Competition Principles

Third, and most significant, a civil society does (or at least should) operate on the consensus principle. Government however operates upon the majority principle. By nature, they then are wholly inconsistent with and hostile to each other. This alone renders one the opponent, rather than the associate or counterpart, of the other.

Mankind first congregated in civil society from, and to enhance and serve, mutual self-interest. Such an objective by definition requires and involves complementary interaction between those in direct contact with each other; if not then their respective actions would be in conflict and therefore not to their mutual self-interest. With complementary interaction, the actions of each benefit both. To determine how these actions will generate mutual benefit, each must express to the other which result is in their primary interest — or, rather, which of their primary interests will not conflict with a primary interest of the other. Thus, this necessitates consensus by both on which of those interests are least in conflict and the particular action that will attain realization of the respective harmonious interests.

If consensus failed, or perhaps even antagonism developed between these participants, then mutual self-interest would dissolve. As this was the reason for the formation of civil society, then as a result it would itself commence disintegration. Ergo, consensus is the operative principle of civil society.

Ideally, government would operate likewise. However, except for the occasional imposition of super-majorities, history and experience demonstrate that legislative and judicial decision-making operate upon the majority principle.2 For how else could it? While unanimity might be ideal, except in a exceedingly-small body of members — an option possible only for a equivalently-small body politic (though this factor might well be deemed to constitute evidence of the superior benefits of a smaller, rather than a larger, community) — requiring unanimity would paralyze the operations of such a council, as it would provide each member a veto on any action by the balance of the members.

Thus, to avoid this prospect and to enable the law-making or law-adjudicating body to perform whatever functions are legitimately within its purview — the performance of this function being the reason for its creation and, thus, also the very justification for its continued existence — they traditionally and generally operate upon a majority rule principle. Such a principle, though, necessarily excludes, at least in part, the interests or preferences of a portion, and sometimes a substantial portion, of its body politic.

For expedience, as well as the means to implement policies that benefit the interests and preferences of the larger portion of its body politic, such a principle is generally the better operative principle. Nevertheless, it further belies the claim that Government is Us.


1 These persons may be either internal to – as a result of, in a geographically-extensive community, being substantially removed from the respective members – or external from, the body politic.

2 Philosophically, it is possible to categorize only the executive functions as the government, whereas the legislative functions are the expression of the sovereign body politic and the judicial functions the exercise of immutable logic operating on eternal truths and positive law. Employing such a categorization should enable more comprehensive and incisive analysis of the within issues. However, a full exploration would unduly expand this discussion and is best deferred for separate consideration.

 

WAYNE A. SMITH
Forester Twp, Michigan USA
15 April 2017

A Well-Armed and Well-Regulated Militia as a Mechanism for Gauging the Presence of Tyranny

Certain semiautomatic rifles, particularly the AR-15 and similar configurations, have been characterized by some as “weapons of war”. Since there are significant differences between the AR-15 and M16, particularly in the modes and rate of fire, it is well-known the characterization is inaccurate.

However, given the similarity in general design, including its ability to accept a high-capacity magazine, let us for the moment accept the designation as a “weapon of war”.  Does this then disqualify it for civilian ownership?

Preceding posts have sufficiently demonstrated, it is believed, that a large block of civilians in this country are compelled, in certain exigent circumstances, to provide military-type services to the country or their State in their capacity as members of the unorganized militia — or at least be available and prepared to do so.  By definition, then, would they not be engaged in war-type activities?  And, if so, should they not then be experienced in and have available a “weapon of war”?  How then can they be proscribed from ownership of and familiarity with such a weapon?

Moreover, the statutory prescription of potential militia service is parallel to the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment.  While historically and contemporaneously there have been continued conflicting interpretations of the purpose and scope of the amendment, there can be no dispute it includes two (2) clauses and that at a minimum the right to keep and bear arms was to enable the people to perform militia service.  Now, by both historical and legal definition, the performance of militia service was engagement, as the circumstances might require, in paramilitary and military service.  How then is the keeping and bearing of a “weapon of war” incompatible with this capacity?  Rather, does not this capacity instead require it?

One might also analyze the question from the perspective of the purpose of a militia.  It is beyond cavil that a militia was considered more harmonious with liberty, in contrast with the greater threat to liberty that was posed by a standing army.  While not as universally accepted, there was also an understanding that a militia could potentially act as a bulwark against a standing army controlled by persons with objectives in conflict with those of the larger — or, at least, a sufficiently substantial — body of the people.

Certain critics have cast scorn on the continued viability of this function, given the geometrically-superior firepower of the country’s military forces. How can, they say, a militia equipped with AR-15s and sidearms realistically oppose a standing army with, inter alia, M16s, tanks, fighter aircraft and bombers?  This however overlooks a singularly perceptive observation (or, at least, its corollary) from our Declaration of Independence.  It is tendered that this provides the mechanism which preserves and proves the viability of such a resistance — albeit one that hopefully will never be required.

Mr. Jefferson noted that “[p]rudence … dictate[d] that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.”  Thus, even if evils are being perpetrated, they are likely to be borne by the greater body of the populace if they are not excessive and egregious.  Any rebellion by an insignificant body of the populace then allows, if not compels, a conclusion that the causes of the outrage are sufferable.

What then is the conclusion that is allowed, if not compelled, when a significant body of the populace engages in some form of insurrection?  It is tendered that it should be deemed then that these evils have now become magnified into ones which are excessive and egregious.  And it seems Mr. Jefferson concurs, as he further states that in such an instance of “… a long train of abuses and usurpations … evinc[ing] a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.”

Let us then suppose that just Five percent (5%) of the population between 15 and 54 years of age deemed themselves outraged by a “long train of abuses and usurpations”.  Nay, instead of more than 8,500,000 citizens, let us suppose that but One percent (1%) resolved to resist what they deemed despotism.  What is conceived to be the likely reaction of the U.S. military forces to a civilian force of more than 1,700,000 citizens?  Would they likely view with equanimity the slaughtering of such a large body of their fellow citizens, deeming it to be consistent with morals and the law?  Wouldn’t they instead be likely to conclude that the perceived grievances of their fellow citizens had become, consistent with Mr. Jefferson’s formula, “insufferable” and due to excessive and egregious “abuses and usurpations”?

It is tendered that out of natural and innate morality — much less and regardless of any concern for their potential jeopardy as a consequence of possible commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity — these military forces would conclude that the actions inspiring such resistance, as well as any orders to overcome such resistance, were patently illegal, and therefore would themselves resist.

It would be impossible of course to reduce to mathematical certainty what proportion of the citizenry would be required for an observer to conclude that resistance was legal rather than illegal.  Suffice it to say that there would be sufficient parameters, when viewed in the context also of any surrounding relevant circumstances, to allow a resistance by a substantial body of the citizenry to be cause for concluding the resistance was justified.  And upon a determination of such justification would instead eliminate the despotism that caused the resistance.

Consequently, a citizenry keeping and bearing arms sufficient to cause a suspension of exertion of force against them, in order to allow an assessment whether their actions were rather justified, demonstrates that the existence and interposition of a militia remains a viable mechanism for resistance to potential despotism.  And the keeping and bearing of arms compatible and consistent with their function as a militia continues to be an essential right.

WAYNE A. SMITH
Forester Twp, Michigan USA
04 July 2016

Religious Liberty vs Civil Rights

The confrontation between proponents of and conflict between putative religious liberty and asserted civil rights has of course been the subject of much recent commentary. It would appear to me though that many of the commentators overlook at least one crucial element in their analysis.

To me one obvious element, which has already been the subject of comment by some, is whether the action by a person asserting the right to religious liberty consists of a form of creative expression rather than the provision of a fungible product. If the former, then an external compulsion to perform constitutes more of an, if not an egregious, interference with their personal liberty; this conclusion proceeds from the recognition that the coerced performer is engaged in customized activity that succeeds and is pursuant to, and arguably restricted by, the demand of the requester. In the latter situation, however, the provider has performed the activity preceding the request for supply thereof, and thus any compulsion to supply it cannot, by definition, restrict or affect activity already performed.

I though have chosen to utilize instead the criteria of whether the performance constituted some form of personal service, the law having long recognized that personal service contracts occupy a unique niche and are subject to different rules of contract. In either event what would be entailed is a person performing an activity that was special, rather than general, and thus possibly deemed constituting or implying a conscious and intentional ratification of the object and product of the activity. Other than for practical reasons, no person in a free society can be compelled to perform any action of any type; they might possibly be properly prohibited from performing certain types of actions. But the power to mandate actions of particular types, much less being compelled to engage in approbation of the principles of another, is the indicia of a tyranny.

However it now occurs to me there is another element that might even better clarify as well as be dispositive of the issue. And this would be whether the person is differentiating based upon the attributes of another or instead the activity or behavior in which they are engaged. This could be deemed parallel to the well-recognized sociological dichotomy of Status and Role.

Most service providers who object to certain activity do not resist based upon only the attributes of the requester; in such a context, since the status of the requester is only a passive element, it is only the provider’s behavior which is in question in this situation — and this therefore does not impinge on the provider’s liberty. But in the context of the activity or behavior in which they are engaged, since it is the requester’s behavior to which the provider is responding, compelling their support of it amounts in effect to participation and ratification — and this therefore does impinge on the actor’s liberty.

Is this a distinction without meaning? I tender the answer is No, it is a significant distinction. The wrong that is the gravamen of the conflict is excessive integration between the sphere of action of one person and the sphere of action of another. If the participants mutually choose to allow these spheres to intersect, then there can be no offense. But the body politic should be encumbered with the obligation to maintain separation between these spheres as much as practicable. Conflicts though are engendered and become onerous when the polity seeks to excessively enunciate and impose certain standards and modes of action that it deems principled and moral. Might not then the proper foundation of the body politic be amorality, doing neither bad nor good but only approving and enforcing policies that are quantitatively, rather than qualitatively, beneficial.

WAYNE A. SMITH
Forester Twp, Michigan USA
04 Oct 2015

 

“Right (or Wrong) Side” of History? — Part I

Two of the most overused, misused and abused phrases currently in vogue are “common sense” and the “wrong (or right) side of history”. Both phrases, while possibly innately innocuous, are now used in contexts that render them malignant.

While Common Sense is now usually being used to imply a solution or answer that ought to be obviously correct, still one person’s Common Sense is another person’s sophistry. Worse though is the aspersion that a person who does not perceive the obvious truth of a solution must be stupid, immoral or corrupt, or a combination of these faults. Consequently, while proposing solutions dictated by Common Sense is ostensibly for the purpose of optimizing the volume of support, it tends to incite conflict rather than collaboration.  Thus it is most clearly not common sense to employ a rationale of Common Sense in an effort to persuade adoption of one’s position.

While perhaps not as irritating, the “wrong (or right) side of history” phrase possesses the potential of — and can be anticipated to almost always inflict — the vastly-greater pernicious effect. For, first, it implies an innate certainty: a present development or condition (either conceptual or tangible) linked in a direct relationship to an overt inevitability. Moreover, second, it is subject to a fatal defect and error: it assumes the progress (a word itself perceived to be endowed with a subjective sense that is questionable) of history is consistent, continuous and positive — despite the evidence that the vector of much, if not most, change is in a negative direction. If historical change results in deterioration, do we really want to be on the side of corruption?

The proper mechanics for analysis is not a prognostication of the misty course of future events, isolated from their meritorious significance. Rather it should consist of an analysis of the virtue and value of an outcome, and whether it then is a sufficient improvement justifying a conscious and persistent effort to attain it, not simply a condition projected to occur in the absence of any effort to obstruct it or substitute another outcome for it. Might it not then be a reasonable proposition that: If an outcome does not require a conscious, intentional and exacting design, implemented by substantial effort, to attain it, then it generally should be avoided and prevented? For, if a condition develops in the natural course without deliberate guidance — a state that might be properly designated as accidental, not purposeful — can it not generally be concluded that it proceeds from sloth, obtuseness, cupidity, corruption, or another like baser human instinct?

I would respectfully tender that numerous examples, parallel metaphors and extrapolations abound to support this harsh assessment of our fecklessness in prescience of history’s direction, and the superiority of using righteousness instead as the guide. I will however reserve addressing these for Part II of this essay.

WAYNE A. SMITH
Forester Twp, Michigan USA
11 May 2015