Creeping Totalitarianism — We Must be Constantly Alert!

 In various writings the author has observed the dangers of corruption through immersion in too broad a scope of alien influences. Infection from those influences through osmosis is a natural threat. (For just one reference in Holy Scripture of this warning see Psalm 125:3.)

While this country was neither quarantined nor imbued with sterling purity prior to World War II, its projection into Europe resulted in a gradual unconscious assimilation of some of those attitudes and traditions. While possibly only peripheral, some of those attitudes include those which spawned the Sturm Abeilung, Schutzstaffel, and Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti.

Alert observers have recognized the unconscious — and, perhaps, even conscious — incorporation of certain of those proclivities into American structures and policies over the last seventy-five (75) years. A recent example is an instance of which I learned from a recent article.

A perusal of this article reveals a new and expanded policy expounded in a Federal Bureau of Investigation internal memorandum.

Its implications are incredible, and tend to bespeak a terrifying image of those Nazi Germany and Soviet Union agencies.

Little more can be added by me than the observations in the article. I then only post this to enable a possible further dissemination and awareness of them.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
10 August 2022

Reflections on The Lord’s Prayer

As is usual for me, I include the recitation of The Lord’s Prayer while saying grace before my midday meal. Included in the prayer process was my reflection on what I had done, as well as what more I should have done, earlier this, and for the balance of the, day.

I thus had occasion to further reflect on the injunctions of the prayer. This article will constitute some of those reflections.

My version of the prayer is the Protestant version, to wit:

Our Father who art in heaven,
hallowed be thy name.
Thy kingdom come.
Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven.
Give us this day our daily bread,
and forgive us our debts,
as we forgive our debtors.
and lead us not into temptation,
but deliver us from evil.
For thine is the kingdom,
and the power,
and the glory, forever.

Though not fully the chronological process of my reflections, it might assist in separately considering each of these passages. Hence these are grouped and considered as follows:

Our Father who art in heaven,
hallowed be thy name.
Thy kingdom come.
Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven.

For thine is the kingdom,
and the power,
and the glory, forever.

These passages distinguish between the divine realm and the secular realm. Moreover they emphasize the surpassing superiority and dominance of the former over the latter, in holiness and virtue as well as in power.

While the kingdom of God is eternal and dominates all, God’s will is not yet “done on earth”; rather, what is done on earth now is corruption and constantly accelerating decay. When God’s kingdom does come, then his divine will will triumph over and terminate the decay and then abolish the corruption with which we are now afflicted.

Give us this day our daily bread,

Most of us are imbued with a belief in entitlement to a vast panoply of blessings, many, if not most, of which we do not need. But, being invested with minimal power over our conditions, we are thereby precluded from possessing the capacity to secure the benefits of all of the blessings for which we aspire. We therefore should be ever attentive to and thankful for the blessings that we do receive. For we are often too oblivious to those blessings that we regularly enjoy.

and forgive us our debts,
as we forgive our debtors.

Corresponding to our self-absorption in what we do not possess is self-absorption in the perceived injuries afflicted on us by others. Rather we tend to forget or overlook those injuries our action or inaction has caused. In both cases of self-absorption we display our lack of humility. We instead must incorporate a constant awareness of our proclivity to error and selfishness. While obsessing excessively on any particular error or set of errors is destructive — by diverting our mental energy and capacities from positive action — engrafted acknowledgment of our propensity to error promotes our humility, and avoids our overconfidence, in the choices presented to us; thereby are we cautious in our consideration and selection of those choices.

and lead us not into temptation,

Scripture confirms that God does not lead us into temptation. Rather our failure to seek the strength of God to resist vice and instead pursue virtue is the cause. Succumbing to temptation can exist in many forms: it can exhibit itself in the active pursuit of vice; consist in cowering in the face of vice being perpetrated on others; and in using our time, energy, and capacities in trivial activities rather than employing them actively and industriously toward positive objectives. Regardless, we must recognize that we are but humble servants in the service of God’s mission of the realization of God’s Kingdom, recognizing God’s divine law as the inspiration and objective for all our actions.

but deliver us from evil.

While combined in the Prayer with the preceding phrase, these are two diametrically-opposite conditions. Temptation is a force we experience internally. Evil is a force that we externally encounter. Evil is not merely a concept, or an absence of righteousness, but an independent force of immense power, one that can only be subjugated by God’s surpassing power. While all are subject to being enticed by temptation, virtually all who are exposed to evil are buffeted by it, with only those most depraved being actually enticed by it. Despite its clear signs, revealing the malevolent force behind them, and the realization by most that it must be rejected and countered, only God’s strength allows effective countering.

What do these reflections teach us? Much! But perhaps the most-important lesson, at least to myself, is the implication proceeding from these reflections.

Scripture mandates our participation in social life, for the promotion of divine values by their exhibition in our own actions and the consequent encouragement of their incorporation into the actions of others. Yet our combination with society can expose us to potential contagion from corruption. In both individuals and societies at large this phenomenon has been frequently observed; while exposure to unrighteousness does not automatically cause us to adopt those precepts, our regular and repeated knowledge of them often anesthetizes us to them and provides us no excuse when we fail to resist them. There thus exists this constant tension and imminent danger.

How then to avoid, or at least minimize, the conflict within this conundrum? Perhaps the most-effective method is to minimize our exposure to the broad and encompassing programs of both large private and public associations — thereby avoiding the temptation to attempt to influence those policies — until their adverse impact on us is observed and experienced.

Once we observe and experience those adverse impacts, then we appreciate action at reformation is essential. Until then we can focus on our own efforts at the promotion and promulgation of righteousness without our time, energy, and capacities being diverted therefrom by attention instead to the action of others.

Knowledge of certain actions of others can be invaluable, when their righteous character is observed, by inspiring us to emulate them. But most actions of other do not partake of this character and thus divert us from our optimal productivity. Temptation is always present to divert us from this course, but this is when the knowledge and straighten of God is required.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
22 July 2022

Rescission of the Constitution for the United States of America — To enable better “securing the Blessings of Liberty”

[A PDF version of this article, including the footnotes thereto, may be downloaded from here.]

On November 3, 2020, I transmitted the following message to my State Senator, along with a suggested application bill:

“Subject : Article V Convention Application Bill

On this Election Day it seemed to me that perhaps the best mode for participation, given the regrettable apparent irreconcilability in our nation, would be to propose the submission by you of a Bill for a Convention of the States, pursuant to US Const, Art V.

Accordingly, I submit the attached for your consideration and potential action.”

A suggested application in generic format can be downloaded from here.

As many conceive and as the author reluctantly concurs, there then existed a “regrettable apparent irreconcilability in our nation”; this assessment was articulated by diverse voices, from across the spectrum consisting of both liberal and conservative proponents, from “elite” and from “ordinary” exponents. This irreconcilability has only been accentuated during the ensuing fifteen months.

While the polarization is between both various segments within society as well as government units of the nation, the author apprehends that the catalyst is an excessively-powerful National government. Rather than restrict itself strictly to the enumerated powers granted to it, it has expanded its reach to innumerable arenas of the liberty, and even of the freedom, of its citizens. Accordingly, the possibility of a radical restructuring of the National government should be seriously considered; by this I suggest the repeal of the Constitution for the United States of America and its replacement by a new instrument of government.

* * * * * * *

The evolution of the settlement of our Nation essentially followed the historical course of community formation. Initially, local enclaves were established; most of these habitations though were pursuant to commercial grants from the English Crown rather than autonomous individual and group migration into virgin territory. Many of these grants allocated territory to these adventurers greatly in excess of those enclaves first inhabited.

Initially the magistrates of those enclaves only governed locally since habitation had not expanded beyond their limited peripheries. Yet, as the magistrates’ authority extended to the boundaries of these grants and various inhabitants of these enclaves migrated to new localities within those boundaries, their authority likewise expanded to encompass them — resulting in a commonwealth embracing numerous communities and the subordination of the initial enclave thereto. Thus, though the inaugural local body polities constituted the foundation of these commonwealths, they did not remain as the predominant civil order but rather were incorporated within and subject to the commonwealth.

This then resulted in the Colonies, and eventually the States, being the sovereign bodies. We then are compelled to consider the powers and remedies available within the context of State jurisdiction rather than local jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, in assessing whether fundamental changes to governmental structure are necessary, as well as the parameters thereof, we must constantly remember core concepts and axioms. For these constitute the foundation upon which any governmental edifice must be structured; repudiation of these concepts and axioms, and substitution instead of an artificial composition will only introduce fragility and the failure and destruction of the edifice.

The author conceives these concepts and axioms to consist of the following:

  • Neighborhoods initially were, and remain still, the core unit of habitation. (This was propounded in the first volume of the author’s Interstice Amid the Fabric of Life essay, The State of Primordial Mankind.) The most-frequent interactions transpire between persons in close physical proximity and regular intercourse with each other and from which their identities are embellished.
  • Neighborhoods then are described and delineated by the radius of normal interaction between the majority of contiguous inhabitants. This interaction will allow the development of common identities and a network of mutual supply of physical necessities and reciprocal assistance and support, both physical and moral.
  • The smaller the political entity, the less the diversity of its inhabitants.

Thus, though we are compelled to recognize the States as the operative entity, we are also compelled to recognize the surpassing importance of the local civil orders and their utilization as the primary expression of the civic will. The justification for this assertion is further confirmed by an examination of the purpose and limitations of these civil orders.

* * * * * * *

The initial stage of the inquiry is the consideration of the inextricable limitation on their authority; for the prime proscription on their powers consists of those inherent rights of its inhabitants which are beyond their capacity to invade. As argued previously by the author, no person, individually or collectively, has the authority to alienate his Primary Natural Rights. Only Secondary Natural Rights are capable of alienation; even then the alienation must be express, unambiguous and unqualified, and restricted to the context which induced the alienation thereof.

Therefore, if the inhabitants of a locality elect to establish a commonwealth for it, the only powers they can grant to it are the powers to regulate Secondary Natural Rights. The necessary corollary, since a commonwealth can only exercise the powers granted to it, is that its powers then are limited to the regulation of these Secondary Natural Rights; even then the regulation of those rights must be both uniform and subject to the express and innate restrictions upon those powers.

Thus, governmental powers are inherently and inextricably limited. The initial and basic limitation consists of the scope of power delegation, for the state cannot exercise a power that it was not granted. This scope is inextricably proscribed as the citizens of a commonwealth are entitled to delegate to a government only those powers whose exercise will generally restrict the Civil rights of at least a majority of the citizens of the commonwealth. In addition to the prohibition against a government exercising power that would restrict the Primary Natural Rights of its citizens, it is limited to regulating only the portion of those additional Civil rights, viz, those which do not constitute Primary Natural Rights, that also constitute Civic rights. There, however, are further reasons for this conclusion.

A more-important, albeit conceptual, limitation consists of the role of a commonwealth and the powers it is entitled to exercise in the performance of this role; if we first isolate the basic purpose of the commonwealth then we better delineate this role. The basic purpose of a commonwealth is to prevent, as far as practicable, an abbreviation of the scope of Liberty available to each individual in the natural order. Hence, the role is to eliminate, or at least ameliorate, conditions that adversely affect at least a majority of its citizens, viz, constitute general problems within the commonwealth.

By this formula the powers that can be exercised gradually diminish, in both scope and degree, the greater the population and geographical extent of the commonwealth — as within the most geographically-restricted commonwealth the impact that any target condition may exert upon the citizens will be more general and tend toward commonality due to the relative homogeneity of those citizens, while within the most geographically-expansive commonwealth (“federal commonwealth”) any target condition that may exert general impact upon the citizens will be few and extraordinary due to the relative diversity of those citizens. The most local commonwealth then is implicitly granted the greatest quantum of power to eliminate or ameliorate adverse conditions within its boundaries, whereas the federal commonwealth is implicitly granted the least quantum of these powers.

Hence, the powers to which the commonwealth is confined — and which constitute the limit of those delegated to it, unless indisputable evidence to the contrary is tendered by it — are those proper and necessary for the performance of this role and the discharge of this function. In this performance and this discharge, the commonwealth is obliged to ignore problems that are only transient and limited within the body of citizens for which it was instituted. Any other standard would implicate the commonwealth intervening in a myriad of potentially-minuscule controversies, with any boundary line beyond which it should refrain being difficult to define and envision.

Objection will presumably be made that this standard will allow the abuse of, by potential abbreviation of rights that should be afforded to, minority segments of the citizenry. Facially this objection would be well-taken. The solution, however, is the formation of a multi-tiered framework of commonwealths, progressively devolving as far as practicable to the most localized jurisdiction. By such a framework those minority segments will have the capacity to constitute a majority in a localized commonwealth and thereby preserve the rights afforded to them.

* * * * * * *

Does the current structure or practices of government in the United States of America conform to the foregoing standards? Clearly they do not.

By virtue of historical development the States have paramount jurisdiction over the local civil organs; the latter, except for limited functions are wholly subordinate. Instead, the author has proposed that it is the local civil organs that should perform the majority of proper and necessary functions and hence possess most governmental power. Nevertheless, given this historical development, there is little present recourse other than to accept the States as the primary unit.

However, the question of the National government is wholly of another class. The extent to which it has grossly exceeded its constitutional limits and eclipsed the status and roles of the State and local civil organs is malevolence indeed. By endeavoring to do too much, it has necessarily antagonized large swaths of the diverse segments in the country; for while policies can contain various exceptions, any policy has to be essentially uniform and general — and no policy can be sufficiently uniform and general to accommodate such disparate diverse segments.

Hence, a dramatic restructuring is in order. Of what form might it consist?

It is supposed that numerous alternative might be suggested. But the author is bold enough to propose one possibility that, it seems to him, should revert inter-governmental relationship closer to the design originally envisioned, and thereby better “secur[e] the Blessings of Liberty”.

This proposal consists of:

  • the passage of bills by two-thirds (2/3) of the States applying for a Convention of the States;
  • the calling by the U.S. Congress of a convention pursuant to these applications;
  • the convening of the convention;
  • the proposal at and approval by the convention of an amendment rescinding The Constitution of the United States, thereby reverting the several States to their full sovereign capacities, or the approval of a new Constitution that provides for and thereby constitutes an amendment rescinding The Constitution of the United States;
  • the formation of a minimum of, say, nine (9) federations between contiguous States, which could conform to:
    • historical, cultural, or unique geographical characteristics, such as, for example:
      • New England,
      • the Mid-Atlantic States,
      • the South,
      • the Northwest Territory States,
      • the Louisiana Purchase States,
      • the Mexican War States, and
      • the Western Coast (including Alaska and Hawaii); or
    • the current divisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeal; or
    • other combinations not yet identified.
  • the formation of a confederation between these various federations.

The chronology of the foregoing stages of this proposal might be differently manipulated. However, it is tendered that this is a framework that ought to be given serious consideration.

* * * * * * *

In 1787 there admittedly were significant differences between the States. These were the result of various factors, including the different groups of adventurers who founded the colonies as well as the divergent religions to which the respective inhabitants adhered.

Nevertheless, as the substantial majority of the immigrants to the colonies were of British origin, these citizens perceived they were endowed with the inherent and established rights of Englishmen. As a result of this common historical knowledge and perception, the similarities between them were more profound than their differences and effectively submerged, or at least subordinated, any dissimilarities.

Hence, a National government was not regarded as likely to be oppressive since there would exist a common body of citizens of similar mind and experience ready and prepared to resist any tyrannical encroachments. Moreover, there was significant dispersion of the inhabitants within the various States. This relative isolation of the citizens, from each other and from the seats of government, constituted substantial obstacles to any effort to infringe the Liberties of them by any particular factions or control by the respective governments.

These conditions, however, soon experienced eradicable alteration — compromising these protections and, ultimately, these principles. The initial, as well as ultimate, cause was the vast accretion of territory controlled by the United States of America. This geographical expansion, proceeding at various times and occasioned by a variety of circumstances, permanently corrupted the carefully-designed polity.

By enabling the multiplication of the number of potential States it presented the specter of lessened cohesion between the existing and new States; for the lesser the number of jurisdictions the greater the capacity for them to unite on proposing or opposing certain policies, with the converse situation the greater the number of jurisdictions. This then presented both the opportunity and justification for the National government to expand its role and power by entry into this void. Thereby was the equilibrium in the Federal system, between the National government and the State governments, imbalanced.

These new territories also provided the opportunity and incentive for new and expanded immigration into the country, as the new regions and resources enticed the settlement and exploitation of them. This immigration exponentially increased the number of citizens of the country in the aggregate; moreover the diversity of the nationalities, and their accompanying national experiences and heritages, of the citizens was necessarily increased. As a result of this increased quantity and diversity the prospect of uniting on proposing or opposing certain policies was impeded, inasmuch as, one, a greater mass of persons always renders accedence to a common position more difficult and less likely, two, these greater dissimilarities rendered consolidation into a uniform position more difficult, and, three, these different traditions introduced the factor of willingness, or at least accentuated the volume of adherents thereto, in acceptance of, rather than resistance to, authority. Thereby, with reduced meaningful opposition, was the continued momentum of the juggernaut of National authority unabated.

The augmented national territory augmented also its power, both in isolation and relative to other countries. The first effect thereof was to induce it to expand its defense establishment and capabilities. As a normal consequence it was then induced to exercise this capability relative to other countries.

The exercise of this capability resulted in the international expansion of the country, both in the form of new territories — some by conquest and some by the exercise of monetary might incident to economic and military might — and the permanent presence within other countries. The latter is exhibited both in the economic influence over and foreign military establishments in numerous countries by the United States of America.

By all of these factors the authority of the National government was expanded to gargantuan proportions. We are now Reaping the Whirlwind. The cavalier and virtually uninhibited exercise by the National government of its Article I and Article II powers, whether real, presumed, assumed, or seized, has strained the fabric of the country with the resulting tension approaching or being at the breaking point.

Accordingly it appears to more than a few isolated malcontents that a dramatic reconfiguration of this country is necessary. The within proposal is but one of many that could be a solution by which retrenchment of concentrated central power is realized. It though appears to the author that the necessity of this retrenchment is beyond cavil.

A sufficient number of Federations of various States — with substantial powers reserved to those States, and a substantial portion of those powers progressively reserved to the local jurisdictions therein — would not only enable geographical segmentation of diversity in those jurisdictions and thereby obstruct suppression of it by more populous segments of different characteristics in different jurisdictions, but would preserve Liberty by this division of power. A Confederation of these federations would maintain national unity, albeit of a more-restricted scope and a more-restrained National government.

The author does not contend this is an ideal framework; but nothing designed by mortal man is ever ideal. It is anticipated though, that under the conditions of 2022 as contrasted with those of 1787, this general skeleton would constitute a vast improvement of the corrupted evolution that has transpired over the intervening two hundred thirty-five (235) years.

While careful design of the structure of the Confederation will of course be necessary, it is anticipated that conceptually the functioning thereof should not be problematic. Conceptually, though, the functioning of the Federations could pose some consideration.

There theoretically is the danger from a smaller federation that its officials will have greater opportunity to interfere in the liberty of its citizens as a consequence of the government having fewer responsibilities and fewer disparate segments of society to distract itself. However, this may be sufficiently offset by its capacity to craft tailored rules for its fewer discrete segments rather than general rules which, by necessity, will not be able to accommodate all of a broad range of segments.

In any event, a solution of this type should obviate many of the problems, Nay, the evils, that exist presently. It is left to abler minds than that of the author to refine this solution more perfectly.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
26 February 2022

The Elective Franchise — A Secondary Civic Right

[A PDF version of this article, including the footnotes thereto, may be downloaded from here.]

Electoral procedures and proposed reforms have been the subject of extensive discussion for much of the last few years, and in particular presently. I consider the emphasis excessive and grossly misplaced. In considering the validity of the author’s perception we must begin with the recognition of the difference between civil rights and civic rights.

Civil rights are those powers that a person exercises in isolation or in a direct relationship with other persons. They are inextricable from the core of each person’s existence and activities, and their source is God and Nature. Being first in origin, they are senior to and dominate all other rights.

Civic rights are those powers that a person exercises in relationship to and within a governmental structure and which are defined and prescribed by this structure. Government though only has those powers that are delegated to it by the citizens of the commonwealth who established it and thereby granted it those powers. Any Civic rights then are derivative from and subordinate to Civil rights, as: the foundation of the society that established the commonwealth are the Civil rights of its individual members; the power to establish the commonwealth and grant its government the authority to exercise its prescribed functions resided in and proceeded from the society establishing it, and, ergo, the Civil rights of its individual members; and Civic rights are only a segment of Civil rights as a priori these Civic rights must have had a source and only Civil rights could have been this source. This should be indisputable as the whole is by nature superior to any part, both in quantity and quality. Civic rights then constitute only the portion of the body of Civil rights that are expressly and unequivocally delegated, and appropriate for delegation, to a commonwealth.

Most Civil rights are exercised within a narrow orbit and with only minimal impact upon others; to the extent there is an impact, it is of the type that should normally be allowed and tolerated, inasmuch as the exercise of Civil rights by those so impacted will also not be in isolation but themselves will exert some degree of impact. It is only when the impact is so substantial and affects others within a broad orbit that rectification is required.

Civic rights though are exercised within even a narrower orbit. Most interactions between inhabitants of a commonwealth are initiated and ordained by those engaging in them, viz, at the level of the civil society. Even the resolution of any disputes as to the rights and duties incident to those interactions are resolved conceptually at the civil society level, inasmuch as the judicial function originated within pre-civil society existence and was then conserved and maintained within civil society.

Conversely, government is only engaged when the factors affecting and bearing upon these interactions are too numerous and affect too many people to be efficiently and comprehensively considered and reconciled at the civil society level. Hence, its functions and activities are inherently proscribed — as its jurisdiction is limited to but a subset of social interactions. As Civic rights are only exercised within the perimeters of the governmental structure, their occasion, significance, and impact is likewise limited.

Among those Civic rights is the elective franchise. By the foregoing hierarchy analysis it is clear that it is subordinate in importance to the Civil rights with which the society’s members are endowed.

Nevertheless, there are those who assert that the exercise of one’s elective franchise is the most-important civic function, and by extension civic right, of a citizen. Others assert that a person who does not exercise the elective franchise has no right to complain about any objectionable exercise by the commonwealth of its powers. With neither assertion can the author agree.

The first assertion is refuted by the circumstance that personal interactions, as above discussed, are the primary, most-significant, and most-numerous activities of any inhabitant of a commonwealth. These personal interactions are central to the existence, life, and viability of a society, with interactions between any inhabitant and the government of the commonwealth being but peripheral. The salient civic function of an inhabitant then is his normal intercourse with his fellow inhabitants, his exercise of his Civil rights in those interactions, and his respect for the Civil rights of the other inhabitants engaged in those interactions.

The civic function of the citizen embodied in the exercise of his Civic rights is but occasional and sporadic, and therefore but peripheral. As the elective franchise is but one of the components of these Civic rights, it is more-peripheral yet.

The second assertion is refuted by the fact that persons frequently form opinions upon policy initiated by foreign governments. Yet they have no right to exercise the franchise for selection of the magistrates of those foreign governments. Are they therefore enjoined from forming and expressing those opinions, much less endeavoring to influence those policies?

Let us, though, for argument accept that one’s central civic function consists of participation in the citizen’s relationship to the government of a commonwealth rather than in the citizen’s relationship to his fellow citizens. Even so, the elective franchise remains as a secondary mode of participation.

Exercise of the elective franchise chooses the magistrates who will exercise the powers of the government. The most-important set of those magistrates are those who will compose the legislature of the commonwealth, for it establishes those rules appropriate for supplementation of, and not in contradiction to, Natural Law. Yet the voting for choice of those magistrates is a broadsword, not a rapier.

No person is the exact imprint of any other in perspective or opinions. This perspective and those opinions are formed by the qualities and experiences unique to each person. Each legislator then will depart from the opinions and preferences of each of his constituents on some, perhaps many, issues. Any citizen’s choice of his legislator then only occasionally results in the legislator adopting positions on policy consistent with the preferences of the particular citizen. Rather, other avenues are available and potentially more-efficacious in promoting the adoption of those preferences.

One avenue consists of that expressed in one of the rights expressed in US Const, Am I, viz, the right to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances”; parallel provisions exist in the State constitutions. The formal petition process allows the citizens to expressly communicate their explicit preferences to their legislators. In this we have a rapier rather than a broadsword.

An even more incisive device, and perhaps the most-important part of civil participation, is the oral or written — with emphasis on the latter as more-effective expression — by a citizen of his opinion on potential or pending legislation; this expression may be directly to a legislator or publicly through some media agency. By this explicit suggestions are provided for policy adoption, revision, or repeal without the burden of the formal petition process.

Moreover, those who communicate their opinion and advice on proposed or pending legislation should be, and at least often are, presumed to have educated themselves to some degree on the subject thereof and the ramifications of the contours of the proposed rules; the aversion to embarrassment in expression of an uneducated opinion will induce reluctance to do so unless the person is sufficiently confident in their position.

Thus, reliance by the legislative body on these expressed opinions, rather than on their vote, will emphasize and elevate both the quality of legislation and the educated portion of the citizenry. Both objectives are invaluable as, one, poorly-conceived legislation will only exacerbate tensions within a society, and, two, enhancement of the proportion of the citizenry that is educated — or at least the influence of the existing proportion that has educated themselves — can only yield immeasurable benefits.

Nevertheless, perhaps the most-important civic participation that is available to every citizen, as well as the greatest influence on the legislative strictures, consists of the exercise of Liberty, as the effect thereof tests the legitimacy of legislation by confronting its boundaries and determining whether those boundaries are justifiable or excessive. By this are these supplementary rules either confirmed or repudiated.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
16 January 2022

Economic Impact Payment Quandary

Shortly after April 7, I by chance discovered that my Savings Account had been enlarged $1,400.00 by the Economic Impact Payment (“EIP”) authorized by the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (“ARP Act”); this amount yet remains there untouched, pending a decision of how to respond to it. (By being bypassed by the $600.00 EIP authorized by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (“2021 Appropriations Act”), I was relieved of the earlier necessity of any decision on how I should respond.)

I, at the time of the enactment of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), considered the $1,200.00 EIP authorized by it to be a prudent response to the severe disruptions caused both by private and public actions in response to the unforeseen COVID-19 onslaught. This was an invasion for which adequate preparations could not have been instituted, and which then appeared to require certain protective action — albeit the scope of such action being then and later still problematic. The response caused extensive unanticipated hardship for which few could have prepared, thus justifying some financial relief for those afflicted.

The passage of time though allowed modulation in those putative protective actions, as experience enabled clarification about those measures that were or were not effective and those that were or were not necessary. Moreover, interim medical advances had ameliorated, to some extent, the danger caused by this virus and the prevalence of being afflicted by it. Therefore, in my mind, by the end of 2020, the necessity of further financial relief was questionable.

I thus then, when the expectation of being confronted with the receipt of an additional $600.00 EIP presented itself, realized that a decision would apparently be required. Accordingly, I investigated whether a response was available and discovered that a mechanism existed for rejection of this payment. I then conceived providing a response, to accompany a check returning this amount, in the following possible terms:

“As acceptance by me of this amount of $600.00 would constitute my contributing to the continuing fiscal and moral bankruptcy of this nation — the repercussions and dangers of which are already and will be further manifold, and an apparently-constant progression in which I decline to participate — I hereby refuse and return the amount of this second Economic Impact Payment.”

The absence of receipt thereof however allowed me to defer the decision to take this action. Now, though, I no longer have this luxury.

For all of my adult life, a period which alone is of no-small duration, the juggernaut in the District of Columbia has demonstrated little inclination to quench its insatiable appetite. While there have been periodic, albeit few, aberrations by way of limited retrenchments in its expansion, the direction of the process has generally been unabated. In this both major political parties bear substantial fault.

As the benefits to be conferred are usually more visible than the costs to be incurred, new or expanded entitlement programs have the intrinsic greater potential to garner advocates and popularity. The existence of this potential is regrettable for various reasons, not the least of which are: the engendered expectation of the permanence of these benefits as well as the accession by additional ones; and the weakening of the fiscal health of the nation, a severe (perhaps fatal) condition already apparent. Nevertheless, these considerations have not proved to be frequently successful in hampering the enthusiasm of expansion advocates.

Yet it now though appears that there could be an exponential growth of this monstrosity we call the Federal Government. While the necessity of the CARES Act was partially justifiable, there was still significant wasteful excess in it. Far less justification existed for components of the 2021 Appropriations Act and the ARP Act; moreover all three (3) of these Acts inordinately increased the U.S. National Debt. However, though the adverse impact upon the current and future fiscal and economic posture of the nation through the exorbitant magnification of debt from these Acts can already be envisioned, the deterioration will pale in comparison as a result of the projected cost of new programs proposed by the current administration.

While the proposed American Jobs Plan and American Families Plan would constitute the largest expenditures, it is expected that further likely proposals would also substantially increase Federal expenditures. The expenditures for those two alone would aggregate in excess of Four Trillion Dollars ($4,000,000,000,000.00), in addition to the One Trillion Nine Hundred Billion Dollars ($1,900,000,000,000.00) authorized by the ARP Act. Whether either of those plans is enacted, or whether sufficient revenue is generated through new tax revenue in order to pay for those expenditures, is of course presently unknown. Suffice it to say that these proposals, along with the CARES Act, the 2021 Appropriations Act and the ARP Act, have and would greatly expand the role of the Federal Government in both the economy and Civil Society. (While non-fiscal proposals of the current administration would also greatly expand the role of the Federal Government in Civil Society — many, if not most, of which the author considers highly objectionable — this post is limited to considering the ramifications upon the economic and fiscal health of the nation. Therefore any comment on the excess intrusiveness of these other proposals would be deferred to possible later posts.)

While these incipient proposals would exponentially increase the National Debt, this insatiable trend has been consistent now over more than the last Half-Century. (A PDF version thereof may also be reviewed.) With rare exceptions all administrations, of whatever political composition, have demonstrated their addiction to extravagant spending. The warnings by the Congressional Budget Office of the unsustainability of these expenditures and deficits have generally fallen on deaf ears. As graphically demonstrated, not only does the recent accentuation of the National Debt consume a far greater proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) than it did on average over the past Half-Century, it now is equal to One Hundred Percent (100%) of the GDP!

In the opinion of the author, as well as many others, this is clearly unsustainable. To liquidate it: in say ten (10) years, we would have to reduce all expenditures to equal revenue, continue to pay the same amount in taxes as currently, plus divert an additional Ten Percent (10%) of GDP to its payment; or, in say one (1) year, to continue to produce at the same rate but for every inhabitant to simultaneously go into suspended animation for a year! Thus, to the author, it clearly appears we are already in a Crisis Situation.

It is tendered that perpetuation, much less accentuation, of the present course can only result in extreme social upheaval, inasmuch as: increased diversion of fiscal resources to and through the government would cause economic disruption by supplanting the natural and ordinary employment of those resources by the populace; and social disruption through the corollary preference of certain social sectors and denigration of others, as these policies by definition would only benefit those selected recipients who are anticipated, by the use of those resources, to contribute to or enable the attainment of the objectives thereof. But perhaps only an extreme social upheaval can result in an inversion of the present destructive path and a reorientation toward reduced governmental participation in and ramifications upon the economy and Civil Society.

Even a Crisis Situation can degenerate into a more-critical state, as there are degrees of crisis. At an earlier stage of a crisis certain actions can be taken to eliminate the causes and remediate the damage; at later stages the scope of those actions are restricted, and ultimately reach a point where any effort is virtually, or absolutely, ineffective. If there was presently any indication of sufficient awareness of this crisis, then vigorous advocacy to inspire corrective efforts by those with this awareness is apropos. However, from what is reported, it appears that few in government are sufficiently-concerned but rather that most are feckless.

Perhaps then the prudential course is to accelerate the crisis by exploiting the opportunities offered — and thereby assist in a propulsion beyond the brink of this fiscal and moral bankruptcy — in order to broaden the awareness of this crisis and make it apparent to even the most injudicious. In this instance it might consist of acceptance by everyone of every EIP and other opportunities that might be offered. But is this the most-principled course?

In embarking upon a course to attain an objective one is often confronted by the conundrum of adhering to principles consistent with the objective and actions, albeit possibly contradictory, more-efficacious in attaining it; compounding the question is the effectiveness of one small action among many countervailing ones. Yet can the action, combined with a declaration of the rationale behind it, resolve this conundrum? Hence the quandary …

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
07 May 2021

EFFECTIVE “Gun Violence” Control

The recent atrocity perpetrated by Brandon Hole (“Hole”) at the Indianapolis Federal Express facility on April 15, 2021 — as well as other recent media high profile like heinous offenses — will undoubtedly result in new demands for “Gun Control”. I tender though that any narrative should be rephrased to consider “Gun Violence Control” rather then “Gun Control”.

These abominations are of course committed only by a small set of citizens. Firearms though are owned by a much larger set of citizens. Ergo, then, only a minority of owners or possessors of firearms engage in commission of these acts. Consequently, the focus of any regulation should be narrow, viz, on the class of these perpetrators rather than the weapon used or superfluous burdens and restrictions imposed on innocent owners; the latter class, being broader, would impact the majority of owners and possessors who are not a component of the problem. By addressing factors that are not the elements of a problem, i.e. here the segment of owners and possessors of firearms who only use them legally, the effectiveness of any regulation would by definition be diminished. Thus, effective measures rather should be considered, the following being tendered as preferable approaches.

According to news reports (reliable or not, such as CNN and AP), Hole was reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) during 2020 by his Mother because of concerns that he might commit “suicide by cop”. The FBI responded and questioned Hole, afterwards of which officers seized a pump-action shotgun possessed by him. It is unclear whether the officers were Federal or State, and whether it was pursuant to IC 35-47-14-1 et seq — the Indiana “Red Flag Law” — or not.

Also according to news reports, Hole subsequently, during July, 2020, and September, 2020, purchased two rifles apparently employed in the atrocity seven (7) months later. The reports do not mention whether any report was made, or any effort was made to invoke IC 35-47-14-1 et seq, during the interim.

The author has previously expressed his opinion that Extreme Risk Protection Order statutes, if structured properly, should be considered for State enactment. Regrettably, as also previously expressed, certain bills introduced at both the Federal and State level fail to satisfy the standard of proper structuring. A cursory review of the Indiana statute appears to indicate it provides at least some of the necessary due process protections.

The author’s rationale is that the vast majority, if not virtually all, of these perpetrators have exhibited severe mental or emotional behavior disturbances prior to their atrocities; some were reported and some were ignored. Assuming that knowledgeable persons would assume the responsibility to initiate appropriate action, then effective solutions for avoidance of many of these incidents do seem to present themselves.

The author is of the opinion that the Eighteenth Century concept of the utility of the Militia is not in the least anachronistic. If so, then each citizen should be expected to own and be familiar with the use of a firearm appropriate for militia use. They should be further required to undergo periodic mustering and training. This would provide the opportunity for observing any aberrations in any of the militia members and the occasion for initiating corrective and protective action to prevent illegal use of and removal of the weapon by and from such a person. A similar scenario is discussed in an earlier post by this author.

It is recognized that this solution might experience significant resistance, Therefore, a solution that likely would have broader appeal would consist of:

• First, a Federal enactment of a due process-compliant statute (“Federal Red Flag Law”) providing financial support to those States that enact Extreme Risk Protection Order statutes that contain certain minimum conditions. (This would be of the form of S.7 and S.506 introduced in the U.S. Senate during 2019, but with its due process deficiencies corrected.); and

• Second, the amendment of 18 USC 922(d) and (g) — the so-called “Prohibited Persons” provisions prohibiting certain persons from firearm purchases — by the addition of a subsection (10) comparable to 18 USC 922(d)(8) and (g)(8), possible verbiage being:

“(10) who is subject to a court order that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) was issued pursuant to a State Extreme Protection Order statute that complies with the Federal Red Flag Law;
(C) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of himself or others; and
(D) deprived the person of a firearm in his possession or prohibited the return of a previously-seized firearm to the person.”

Provision for a maximum time for the effectiveness of such a provision, as well as to relief due to changed circumstances in the mental and emotional condition of such a person, should also be addressed. And, of course, none of this discourages attention to improved mental health treatment, as the mental and emotional condition of these perpetrators is the common denominator of the occasion for all of these incidents.

Would all incidents be eliminated by one of these solutions? It is not expected that they would. However, it is tendered that the vast majority thereof would be eliminated, while concurrently avoiding the abuse and restriction of rights of those persons who are not an element of the problem.

[UPDATE:  A new study by the Rand Corporation demonstrates the difficulties with defining and categorizing “mass shootings”.  Accordingly, legislatures should be even more-cautious in promulgating new restrictions to prevent incidents that may be exaggerated by some observers — particularly when those restrictions adversely impact, to a severe extent, a class of persons external to the problem.]

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
19 April 2021

Fossil Fuel Retrenchment  — The Law of Unintended Consequences?

This is a topic that I don’t recall I have addressed previously. Thus, since I today composed the following as an e-mail message to a friend in response to an editorial cartoon, it occurred to me that I ought to post it here — to provide an expression of my thoughts and possibly to engender some in others. From the circumstances of its composition it is not as elaborate an articulation as it might otherwise be; thus it likely ought to be later expanded, but should suffice, for the moment, as to an outline of these considerations. (The original text has been somewhat revised in verbiage as well as format, but, due to time constraints, has been retained in its original brevity.)

Though I’m not a tree hugger (in the sense in which that term has been pejoratively used), I’m all in favor of environment conservation; this preference is a product of my opposition to excessive, conspicuous consumption as well as my religious beliefs. But I recognize that attaining this objective is not going to be as easy or painless as many people think.

It would require much personal sacrifice and alteration of normal behavior. My style may be an example, including: minimization of use of a motor vehicle to less than 5,000 miles/year; avoiding much restaurant visitations; grouping necessary errands in a single trip; grouping purchases of regular staples for a couple months usage; eschewing leisure travel/vacations; and no air conditioning and maintaining the thermostat during the Winter at no more than 64 to 65 Degrees.
If everyone voluntarily adhered to similar retrenchments, then many of the adverse effects upon the environment from human activity would be eliminated; but it will have severe effects upon many economic sectors, e.g. restaurants, airlines, automobile industry, lodging establishments, etc.

Moreover, in addition to the many counterproductive effects you have mentioned in a switch to replacement energy modes — these consisting of equivalent or near-equivalent energy expenditure in extraction or production of the materials required by these replacement modes — there will be substantial economic distress, at least during the interim. If electric motor vehicles become prevalent — either as the compelled or voluntary mode — it will necessarily increase the price of gasoline due to amortization of the same fixed costs over a smaller volume of purchases. (The old rules of supply and demand will be reversed because of contortions of the market by these external influences and factors.). Those then who cannot afford these new vehicles or who have to travel long distances will suffer extensive hardship.

The discouragement of vehicle use within cities appears to be the new trend, and is from an isolated view attractive for many reasons. But it ignores the fact that not everyone lives in these densely-populated elitist enclaves. Those who do will benefit the environment and experience advantages while circulating there. But the prices on items they purchase that depend on long-distance transport, such as food and non-locally produced materials, will increase exponentially — as the cost of those hardships on persons engaged in long-distance travel will have to be passed on to the beneficiaries thereof — and they will be restricted from travel outside those enclaves. Prospects of the consequences of the early abandonment of fossil fuels then are being viewed through excessively rose-colored glasses.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
10 November 2020

The Improvidence of Disproportionality in Governmental Policy

[A PDF version of this article may be downloaded from here.]

The COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic has spawned many public and private avoidance efforts. It has also spawned many antagonistic perspectives and attitudes as a consequence.

The divergence between them, and the objectives that they propound, make it difficult to evaluate which should prevail. It is submitted that perhaps use of the Liberty-Freedom Dichotomy might assist in this effort.

As has been posited by this author, Liberty is the Prime Natural Right as it is affirmative and affords the right to initiate action. However, as the exercise of this right is most likely to affect others — whereas Freedom is passive and affords the right to refrain from action — it is the right with which a public body has the legitimate power to circumspectly constrain.* The question here then is not what actions a public body may require an individual to perform but what actions a public body may legitimately constrain an individual from performing.

In the context of various restrictions imposed by governments during this pandemic some may say the distinction is immaterial. I tender it is not.

All potential actions are impacted by various factors that necessitate assessment of the relative importance thereof in determining the beneficial or adverse consequence of the action. In addition, there are numerous possible consequences of each potential action, of which the likelihood and effect thereof (on future potential actions) has to be projected. Thus, all decisions to initiate or refrain from action are impressed with certain risks.

The author concurs that we are obliged to avoid needless risks, in order to optimize our time and hence opportunities for attaining further objectives, those beyond the objective envisioned by the immediate proposed action.** However, these should be substantial, demonstrable risks. We cannot eliminate all risks with which we may be confronted, and it would be perilous to even endeavor to do so.***  While there conceivably are numerous reasons, two of them are paramount.

First, it would promote an even-further deterioration in intellectual capabilities. We are endowed, by Nature or by God (as one’s perspective chooses), with rational, abstract capacity, and it is our duty to preserve and deploy these capabilities whenever possible. As already observed, this process entails assessing various factors in each situation which we confront, and determining those most relevant to and beneficial for an intended course of action prior to formulation of the decision as to the choice to be made. Each situation has various nuances and requires intensive examination to identify and analyze these nuances in order to determine what action, if any, is appropriate to avoid and ameliorate the risks incident to alternative courses. Discouraging employment of this process would result in superficial and careless reasoning. All approaches constitute precedents that have the potential to be ingrained; an absence of meticulous consideration then has the potential to be a “foundation of sand”, to our future detriment — by failing and even refusing to make adjustments where circumstances warrant or even require them. Thus, retention of risks is beneficial, as providing challenges that require mental acuity.

Second, and most importantly, an extreme risk-aversion preoccupation deemphasizes the role and supremacy of both God and the Creature. The secular aspect of this proposition derives from the necessity of this preoccupation assigning to some corporate body the function and right of determination of the existence and degree of risks. Who would be this corporate body? Some discrete or obscure body of “experts”? Some singular governmental body? In any event, thereby would be established an oligarchy entitled to control decisions rightfully belonging to the individual; this is contradictory to and destructive of individual responsibility and moral choice. By being subjected to acute situations requiring critical decisions, the individual is compelled to experience moral growth and a sense of his responsibility for making these crucial decisions. This process leads to virtue and righteousness, the abandonment of which would only be at our peril.

The sacred aspect of this proposition derives from the absence of control by humanity, in contrast to the potential control by God, over conditions and events; while God has the power of absolute control, it is only periodically exercised and therefore potential. Scripture repeatedly acknowledges that retribution for vice is suffered by the offenders through their own actions, with rewards for righteousness being but occasional and not linear. It is only through the supplication of prayer that God’s intervention can be enlisted. The world then is, by First Cause design, a deterioration into chaos; God created order as the natural condition, but also created other factors (including humanity) that permitted irretrievable devolution into corruption. Though humanity then is by nature of limited power and competency, yet some apparently perceive that virtual elimination, and not merely minimization, of risk is an attainable objective; they believe by their intervention they can remold the world, through the elimination of the risk incident to disorder, rather than seek God’s intervention. By not trusting in God are we not treading on dangerous ground, by pretending to usurp His power?****

Government then should be cautious in the exertion of any power which is granted to it. It should only exercise this power when clearly necessary to protect vital interests. This then requires:

  • First, assessment of the severity of a risk, and if it is deemed sufficiently-substantial the gradual implementation of restrictions to minimize it; and

  • Second, if restrictions are deemed necessary, the tailoring of them so that there is a reasonable fit between the rules and the objectives thereof; this then requires recognizing the differences between the circumstances of the persons who will be affected thereby.

In most instances there was no compliance with the conditions of the posited first stage. Simply by virtue of its designation as a “novel coronavirus” it was established that there was no clinical data to determine its transmissibility or its virulence. While it appears to be undisputed that its transmissibility is greater than normal, it yet remains doubtful whether its virulence is such. Accordingly, no justification existed for initially imposing draconian measures as opposed to gradual implementation of them if proven necessary — particularly as experience and logic both confirm that it is more difficult to revise and remove restrictions than it is to expand them later.

The second stage implicates another basic principle of not only our jurisprudence but of core justice, viz, Equal Protection. Equal Treatment can be either a just requirement or an unjust burden, depending upon the circumstances. In many contexts it prevents unjust discriminatory treatment, as when its absence would deprive certain individuals or classes of persons of rights afforded to others. But in other contexts it will deprive certain individuals or classes of persons of liberty that the circumstances do not justify. The latter was the consequence of many of the governmental initiatives during this pandemic.

Those restrictions which imposed isolation, because of the circumstances of some classes of people, were to their benefit. The same restrictions, because of the circumstances of other classes of people, were unnecessary and therefore to them a burden. Thus was imposed unequal treatment.

Moreover, certain of these restrictions — a regime that was a burden upon all — were accompanied by benefits that redounded but to some.*****  These benefits, designed to partially alleviate those burdens, were thus unequally distributed. This was further manifest error as awarding benefits to certain classes of persons but not others demonstrates (or at least implies) that the latter are disfavored and disadvantaged.******  Thereby was afflicted further injustice as governmental action should not burden but some and thereby require them to palpably suffer and experience inequity.

Rather, burdens should be imposed only where the substantial liberty of some is being directly threatened by the liberty exercised by others, consisting of clear jeopardy to the former and not merely speculation. Thus, imposed restrictions on liberty are not justifiable but under circumstances of clear and present danger.*******

The author does not dispute that there are certain situations that entailed increased risk, such as population density, frequency of circulation outside of the domicile, circulation outside of their community (community being capable of a flexible definition depending upon common characteristics of susceptibility or lack thereof), age, and preexisting health conditions. Application of restrictions to persons and areas subject to these conditions are justifiable. General restrictions applied to persons and areas not subject to these conditions, but rather composed of different characteristics, however are not; and the more persons or areas differ the greater the burden on a government to justify them.  They are particularly unjustifiable when applied to institutions historically and by intrinsic nature antagonistic to government — the Church in particular.*******

Justifiable measures restricting liberty ought then to have focused upon isolation of those most at risk. But does imposing protection measures on those at risk justify doing so on those not at risk? Is not this a case of the onerous, and thus erroneous, application of equal treatment? If classes of persons are unlikely to injure others, then no justification exists for imposition of restraints on their liberty, much less constraints on their freedom. Rather, if classes of persons are more likely to be injured by others, then it is proper only to devise protection measures to impose on those at risk of being injured.  This then preserves the Freedom of those not at risk while only limiting the Liberty of those at risk and those persons in contact with them to the extent necessary.

But the regimes that have been imposed have been contrary to this principle. Rather they have yielded benefits to some and burdens to others.*********  As a result those benefited acquire greater Liberty and hence more Power as the increased rewards yield greater opportunities for initiating activity, and these opportunities will enable, if rightly pursued, the acquisition of more power. Those without those opportunities will have little, if any capacity for acquiring power.

Increased, and hence inequality of, power is always malevolent. For Power is a variable in the equation of the amount of Liberty bestowed upon a person. One might devise the following formula:

L = ((Σ-Δ)/Σ) x ((Ω/(Ω-P))
L = Liberty Coefficient
Δ = Government Expenditures
Σ = Gross Domestic Product
P = Median National Wealth
Ω = Total National Wealth

or, alternatively,
L = ((Φ-Ψ)/Φ) x ((Ω/(Ω-P))
L = Liberty Coefficient
Ψ = Government Employees
Φ = Total Population
P = Median National Wealth
Ω = Total National Wealth

By these formulae a Liberty Coefficient is calculated with the greater the product of the calculation demonstrating a greater level of Liberty in a nation.**********  While the author believes either formula is a valid demonstration of a level of Liberty, he apprehends that the first equation may be preferable.

In either event, assuming the validity thereof, the greater the intrusion of a government and the greater the wealth inequality, the greater the power afforded to only certain classes and the less the liberty afforded to the citizens in general. Either variable, viz, the dominance of government or the concentration of wealth, has egregious effects; when combined they are intolerable.***********

* * * * * * *

To the author the current pandemic regime has disclosed all of these pernicious factors and effects. It has paralyzed many without reason, but with atrocious effects. It is an apt study of the obscene dangers of power in government and society. Whence has gone the ascendancy of the Individual and of Freedom?

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
06 October 2020

*   Liberty is exercised, consisting of activity initiated by a person, and thus is anticipated to, and usually has, an effect beyond the person exercising it. Therefore, it normally will have some constraint upon the Liberty of another. Accordingly, certain constraints by government on Liberty are permissible.
Still, the imposition of constraints has to be circumspect, viz, only when this Liberty will either substantially and materially affect a sufficiently-substantial number of persons or will deprive an identifiable class of persons, even if not of a substantial number, of a Primary Natural Right; while deprivation of a Primary Natural Right from even a single person is to be regretted, this factor alone does not justify prohibition of a constraint per se since a magistracy of the size necessary to identify and prevent any abuse by a constraint would jeopardize all Liberty.
Freedom, though, is an absence of compulsion by another to initiate a specified action and thus its preservation will have no effect other then the failure of the effort to compel; the person who is the object of the inchoate compulsion will be unaffected though the person endeavoring to compel will be affected only by the failure of his effort and, thus, a negation of his activity. Therefore, since the preservation of Freedom will have no effect extending beyond the person asserting it, its orbit has a diameter shorter than the diameter of an orbit of Liberty. Accordingly, restriction of the orbit of Freedom is always unjustifiable.

**   These further objectives may be of disparate quality, depending upon the framework of principles of each person. They may be, inter alia, to: enhance personal reward; benefit mankind or some segment thereof; or serve and glorify God.

***   The peril would consist of constant inaction, as every action entails certain risks and their elimination is impossible. Concern about these risks then would paralyze all decisions and actions. But to avoid action, one then denies the very quality of life and existence — as it is a constant progression from one stage to another and, finally, to the ultimate stage of life.

****   It is my conclusion that the Church, in both its abstract and institutional sense, is theoretically and historically in an adversarial relationship with Government. I consider the Biblical authority to be consistent. For example, compare: 1 Samuel 8:7; John 18:36; Acts 5:29; and Matthew 22:21.

***** These consisted, inter alia, of monetary benefits to replace lost income, paid leave to accommodate family circumstances, and adjustment of the working environment to allow telecommuting. Because not all classes of persons had regular income, were blessed with a family, or could perform their work in isolation, only certain classes were afflicted with substantial burdens.

****** Extending benefits to some may expand their liberty, but should it prejudice people to whom these are not awarded and whose liberty is thus not benefited?

******* The standard of “clear and present danger” admittedly originated in a different legal context. Nevertheless, the author posits that its application is appropriate here as only demonstrable and immediate substantial injury should be a justification for restricting Freedom.

******** In addition to these restrictions being antagonistic to the limited role that God has assigned to government, there is the additional protection afforded through our jurisprudence by virtue of the Free Exercise Clause. We are enjoined by Scripture to celebrate the Lord’s Last Supper and to praise God through joyful song. Yet governmental restrictions in many jurisdictions restricted observance, and thereby enjoined the faithful to violate their sacred duties. To paraphrase Jesus’ command, many were compelled to “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that Caesar allows.” Thus, was God, in this core function of the life of many, subordinated to government rather than government subordinated to God.

********* Some of those disproportionate in benefits have already been mentioned. However here a different disproportion surfaces; this is the disproportion in burdens. For each if gross burdens on all are equivalent, some will be benefited thereby while others will not. Thus the net burdens are not equivalent.

********** Other more refined and sophisticated formulae can be devised and likely are more demonstrable and better proof of this question. Yet, while the author only expended limited time in devising them, he still believes they are valid and can be legitimately applied in analysis.

********** Preliminary calculations seem to indicate that these two variables have equivalent negative effects; thus submission to one while limiting the other is a Pyrrhic solution as it will still yield an equivalent loss of liberty. Rather, both are subjects for constraint.


Civil Society, rather than the State, as the Incubator of Life

The primary subject of this comment will be one of the matters to be addressed by my second (2nd) volume, The Nature of Mankind and Government, in my series Interstice Amid the Fabric of Life. But my rereading of Plato’s Crito — it having been more than fifty-five (55) years since I first studied it, and I deemed a refreshing to be beneficial — inspired me to presently endeavor to distinguish the State from the organic and essential assemblages of Mankind.

I was cruising along with Plato’s reasoning but then suddenly [at 50 – 51] I came upon the Athenians’ arguments anticipated by Socrates and was repulsed by them. These arguments, with which Socrates (and, by extrapolation, Plato) agreed, were that:

it was through the laws of Athens that Socrates’ father married his mother and conceived him,

the city thereby gave birth to him,

he was raised and educated because of its laws directing a certain program of education,

since by virtue of he thereby being “born and brought up and educated … [he was then the] offspring and slave [of Athens] from the beginning, both [he] and [his] ancestors”,

consequently “the homeland is deserving of more honor and reverence and worship than [Socrates’] mother and father and all of [his] other ancestors”, and

he therefore “should show her more respect and compliance and obedience than [his] father, and either convince her or do what she commands, and suffer without complaining if she orders [him] to suffer something … whether it is to be beaten or imprisoned, or to be wounded or killed if she leads [him] into war …”.

It seemed incredulous that anyone could adopt this perspective! Now it admittedly is somewhat ameliorated by the rejoinder that:

Athens granted the power, to any citizen of discretion and experience with its affairs and laws who is not pleased with them, “to take his possessions and leave for whatever he wants”, yet

if such a citizen having cognizance of its laws and other civic matters remains in Athens, then the citizen “by his action has now made an agreement with [the city] to do what [it] commands him to do.”

Asserting that an individual can enter into a political contract by his affirmative conduct (and the necessary inferences therefrom) is well-taken. Yet the question remains as to what are the contours of such a political contract, and whether those contours can be concluded to vitiate the volitional nature of the individual’s consent.

For a person can be rightfully deemed to have intelligently acquiesced in the abbreviation or even surrender of certain secondary rights in exchange for the greater security of his primary rights. But can a person be deemed to have knowingly and willingly compacted when the nature of the political contract conceives the State to not only have the capacity to adjust and reconcile, but be the very source of, primary rights?*  Such a construction is so at variance with both Mankind’s experience and innate principles that it must be concluded that any adhesion to such a contract was only the result of compulsion or duplicity.**

These types of questions compel an examination into the origin, nature, and legitimacy of the nebulous creature known as the State.

The concept of the composition of a State as a discrete entity has been considered and analyzed over the millennia. But have these analyses been retrospective or prospective in perspective? Have they accepted the political structures into which they were born and matured as axioms and then applied them to primordial existence?

Many, if not most, of those discussions treat the State as an elemental structure in social life. However a State is not a natural structure, much less elemental, but rather an artificial construct.*** By nature it experiences transmutation and metamorphosizes into new combinations. Let us then now consider what is contended to be the composition of a State.

Of what does one conceive constitutes a State? Though the required components might be similar, it would seem that various differing perspectives do or could exist, depending upon which facet is deemed most central. Nevertheless, one could describe a State as

a distinct territory encompassed by defined borders,
permanently occupied by a static, or semi-static, population:

manifesting and conforming to various cultures
espousing various sets of mores
organized by an organic social structure
engaged in regular and continual economic interactions

promulgating and subjecting its population to certain laws, and

establishing and employing a governmental structure for the administration of those laws.

Further analysis of these components demonstrate that the State, as conceived, interposes a layer that only subordinates, nay subjugates, civil society to a formal hierarchy and imposes a rigidity that complicates rending of these shackles.

These components can and should be considered in order.

Geographical expanse and boundaries provide no innate definition of uniqueness. History is replete with examples of accretion of territory to nations, as well as of divestiture of regions from them; just to consider the most recent, there was: the annexation of Silesia and much of Poland by Germany prior to, and then the divestiture from it of those regions as well as East Prussia following, World War II; the annexation of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China; the division of Eastern European countries after 1989, consisting of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; and, prehaps most dramtic, the division of the Soviet Union (followed by de facto reincorporation of a number of the former regions into Russia’s sphere of influence). Moving from the specific to the general, we have already hypothesized how even within neighborhoods themselves mitosis and division is a natural dynamic; how much more than is it natural the larger the combination — there by definition being far more differences in a more populous and expansive nation, and hence occasions for dissension and rancor. This, then, provides no foundation for the erection of the additional layer of the State.

The culture and mores of the nation derive from the various neighborhoods that compose the polity. They are the product of the unique experiences, thereby forming the traditions, of the unitary, and then extended, families forming those neighborhoods.

They thus by nature precede any State, are deployed and employed independent of it, would survive its abolition, and cannot be enhanced, but only infringed, by it. Moreover, the larger the nation, the greater the volume and diversity of each set of culture and mores. Thus, endeavoring to define the character of a State by them only yields confusion and complication.

The social structure of any region not only has primordial roots, but fundamentally originated from and consists of individual person-to person interactions. These bilateral interactions then provide the foundation for and evolve into more-complex multilateral interactions.

Though these relationships then are constantly evolving they still depend upon the needs, decisions, and actions of each individual as they regularly engage with other individuals. The focus of daily life then is horizontal rather than vertical. The influence of the aggregate set of interrelationships composing a State then is but irregular.

The economy is perhaps the most fundamental, as well as essential, development in any society. It originates in the first person’s search for and acquisition of food, clothing, and shelter. It of course then develops in complexity as population expands.

Still economic interaction may be one of the limited arenas in which a State has a role. For it may be able to encourage efficiency, and limit (or eliminate) inequities, in the distriubtion of goods or services. Nevertheless, this role is an ameliorative, rather than formative, function — only being exerted upon the fringes, rather than the core, of an economic structure already in operation.

In conceiving the State as a fundamental entity, it is tendered that the theorists concentrated their attention upon the laws promulgated by it. This it is conceded is one of the indicias of a political entity, and a necessary development in any society. For as complexity increases, the necessity of promulgating and executing specific rules to govern the new relationships produced by this complexity also increases.

Yet, prior to Positive Law there were already standards imposed and observed. The fundamental standards were those imposed by Natural Law.****  Supplementary ones were the product of what the earliest combinations in society deemed just and beneficial. Thus, while it is not disputed that Positive Law (at least to some extent) is necessary, it was not the foundation nor the essence of the principles regulating personal interaction. Moreover, this Positive Law, as demonstrated by history and theory, is not static; they are periodically revised, modified, and supplemented. If so, then, it is impossible to define a State by them since a defintion is static by nature but the state of Positive Law is dynamic.

The laws of a community then are reactive rather than proactive, and do not constitute the foundation of a nation. By extrapolation a State likewise must be deemed a gloss upon the foundational, constituent neighborhoods that compose the community.

The final component to be considered is the governmental structure of a political entity. This likely was the element which proccupied the theorists in their conception of a State. It is the most visible facade of a nation as being the most articulated. By its very nature and necessity this structure must be meticulously defined, else it leads to tyranny and slavery. Further, how can it be effective and perform its intended function if neither the magistrates nor the populace understand its powers and restrictions?

Yet, simply because this structure is the most obvious and known component of a nation does not mean it is organic, much less the most important. For its purpose is but to enact Positive Law when it is required, to enforce it, and to adjudicate whether the enactments and enforcements were permissable and proper. Accordingly, if Positive Law is only of peripheral concern for and effect on the vast majority of personal interactions, then the government structure which is its source and sanction is likewise only peripheral; and the above demonstrates that the lack of centrality of the State to those interactions.

Rather, instead of the State, the only ineluctable structure is the Unitary Family; even it — in practice, even if contrary to precept — transforms not infrequently. Immediately beyond this is the Extended Family but it, because of its greater volume and diversity, is regularly subject to disputes between and division of its members. Even more are the larger combinations — neighborhoods, communities, regions and nations — subject to turmoil and dissention.

The Civil Society is inherently without conscious or deliberate organization. Its members interact, but this interaction is by nature organic. It thus experiences growth, mutations, and death. These changes may be as to the organism as a whole or in sets of its members only. These developments may be prolonged or rapid.

Civil Society then is continually, if not constantly (always, or even usually), in flux. Its composition and character may be stable, but of a different composition and character. Rather, its stability is a function and consequence of its transformation by adaptation; for it marginalizes or, when necessary, expels those members that exhibit or engage in rancor or disunity and integrates new members.

A State though, as defined and examined, is a natural appendage to Civil Society. For, as the result of the necessity of dispute resolution that exists at all stages, it first utilizes the inherent household mechanisms therefor and then expands and refines it as the inhabitants of the neighborhood, and then community, increase. Then, as the community further increases, in inhabitant volume and geographically, it then is compelled to establish defined, specific rules for the new contingencies and situations it did not previously confront.*****  Finally, the proliferation of further new contingencies and consequent rules necessitates a separate body for the administration and application of them. The community thus experiences the necessity of the formation of a Proto-Judiciary, then a Proto-Legislature, and, later, a Proto-Executive. The Civil Society then grafts these appendages onto itself. While adaptations thereto may later be necessary and then effectuated, they retain their character as but an adjunct of Civil Society.

A State then is not a natural creature, but an artificial embodiment of the precursive organism. Civil Society, as an infinitely-varied entity (depending upon the median mores, culture and experiences of its members), cannot have perceived any necessity for a duplicative definition of it; a State would be but an exact overlay of it, yielding no benefit but rather only confusion. From the perspective of a government, though, such a concept would be beneficial, by rendering its existence inviolable and transforming its position to be the root of the community. But this reverses the chronology and its status as but a branch of Civil Society. And it cannot be otherwise — for their natures are singular.

Civil Society is a flexible transmuting organism. It is dynamic, not static.

A State, though, is a formal entity with an integrated structure. While it might be altered (even dramatically), the new pattern will still be formal and integrated.

The one then is alive and the other is subject to atrophy. This being so, only Civil Society can give birth to the future, open vistas for the energies and talents of its members, provide the arena for the interactions of these energies and talents, and bestow the reciprocal rewards therefor.

Consequently, with all due respect to Plato and Socrates, I retain my incredulity at their proposition.

*  Primary natural rights are, by their very designation, primary. They are essential to the survival and autonomy of each individual. As such, the loss, or worse the deprivation by another, of them would result in the destruction of the individual. As destruction of another person is an indisputable violation of Natural Law, the loss or deprivation of Primary natural rights is likewise a violation of Natural Law and is forbidden. No person, then, may abridge, alienate, or surrender his Primary natural rights, either to a State or to another Unitary Family or Extended Family; only Secondary natural rights — when essential, in adequate exchange for greater security of or enhanced power to exercise a Primary natural right, and for a limited duration — can be abridged.

Yet, in the case of a State, even the right of alienation of Secondary natural rights to it is problematic since as the State has been conceived (at least by some) as a permanent entity and resistant to the removal of powers once granted, it could jeopardize the exercise of those rights by later generations; and no person has the right to deprive later generations of Secondary, much less Primary, natural rights. (The alienation of Secondary natural rights to another Unitary Family or Extended Family is less problematic since, as discussed herein, their composition and duration is dynamic and constantly in flux ¥ yielding the opportunity to be released from his alienation of those rights.)

Further we should consider, as is elaborated in this essay as well as established a priori, Civil Society is antecedent to and developed independent of any State. Yet Primary natural rights were antecedent to Civil Society. They thus are ingrained in all persons and inherent in all interrelationships. Being then elemental and antecedent, any State is subject to them. Thus, while a State may have the residual power to adjust and reconcile Primary natural rights, this power must be restrictively interpreted and extraordinarily exercised. For otherwise the very survival of every member of the community would be in constant and ultimate jeopardy.

**  Natural Rights are a component of Natural Law, and Natural Law is integral to Nature, Nature being the totality of all existence and life. As each person is born into Nature, by virtue of thereby being a part of existence and life, Mankind is a part of Nature and Natural Rights hence are a part of each person; they are bestowed at birth and are innate to each individual.

These rights may be either Primary and Secondary. The difference between them is that the former are required for survival of the individual and thus cannot be alienated; for since his birth was not his choice nor the result of his actions, no person has the right to abandon his life. Moreover, as the instinct to perpetuate life is natural and any inclination to abandon life is unnatural, any putative choice to the contrary must be presumed to be misapprehended and the result rather of external forces; else the gate allowing oppressive and tyrannical power to enter is opened. (As life was a gift bestowed upon him, all persons have a duty to preserve it and engage in activities for their own benefit. Moreover, as life is not solitary — save for the hermit who lives his life in isolation and thus is without impact or effect in his time or after his demise — he has a duty also to engage in activities that may potentially or will directly benefit others.)

Thus, abridgment, much less surrender, by any person of their Primary natural rights would constitute repudiation of the natural order, much less his inherent rights and natural instincts. Therefore, any acquiescence in the loss thereof must be deemed inconceivable and not the result of his knowing and volitional choice.

***  A State could not exist in a different spatial sphere than the community with which it is associated and purportedly serves. Yet, as has been demonstrated both theoretically and historically, a community is subject to both merger and division. If then a community as constituted is a temporary creature, then so must a State be deemed, not merely a temporary, but an artificial construct — as its structure and jurisdiction is not merely derivative but unsubstantial.

****  Positive Law is both historically posterior and subordinate to Natural Law and its associated Natural Rights. Moreover, both the community and its Positive Law are transitory whereas Natural Law is unalterable and enduring.

*****  We today characterize these rules as Positive Law, viz, Constitutions and Statutes.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
04 Apr 2020

Secularism in Defense of Ignorance

Regrettably there are not a few who conceive that the language “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” permits, if not mandates, the establishment of a secular state. Some may even fancy that the United States should approach the concept of such a state that has been adopted by France. This would be tragic.

France admittedly has a unique legal framework where the laïcité principle was in incubation for over two (2) centuries. However, as demonstrated by a most-recent abuse of this principle that is discussed in the New York Times “Another Hijab Furor Hits France, Over a Mother on a School Trip” article, its application yields egregious results and certainly should be avoided by all other legal systems.

Being offended appears to be a salient motivating sentiment these days. While in certain instances it could be a legitimate grievance, the character of the putative offense is the determining factor.

Ad hominem assertions are one set of offending assertions that generally should be castigated. However, an expression that the opinion of another is unfounded, imprudent, or unwise — or, perhaps, even just stupid — should never be restrained. Even more offensive is when an effort is made to restrain isolated actions of a person who is thereby expressing their own opinion.

The wearing of a hijab certainly is encompassed within the latter category. It is isolated in that it does not impinge upon or restrict either the liberty or freedom of another. And it is but the expression by the wearer of their own opinion, in this case of religious beliefs.

It does suggest that the wearer believes their opinion and beliefs are superior to those of persons who hold contrary opinions and beliefs. But are there not a diversity of opinions and beliefs? And is there not a value in this diversity as it allows an inducement, or at least an opportunity, for assessment of one’s own opinions and beliefs?

Homogeneity has many benefits; but they are best embraced and pursued in discrete communities. As duality is the rule in all systems, in order to preserve homogeneity, heterogeneity must also be preserved.

Here, those objecting to these public displays are seeking to suppress contrary opinions and beliefs. But the expression of opinions and beliefs, either verbally or non-verbally, best enables the preservation of them. These efforts at restriction obviously are destructive of both heterogeneity and diversity.

Even more abusive are restrictions that evince religious hostility or restrict religious diversity. Unlike actions that have common activities as a focus — and therefore have a greater capacity to unjustifiably impinge upon the liberty of another — religious opinions and beliefs are inherently of an abstract character. For this reason, as well as the very character of the focus of these beliefs, they have historically always been afforded greater protection. (It is of course recognized that history records numerous acts of violence perpetrated in the name of religion, but these almost universally constitute repudiation of those religious beliefs and thus do not invalidate the aforesaid assertion.)

The policy of laïcité had its origins in the French Revolution as a reaction to the power of the Church under the monarchy. Excessive power of the Church was deemed inconsistent with “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity”. But is excessive power concentration in the state an appropriate remedy for perceived ills?  For:

How is suppression of the expression of opinion consistent with Liberty?
If all are Equal, how can some opinions be more equal than others?
Does not relegation of some opinion to disfavored status in fact destroy Fraternity?

A Free State permits all actions of its citizens that do not impinge upon vital interests of another. These include all expressions and displays of religious opinions and beliefs. Secularism though seeks to suppress those expressions and beliefs by purging them from the public arena. It then by circumscribing and abbreviating the scope of those opinions which it deems permissible is in service of ignorance.

Let us then pray that this malignant contagion never infests our shores, and that we may succeed in retrenching the misconceived abbreviation of this liberty inflicted by our Courts in incipient service of this foreign doctrine.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
24 October 2019

Jefferson’s “Wall of Separation”

[The below are posts made by the undersigned in different fora, and now are incorporated here. These are provided both to memorialize them, and as background for the succeeding post.]


It is possible, as noted below, that Jefferson was aware of Roger Williams’ opinions. (I have no knowledge of Madison’s awareness thereof.) The issue though is the construction of the Free Establishment clause, and I tender that Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in Reynolds v United States (1879), followed by Mr. Justice Black, in Everson v Board of Education (1947), misconstrued the prohibition against any “law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” as requiring “a wall of separation between church and State”, as enunciated by Jefferson in his letter to the Danbury Baptists.

First, it of course was Madison that proposed in the First Congress the amendments that would, in part, become the Bill of Rights. While Madison and Jefferson agreed on many things (e.g. Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions), they certainly had differing opinions also. Further, Jefferson had no role in those amendments; when Congress passed the bill consisting of the proposed amendments to be submitted for ratification, Jefferson was still in France. How then Mr. Chief Justice Waite could find that Jefferson’s opinion “may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured” is more than a bit surprising.

Second, while scholarly opinion differs on the origin of the phrase and what was understood by Jefferson thereby, there is some support that his opinion was parallel with that expressed by Roger Williams more than a century prior. (The fact that both Williams and the Baptists were opponents of the Congregationalists seems to me more than a bit material to the issue, as will appear below.) There is little dispute that Williams was not in the mainstream of thought on the question. Likewise, I would modestly tender that, even if Jefferson intended what was later inferred by SCOTUS, neither was he in the mainstream.

Third, it would appear that Jefferson’s missive was intended more for political benefit than intended as a legal or philosophical exposition. It thus should earlier and now not have received the impact it was afforded.

New England, and Connecticut in particular, was the stronghold of Federalist politics. Providing support to Federalist opponents then was to the benefit of the Democratic-Republicans. According to Dumas Malone, perhaps his preeminent biographer, Jefferson circulated a draft of the letter only to his Postmaster General and Attorney General, his chief consultants on New England, for their comments. Malone concludes that, by the letter, Jefferson “was seeking to encourage the dissenting minority in Connecticut and to rebuke the politico-religious rulers of that commonwealth.” The “politico-religious rulers of that commonwealth” were the Congregationalists.

Malone does not indicate that it was also circulated to his Secretary of State, Madison. Further, my scanning of the correspondence between Jefferson and Madison during the last quarter of 1801 and the first few days of 1802, the letter to the Baptists being dated January 1, 1802, discloses no reference to it. If Jefferson had intended it to be “an authoritative declaration” on the First Amendment, would he not have also elicited Madison’s comments thereon?

The Reynolds and Everson decisions are now of course precedent. But, as we all know, precedent has not necessarily been without error. In this instance Jefferson’s metaphor resulted in an Historical Fiction that regrettably produced much misdirection in this jurisprudence.


I am modestly familiar w/ 17th Century Massachusetts, having in my long-ago youth studied a decent number of the works of Perry Miller and Edmund Morgan; I’m currently, in my “spare time”, sporadically revisiting some of Prof Miller’s works. These though of course dealt primarily with Massachusetts Bay’s theological, rather than political, structure.

I would concur that it appears Massachusetts Bay’s theocracy “went off the rails” as essentially being in conflict w/ their theology. One of the pronouncements of the Westminster Confession of Faith is that:

“God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in anything contrary to his Word, or beside it in matters of faith or worship. So that to believe such doctrines, or to obey such commandments out of conscience, is to betray true liberty of conscience; and the requiring an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience, is to destroy liberty of conscience, and reason also.”

Now admittedly when the Long Parliament caused the Westminster Assembly to be instituted, the Arbella had already sailed. Still, the attitude and practices of Winthrop et al ought not to have been at significant variance w/ those of his compatriots who remained behind.

Further, while Archbishop Laud was not installed as such also until after the sailing of the Arbella, his dominance and hostility should have been known by those in Boston. If one finds autocracy in England obnoxious, can one justify it in Boston?

Perhaps the conundrum can be justified by the necessity of contemporaneously establishing both the church and government in a virgin territory. (I’m currently listening to Bradford’s “History of the Plymouth Settlement”, and will find it interesting how it resolved this question. While the religious polity of the Separatists in Plymouth was different from their Boston counterparts, their theology was essentially the same.) Still, Boston’s variance in what it should have done seems indisputable.

The purpose then of the Establishment Clause isn’t questioned. My dispute is w/ the misuse of Jefferson’s metaphor — in Reynolds, Everson, and Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent — which has unduly expanded this purpose. Part of the abuse is Jefferson’s use of the dichotomy of “Church and State” whereas the Establishment Clause (as well as the Free Exercise Clause) instead utilizes the term “religion”; the distinction has been noted previously, and different conclusions drawn as a result. While it can be argued that the policy of Jefferson and Williams (assuming the latter was the inspiration for the former) was preferable, I still find little evidence for it being the proper basis of construction of the Establishment Clause.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
24 October 2019

Michigan “Extreme Risk Protection Order” Bills

After my last posting I took the occasion to review the subject, consisting of House Bill No. 4283 and Senate Bill No. 156 introduced in the Michigan Legislature.  They are “carbon copies” of each other.

Since the last post didn’t explicitly indicate that I favor these type of bills if properly structured, I decided that I ought to post comments I submitted to my State Representative and State Senator.  These demonstrate both my support of appropriate ERPO statutes, and also deficiencies in those bills.  Therefore, below is the text of those comments.

This is provided in regard to [House Bill No. 4283] [Senate Bill No. 156].

It is my opinion that the utility of an Extreme Risk Protection Order (“ERPO”) is a beneficial exercise of authority in appropriate situations and ought to be authorized by appropriate statute provided that the authorizing ERPO statute conforms to procedural due process requirements. Regrettably, it is my opinion that this bill does not, and therefore urge that the committee and chamber make radical amendments thereto.

For assistance in demonstrating some of the deficiencies in the aforesaid bill I have recently made an analysis of similar bills now pending in the U.S. Senate, this being accessible at:

Do the current proposed Congressional “Red Flag Laws” themselves exhibit Red Flags?

A PDF version of the post, containing in the body thereof the PDF tables linked therein, can be provided on request.

Specifically, I inter alia note problems with the following sections of the bill:

  • 3(e) (a qualified objection, as to its breadth)
  • 5(2)(b), (c) and (d)
  • 5(3), as to the “significant risk”, rather than an “extreme risk”, standard
  • 7(1), as to the minimal “reasonable cause” and “significant risk” standards. [In this connection I would note that the bill does not even require the unacceptable “preponderance of evidence” standard for the adversarial hearing order imposed by S.506 of Senator Feinstein.]
  • 7(1)(a), as it is not clear from the “testimony” reference that appearance by and cross-examination of the complainant is required, risking the same possibility of “show trials” envisioned by Senator Feinstein
  • 7(2), as a “clear and convincing” standard only is appropriate, though it, unlike S.7 of Senator Rubio and S.506 of Senator Feinstein, does require a showing of “immediate and irreparable injury”
  • 7(4), as to the limitation to 1 motion is inadequate, as potential abuse from multiple motions could be otherwise addressed
  • 17

Other sections of the bill also pose difficulties but, since they are not replicated in the U.S. Senate Bills, are not addressed in the post and would have to be discussed later.

I trust the foregoing is satisfactory to indicate the necessity of opposition to the aforesaid bill as presently drafted.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
04 June 2019

Do the current proposed Congressional “Red Flag Laws” themselves exhibit Red Flags?

On January 3, 2019, Senator Marco Rubio of Florida introduced in the United States Senate his Extreme Risk Protection Order and Violence Prevention Act of 2019 (“S.7″). On February 14, 2019, Senator Dianne Feinstein of California introduced in the United States Senate her Extreme Risk Protection Order Act of 2019 (“S.506”).

On March 26, 2019, the United States Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action (“Hearing”). Five (5) witnesses appeared at the Hearing, all of whom submitted written testimony prior thereto as well as testified at it. One of those witnesses was Professor David B. Kopel (“Kopel”) whose written testimony set forth certain criteria for assessing the conformity of such statutes to procedural due process requirements.

This post will endeavor to analyze whether S.7 and S.506 conform to Kopel’s criteria. While some may disagree that these are the proper criteria to apply, this post operates upon the assumption that these ought to be operative in determining the acceptability of, or deficiencies in, either S.7 or S.506.

The initial observation is that both S.7 and S.506 are properly limited to the function of providing possible financial grants to the States for implementing such statutory regimes. For these regimes are solely within the Police Powers of the States and thus beyond the enumerated powers of the Federal government. Nevertheless, since both S.7 and S.506 prescribe certain guidelines for determining standing and procedures, those guidelines will be expected to exert a certain coercive effect upon the States to adopt a statutory regime parallel to them; for even if more strict standards could be employed by the States, or some of them, it will be expected that the general propensity (if not universal principle) to exert minimal effort to attain an objective will discourage the States, or some of them, to be more ambitious in providing further standing limitations or procedural protections.

Let us first review Kopels’ criteria, by category and standard, of preferred requirements. Afterward I will offer my own modest reaction to any toward which I might find problematic. These criteria, due to page width and consequent formatting problems, are set forth in my PV-ERPO_Tlb-1.pdf PDF file.

The only requirements that I might find problematic are, first, providing appointed counsel for the Respondent, and, two, excessive discouragement of No-Knock Raids.

Addressing the latter first, while these entries are certainly subject to abuse, they are occasionally required. If specific restrictions are described for their employment, then these can be prudent.

A confiscation regime is a civil proceeding. Accordingly, the requirement of provision of appointed counsel could be questionable. Nevertheless, since these proceedings could be deemed quasi-criminal, such a requirement could be appropriate.

Other than these, I find Kopel’s requirements reasonable and prudent indeed.

Let us now address our attention to S.7 and S.506 to determine how their standards conform to Kopel’s requirements. While some of those requirements may not be appropriate to either bill, as its purpose is to provide financial grants and only prescribe minimum standards therefor, I will include all of them in the below table, and either fail to note an “X” in either the “Yes” or “No” column if inapplicable, infer a negative answer by its silence, or include an * when the answer is qualified.

Now let us see how well these bills measure up. This comparison, due to page width and consequent formatting problems, are set forth in my PV-ERPO_Tlb-2.pdf PDF file.

As is clear from this PDF file, both S.7 and S.506 are deficient in providing protections deemed by Kopel to be required; while the marks in the “No” column for S.506 are profuse, S.7 also exhibits numerous failing grades. This writer likewise concurs that insufficient protections are afforded to the potential respondents in these proceedings.

S.7 makes some attempts to afford protection to potential respondents, albeit not adequate in this writer’s opinion. Its profuse provisions, the verbosity being far in excess of the sketchiness of S.506, may detract from, rather than enhance, those protections.

S.506, however, makes no attempt to provide more than a facade of procedural due process. It provides only a bare skeleton, delegating to the States — a facile gesture to Federalism as §4 describes it as the “National Extreme Risk Protection Order Law” (emphasis supplied) — the task of defining the procedural requirements, none of which have to be more rigorous than the bare skeleton of S.506.

Nevertheless, an attempt will be made now to compare certain of the respective provisions in, and the anomalies of, these bills. These will be addressed, as above, in a chronological order, and thus not a ranking of the importance of these deficiencies:

1. Commencement
S.506 provides no definition of or limitation upon the persons who could file a petition, but wholly defers to State action. Theoretically, then, if each State acted likewise, any of some-325,000,000 persons could file a petition against anyone else, regardless of their facile lack of knowledge.

S.7 attempts, by its addition of 34 USC 3041(3), to limit those qualified to initiate a proceeding. Still, the breadth introduced by (3)(B), (3)(C)(ii), (3)(E), and (3)(F) allows a wide range of persons who could act from ulterior motives as well as, in some of the cases, have minimal current contact with a potential respondent. Curiously, the proposed addition of 34 USC 3042(b)(5) allows a State to limit qualified petitioners to only law enforcement officers without imposing it as a minimum requirement; by this it almost appears as an afterthought or as a cautious suggestion to the States.

2. Risk of Injury
Neither S.7 nor S.506 impose a high standard of prospective adverse consequences if a confiscation order is not entered. S.7 only requires a showing of significant danger, while S.506 even eliminates the adjective and is satisfied with just a showing of danger. Neither then is consistent with their titles of addressing extreme risk. Further, the criterion of just danger seems overly-broad, would “cast too wide a net”, and often can merely be in the “eye of the beholder”.

3. Burden of Proof
This it would seem is the most-important deficiency in the bills.

While S.7 fortunately does require proof at the adversarial hearing by clear and convincing evidence, it permits the entry of an ex parte temporary confiscation order upon only a finding of probable cause; as this does not satisfy even the preponderance of evidence, much less the clear and convincing, standard, it clearly seems inadequate. This writer considers Kopel’s argument — if an unopposed application cannot at least satisfy a clear and convincing standard then there would not seem much merit to it — persuasive.

S.506 fails even more than S.7 in this regard. For an ex parte temporary confiscation order it only requires a finding of reasonable cause. And for the adversarial hearing it allows entry of a confiscation order by only a preponderance of evidence. Along with its other provisions, S.506 seems to consider requiring confiscation to be the default posture.

4. Ex Parte Temporary Confiscation Order Evidence
If the standard for the burden of proof justifying entry of such an order were high enough, then neither bill would be fatally deficient in this regard. It is of course common practice for Temporary Restraining Orders to be determined and entered based upon affidavit only.

S.7 does require the petition to be accompanied by a sworn affidavit “stating the specific facts that give rise to reasonable fear of significant dangerous acts” and requires for the entry of a temporary order “detailed allegations based on personal knowledge that the respondent poses a significant danger”. It also requires the court to “conduct a hearing, either in person or by telephone”. If it also imposed a higher standard of proof, this procedure would seem sufficient.

S.506, though, in addition to the same inadequate standard of proof, fails to provide for like submission of necessary evidence. It permits the entry of an order if “the application alleges that the respondent poses a danger of causing harm”, with the application being “on a form designed by the court … that … describes the facts and circumstances justifying … an extreme risk protection order … and … is signed by the applicant, under oath.” Those with familiarity with court forms providing for check boxes allows them to apprehend that merely minimal and cursory allegations may well suffice.

5. Surrender of Firearms
S.7 appears to provide for sufficient procedural protection upon this aspect. While not explicit, the various sections providing for surrender indicate that voluntary compliance will be allowed. No necessary confrontation between law enforcement and respondents is envisioned.

S.506 again is less accommodating. As it defines an extreme risk protection order as either “a written order or warrant”, it suggest that No-Knock Raids may be a standard feature of its regime.

6. Storage of Firearms
Both S.7 and S.506 provide adequate provisions upon this aspect. However, S.7 is superior as, in addition to storage by law enforcement and Federal Firearm Licensees, it allows storage by responsible third persons, presumably acceptable to the respondent. Further, S.7 provides an express prohibition upon any action (or inferentially inaction) by a custodian that would deleteriously affect or impair the rights of the owner in the firearms.

7. Notice to Respondent
While both S.7 and S.506 refer to providing notice to respondents, neither prescribes that this will be promptly effectuated, much less within any defined period after entry of a temporary order or the issuance of a hearing notice. This obviously allows for potential abuse and, especially in the case of an ex parte temporary confiscation order, possible dangerous situations.

8. Conduct of Adversarial Hearings
Here also, as with the Burden of Proof aspect, there is an inexcusable failure to conform to procedural due process requirements.

S.7 provides that a court “may conduct the hearing required under clause (i) [the adversarial, not the ex parte, hearing] by telephone …” The respondent then is apparently deprived of the right of cross-examination, and possibly even of sworn testimony being required of the petitioner. This is wholly unacceptable.

S.506, if possible, is even more egregious. It provides no standards for the conduct of the hearing — not even telephonic “testimony”. Apparently, the only evidence it would require of the petitioner is the sworn application. S.506, it would seem, now introduces the novelty of “show trials” into American jurisprudence.

9. Malicious Prosecution Sanctions
S.7 at least endeavors to discourage abuse of its procedures. For it requires the States to enact a statute that any making of false statements under oath in these proceedings would constitute a Felony. While it would presumably apply also to respondents, any petitioner would likewise be subject thereto.

This should discourage any clearly-unjustified petition. However, since some prosecutors conceivably could be loath to prosecute these felonies, provision should have been made also for a civil remedy, as it would be under the control of the wronged respondent. No such provision exists.

S.506, as expected, makes no provision for either.

Other deficiencies exist in both statutes. Among these are some questionable categories of evidence treated as admissible, particularly those recited in S.7. However, this post is verbose enough as it is. Suffice it to say that the foregoing should demonstrate both bills require radical amendments in order to conform to well-established principles of American jurisprudence.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
06 April 2019


The author belatedly became aware that also on February 14, 2019, Representative Salud Carbajal of California introduced in the United States House of Representatives his Extreme Risk Protection Order Act of 2019 (“H.R.1236”).

The author has now compared S.506 and H.R.1236 and they are identical.  Therefore, H.R.1236 displays all the deficiencies of S.506 discussed above.

Nevertheless, there is a further deficiency in both bills not previously appreciated.  Section 7 of both Bills recite:

Any extreme risk protection order issued under a State or Tribal law enacted in accordance with this Act 14 shall be accorded the same full faith and credit by the court of another State or Indian Tribe (the enforcing State or Indian Tribe) and enforced by the court and law enforcement personnel of the other State or Tribal government as if it were the order of the enforcing State or Tribe.

However, Section 4 of both Bills, in pertinent part, recite:


(b) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.—Legislation described in this section may—
(1) provide procedures for the termination of an extreme risk protection order;
(2) provide procedures for the renewal of an extreme risk protection order;
(3) establish burdens of proof for issuance of orders described in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a) that are higher than the burdens of proof required under those paragraphs; and
(4) limit the individuals who may submit an application described in subsection (a)(1), provided that, at a minimum, law enforcement officers are authorized to do so.

Therefore, Section 7 is manifestly inconsistent with Section 4.  Suppose State A enters an Extreme Risk Protection Order (“ERPO”).  The ERPO is then sought to be enforced in State B

However, State B, pursuant to Section 4(b)(1), (3), and (4) has enacted similar legislation but with standards more rigorous than those of State A; those higher standards might conceivably have resulted in denial of an ERPO if sought in State B.  Nevertheless, Section 7 would purportedly require enforcement of the State A ERPO even though unjustified by the laws, and against the public policy, of State B.

Hence, thereby, would the Police Powers of State B be supplanted and controlled by the laws of State A.  Federalism is not intended to allow, nor does it permit, the lowest common denominator to dictate the laws of another State.

For this reason also, these Bills are unacceptable.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
03 September 2019



Another Example of the Prudence of Minimal Governmental Intervention

The outrageous tragedy at the Tree of Life Congregation synagogue in Pittsburgh on October 27, provides another example of the vital importance of governments, particularly at the national or international level, maintaining a “skinny agenda”.

It appears that his hysteria on the Immigration issue was the ultimate motivation of the unspeakable villain, Robert Bowers, in his evil attack at the synagogue.  Forming a conclusion that the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society was engaged in activities on the opposite side of the divide on the issue, he lashed out at innocents who he identified with it.  (This in no way implies any justification for his heinous actions but is only intended to provide the context for below perspective — as his psychopathic behavior was not inspired only by personal animus but by positions on public policy.)

The question of Immigration policy has of course been one of the most hotly-disputed current issues. It has inflamed people and occasioned excessive incendiary rhetoric on both sides of it. The polarization on the question has resulted in a constantly-spiraling descent in inflammatory rhetoric by both sides.  (At the risk of inspiring ire by paraphrasing POTUS’ inarticulate comments on the 2017 Charlottesville Virginia rancor, there are, in addition to good people, also bad people, on both sides of an issue.)  Certain people are deranged by this rancor.

On any issue there are discrete groups of people with contrary opinions.  On both sides one will find tiers of these groups, consisting of:

  • good people espousing rational arguments,
  • good people espousing irrational arguments,
  • bad people, and
  • evil people.

If an issue is sufficiently detached from immediate interest and impact on most people, the persons involved in expressing and effectuating an opinion on these issues will generally be only those upper tiers.  However, as the impact from it becomes more direct and significant, as well as the rhetoric surrounding it becoming more incendiary, then the lower tiers will begin emerging from the woodwork.  Then the threat of intense conflict and violence accelerates.

Wisdom and prescience are always in short supply.  The inability to accurately assess and evaluate an issue curses the vast majority of the decisions of everyone.  Therefore, maintaining flexibility and humility in formulating, expressing, and effectuating one’s opinions is of paramount importance; for the most confident anyone should be is that the contrary opinion of another may be the correct one.

Unfortunately, in the context of government, this is usually an impossible challenge.  Both historically and by theory the vast majority of decisions are decided by the will of a simple majority.  This necessarily then excludes a substantial portion of the people within its jurisdiction, and imposes a policy contrary to their opinion.  This policy will necessarily, proceeding from the decision by only a portion of imperfect persons, fail in attaining its intended objectives.

The more a government attempts to intervene in the regular activities of its citizens, the more intense will be the reaction of those who disagree with and oppose the policy.  Rancor will then result, and the tiers of bad people and evil people will swarm into the controversy.  Thus, the skinnier the agenda, the less likelihood of intervention in common activities and the inspiring of hostility by those affected.

Admittedly, Immigration policy might be a poor example upon which to base this characterization.  This policy is not only one that can only be determined and administered by a national government but is a basic function thereof — as well as one which was required to be performed not only by the current administration but by all previous ones.  Yet, if government had not intervened on many other issues that are justly outside of its jurisdiction — thereby introducing an environment of hostility and conflict — the impact and effect from the controversy on Immigration policy might have been minimal.  For the less a government causes irritation among its citizens, the less sensitive will they be to policies with which they disagree, and less susceptible to agitation by malefactors.

Thus, government structure, when conforming to this “skinny protocol”, can be envisioned as a pyramid, with the national government at the top pursuing the narrowest agenda, and downwards gradually expanding into broader agendas at lower levels, with the broadest being at the local level.  With local units that are, by chance or choice, more homogenous in their citizen composition, then even broad agendas will be unlikely to inspire hostility and conflict.

Sanilac County, Michigan USA
30 October 2018


[A PDF version of this post may be downloaded from here.]

[The following is the first draft of Appendix C to the Second Edition of my Interstice Amid the Fabric of Life / Volume 1 : The State of Primordial Mankind (Print on Demand edition and Nook® ePub or Kindle® ePub editions) essay.  As I will for awhile be in the process of finalizing the second edition, I provide this as preliminary notice of this addition thereto.
UPDATE:  The later version of the following, in addition to its inclusion as an appendix to the Second Edition of the aforesaid volume, is also incorporated into the text of Chapter One and Chapter Four of the succeeding volume of the essay, Volume 2 : The Nature of Mankind and Government, (Print on Demand edition, and Nook® ePub or Kindle® ePub editions.)]

These three principles are basic premises, and essential to the perspective, of this essay. Accordingly, inclusion in this edition of this discussion was deemed essential.

However, as they are the premises and perspective, it was considered that insertion of them in the text — the suggested chronological narrative of the development of civil society and its support institutions — would cause disruption in the “narrative flow”. Therefore, even though this development could only have transpired within the context of the operation of these principles, this construct is assigned to an appendix instead.

Origin and Character

When the first inhabitant appeared he was unrestricted — other than by his personal mental and physical limitations, as well as by his locality’s geographical features — in his liberty of choice.1 He was endowed with the right to select the course of his life, those means and devices to utilize in order to preserve it, the area of habitation for it, his food for survival during it, and the labor to be performed to secure those goals. These then were his Natural Rights.

Exercise of these Natural Rights though was not random. As Liberty is an active state, it entails conscious, intentional behavior. However, as all energy is finite, and particularly that available to any individual, in a natural state there must be a direction and vector for this behavior; otherwise the energy that would be utilized to enable performance will be dissipated and no longer available to that individual.2 This dissipation of energy then would restrict the capacity of the source individual in the exercise of his Natural Rights.

But such a consequence would constitute a deprivation of these Natural Rights. And the endowment of these on all persons is an axiom. Thus, since such a state is inconceivable as it would destroy the system, there must exist certain principles for the guidance and regulation in the exercise of these Natural Rights. In these principles then is the basis and substance of Natural Law.

Natural Law then consists of original, inviolable, universal principles governing and directing human conduct.3 Any violations, much less repudiation, of Natural Law necessarily leads to social decay and destruction. For as they are integral to the system, the system cannot survive without observance of them.4

Not only the inaugural inhabitant but all successive inhabitants were likewise unrestricted, endowed with these Natural Rights and subject to this Natural Law — of the same degree and equivalence, as if they had been the inaugural inhabitant. For it was the system which invested them and subjected them, and not their predecessors. Therefore it was beyond the power of any predecessor inhabitant, either individually or collectively, to alter either.

Only when contact occurred between these inhabitants did the necessity arise for mutual restriction of the scope of their liberty. And even then the degree of this restriction was only in proportion to the duration of the contact, whether temporary or permanent.

Only in community did each of the members of it voluntarily abridge their Natural Rights — and then only some of them and only to the extent necessary to remain in community. By mutual concurrence upon appropriate and necessary restrictions in response to exigencies encountered in community, gradually considering alternate solutions to each unique circumstance, uniform standards of fairness and equity were identified.5 This then was Natural Justice.

As civil society enlarged, further adjustments to practices, in order to preserve peace and order, were required. These however, since Natural Rights, Natural Law and Natural Justice existed before any inhabitant, much less community, emerged, did not and could not redefine, much less abrogate, them.


Natural Rights
These original rights are inherent in and implicit to nature. While these rights can be codified, as they are integral to the system of life, they then need not be made explicit, and any absence of codification cannot be construed to abrogate or restrict them in any degree. None are displaced by any delegation of authority to anyone else unless possibly by explicit and unambiguous surrender.6

These original rights consist of those which are primary and secondary. Primary original rights cannot be divested, though secondary original rights, for predominant reasons and with unambiguous consent, can be potentially and partially divested. Those primary original rights, ones which cannot be divested, consist of the following:
–  life
–  self-defense
–  a domicile and shelter within its curtilage
–  food
–  performance of productive labor
Those secondary original rights, ones which can be potentially and partially divested, consist of the following:
–  movement
–  clothing
–  procreation

Natural Law
Natural Rights and Natural Law, being integral to the system, originate concurrently. However, as Natural Rights can be exercised in isolation, Natural Law, or at least a segment of it, initially remains inchoate. Yet, even if partially inchoate, Natural Law always remains present and active.

For, as already observed, mankind in its natural state were endowed with certain essential rights. When exercised in isolation, and thereby under the control of a sole individual, order is present. However, when exercised in sufficient proximity to another individual as to limit the other person’s liberty, then disorder is introduced.

This is the consequence of Natural Rights being of equivalent characteristics and with equivalent orbit in their effects when exercised. Accordingly, when an individual no longer exercises these rights in isolation, the orbit of their effect will overlap the orbit of another. But since no two properties can occupy the same space, collision between these sets of rights — even if not necessarily conflict between the individuals — is inevitable.

Accordingly, a mechanism must exist to enable order.7 Otherwise chaos would have ultimately ensued incident to this clash of orbits of Natural Rights, with all inhabitants subject to endemic war and insecurity. But entropy is not the natural state of a system, but rather is only its end, deteriorated state. Consequently, it would be impossible for disorder to be the natural state of mankind; ergo, it must be concluded that conditions promoting and constituting order were originally present. These conditions were the principles of Natural Law ensuring survival of mankind.

What is the nature of Natural Law? In analyzing it let us look at the prime Natural Right, viz, Liberty. Liberty endows each person with the right of choice. It is therefore individually-oriented, with the choices reflecting the person’s unique psychological composition. As these psychological compositions are unique, the choices of any set of various persons will then proceed in disparate directions8; ultimately they will converge on each other. These multiple and conflicting vectors though are contrary to order, the innate quality of the natural state.

Natural Rights thus require direction. Natural Law directs the proper exercise of these Natural Rights. Natural Law then is mandatory in character.

Now, what are the principles of Natural Law? Being integral to the system, these principles are not merely inviolable but fully and perfectly integrated. But Mankind’s comprehension is congenitally limited and imperfect — demonstrable not merely empirically but as Mankind is but an addition to and component of the system and therefore subordinate to it. Therefore, these principles are essentially incognizable and imperceptible.

Yet, the core principle is manifest. The function of Natural Law to institute and maintain order. Thus, the core principle is harmony. From this core are radiated the corollary principles.

Unlike Natural Law, the scope and elements of Natural Rights are known. Each person then knows he is endowed with them. Therefore, he knows that all other persons are likewise endowed with them.

In a state of harmony there is understanding of and appreciation for the conditions and circumstances of the social environment, including the knowledge of this universality of Natural Rights. They thereby are then mandated to observe respect for the Natural Rights of each other inhabitant. Respect for the Natural Rights of others then is a prime sequential mandate of Natural Law.

Nevertheless, a course of activities by one will necessarily intrude upon the course of activities by another.9 Thus, some exercises of Natural Rights by one person will necessarily infringe upon some exercise of Natural Rights by another.

This infringement, though, is in conflict with the mandated respect for the Natural Rights of others. How then to resolve this conflict? One can only do so by structuring the activities in which they engage so that these observe the Natural Rights of the other inhabitants. To do so, they are mandated to mutually cooperate with any inhabitant who is affected by any of their activities. Mutual cooperation then is another prime sequential mandate of Natural Law.

Further, if a given inhabitant is more adept and successful in accumulating resources, they are mandated to share those resources with those inhabitants who are less privileged — as the inequality between them will, to some degree, produce disharmony; the occasion and extent for this assistance, though, remains an election and exercise of choice by the more-privileged inhabitant, as he remains endowed with his Natural Right of Liberty. No inhabitant is compelled by any collective body of society to perform these acts of charity, but rather only compelled to so by Natural Law. Charity then is one more prime sequential mandate of Natural Law.

Other prime and corollary principles must exist but, not only are they beyond the ken of this writer, they are by definition not fully cognizable. Rather, only the failure to observe these principles is always cognizable; for any neglect in adhering to these principles will result in disharmony in the community — and this will be the evidence and the proof that the community is instead engaged in violation of Natural Law.

Thus, many of these principles will be discoverable only by observation of the effects in pursuing contrary principles, and not by means of a priori knowledge. These then are revealed empirically, during the process of resolution of a conflict between the apparent Natural Rights of disputant inhabitants, in determining the equitable and harmonious solution. In doing so the community then effectuates Natural Justice.

Natural Justice
Natural Justice is a standard that is constant. For the cornerstone of its precepts and its application is a respect for Natural Rights and an observance of Natural Law.10 Yet, while it does not arise out of but precedes civil society, it is a standard that remains inchoate without civil society.

Justice is the moral consequence of an unjustified act or failure to act. While it can occur in isolation — such as, for example, a person neglecting to perform some necessary labor, and rather remaining lounging somewhere, as a consequence of which a rotten tree limb falls on him, injuring or killing him — it almost invariably occurs relationally, in determining which of two acts (or failures to act) was morally justifiable and then sanctioning the person who performed unjustifiably.

Thus, justice almost invariably depends on the existence of interactions between people. And, consequently, civil society is a prerequisite for the materialization of an understanding of what justice consists. Natural Justice is the version of justice which optimally preserves Natural Rights and employs the principles of Natural Law. Just as civil society is essential for the emergence of Natural Justice, so Natural Justice is essential for the preservation of civil society. If so, then, the revealing of Natural justice is also essential.

Just as mankind is endowed with superior analytic intellectual capabilities — and the ability to make critical discernment — it is endowed with a sense of the contours of Natural Justice. A component of this sense of Natural Justice, and parallel to our superior critical capabilities, is the capacity to discern between actions and policies that are either just or unjust.

If we are able to discern actions that are just and unjust, then we likewise are endowed with the capacity to choose between them. For an element of discernment capacity is the employment, or non-employment, of that capacity — ergo, the capability of choice.

Integral to, and a component of, this choice and free will capacity, is the ability to choose evil acts. Therefore, while all mankind may be naturally endowed with a sense of righteousness, they are also subject to committing acts of unrighteousness. Thus both righteousness and unrighteousness dwell within each individual simultaneously and concurrently. Consequently, in these interactions between people there always will be some acts that are just and some that are unjust.

Moreover, there may be some corresponding actions by multiple people that are both just, but of a varying degree of justness. In these situations in particular the discernment capability is most crucial.

For it is in those complex and challenging contexts that the character and mandates of Natural Justice emerge. For Natural Justice is disclosed and defined as situations which require its explication arise.

As civil society develops and becomes more complex, the quality and extent of interactions between its members will expand and evolve. This though does not suggest that the inherent nature of Natural Justice evolves, but rather that its contours become more delineated, as well as more comprehensive. For the essential and common interactions between people have been and remain constant and omnipresent, and the lessons of Natural Justice learned from them are extrapolated to these emerging contexts in order to reveal and maintain its symmetrical contours.

In this Natural Justice effectuates Natural Law and preserves the harmony of civil society. Nevertheless, civil society will experience conundrums in its development where the unabbreviated exercise of Natural Rights interjects certain tensions in civil society. For this it will conclude that certain human-inspired rules are required. Hence, Positive Law is introduced.11

The Role of and Limitations upon
Positive Law

Introduction and Role of Positive Law
In the extended family and neighborhood stages, elementary application of Natural Justice was easily administered, since: first, the disputes were, in this sparsely-settled environment, relatively-infrequent; second, the disputants were more likely to be familiar with each other, and thus more inclined to assist in amicable resolution; third, the circumstances of the disputes were relatively-uncomplicated; and, fourth, the adjudicator could have the advantage of familiarity with the parties and circumstances.

Eventually, though, as the community emerged with its greater expanse and concentration, the volume and complexity of interactions proliferated, resulting in more disputes, the greater likelihood of minimal familiarity between the disputants and adjudicator, and increased factors for consideration in crafting a solution. In addition, the proliferation of interactions occasioned a greater intertwining of them, thereby, both in the dispute and its resolution, incidentally impacting other members of the community — injecting further factors for consideration.

Thus, the promulgation of subordinate rules to account for and prioritize these myriad factors was deemed to be of utility. Thus was introduced Positive Law.

Limitations upon Positive Law

Positive Law though is preceded by Natural Rights, Natural Law and Natural Justice. It is also an invention of human ingenuity rather than an inherent quality. It thus must be limited in its authority. Those limitations then should now be addressed.

Subordination to Natural Law
The nature and foundation of Natural Law is a foundation, a structure, albeit an intangible structure. An action either conforms to and matches the structure or it is incompatible with it.

Righteous actions and unrighteous actions thus can exist in the state of nature. If a person by his actions conforms to Natural Law, even if in ignorant of its requirements and mandates, then he may be deemed to act rightly.12

A known code of conduct, against which to measure an action, then is not required for it to be classifiable as righteous or unrighteous. Its success or failure to conform to the structure and standard of Natural Law then may be unknown — but for the stability or instability flowing from it, by which fruit it then will be known.

In the state of nature, then, an action either preserves harmony or promotes disharmony. It is the impact, or lack of impact, upon the social order then which qualifies it as righteous or unrighteous. As there is no code of conduct, there is no commendation for or penalty against the actor.

Without Natural Justice or Positive Law, then, an action will not be classified as wrong. However, since Natural Law is omnipresent, a wrong action, even if not explicitly prohibited, may still yield adverse consequences.13

Natural Justice, in determining the character of various actions, then (to analogize from quantum mechanics) collapses the question, by determining which action (or set of actions) is righteous. Yet, in a more-complex society where actions have proliferated (and necessarily then where wrong actions have also proliferated), advance guidance and classification was deemed prudent.14 Thus, Positive Law identified, and imposed penalties upon, unrighteous actions. Its function was to endeavor to codify the process and results which would have been employed and attained by Natural Justice.

While Positive Law then endeavored to perform the function of Natural Justice in a more complex and dispersed society, we should also consider its interaction with Natural Law. Natural Law provides mankind a direction toward which it must conform; and to conform, there are actions which it is directed to perform. Positive Law is not authorized — as it is inferior, being later in origin and of human invention — to conflict with or counter Natural Law. Therefore, Positive Law then is prohibitory in character.

It formally articulates the elements of unrighteous actions which Natural Justice revealed were implicitly prohibited by Natural Law. In conjunction with identifying those elements, it also imposes penalties upon the person performing these unrighteous actions. In this its prohibitory tenor is demonstrated and proven.

Positive Law then, to the extent it performs its assigned role, encompasses those actions which Natural Law implicitly prohibited. In this it parallels Natural Law, but as the analogue thereto.

But what if it does not? What if instead of promulgating the implicit prohibitions of Natural Law it conflicts with it? It would then yield an unjust society; for justice consists in what Natural Law decrees to be righteous. How then to minimize conflict between Positive Law and Natural Law?

Positive Law that mandates certain actions by individuals will obviously conflict with liberty, for it constricts the scope of choice which would otherwise be within the discretion of the individual. Positive Law that prohibits certain actions by individuals will likewise constrict liberty but, if in accordance with the strictures of Natural Law, would be a permissible restriction. Positive Law which expands prohibitions beyond those implicitly enjoined by Natural Law will, as indicated, produce injustice in the community.

Justifying an expansive application of Positive Law then is problematic. Rather, a narrow scope to Positive Law then would appear prudent — if not required. Nevertheless, certain conflicts will be expected to arise that would seem to require the attention and guidance by Positive Law; yet, the promulgators of it should be cautious in the imposition of it.

Perhaps, any Positive Law proposed for promulgation also should be deemed to be of temporary duration, to avoid both misconception of the prudence of it, and also to avoid binding descendants of the current generation to standards for which it is inapplicable in a new context. (The conundrum posed by conflicting considerations pertinent to this issue will be addressed in a succeeding sub-part.)

Finally, we began with the acknowledgment that Positive Law is of course subordinate to Natural Law. Another palliative might be a duty upon Positive Law promulgators to delineate any potential conflicts between them, enable these conflicts to be apparent to observation by the members of the polity through explicit notice thereof, and a duty to repeal any Positive Law proven by experience or manifest opposition to be in conflict with Natural Law (as well as to establish the mechanism therefor).

Restriction by Limited Government Powers
The pervasive cause of excessive, and potentially unrighteous, Positive Law is attributable to a misconception of the power of government. A crucial, if not primary, corrective to the danger of such Positive Law consists of a constant recognition of and adherence to the proper function of government. Thus, a brief summary of its role would seem to be proper.

It is the duty of civil society to both secure the Natural Rights with which its members were endowed and, in conformity with Natural Justice, resolve any conflicts arising from mutual exercise of them. As it expands, though, those conflicts become more numerous and complex, and eventually, due to the inability of its members to divert sufficient time and energy from their private obligations for the considered resolution of them, government is formed by the members of civil society. Since civil society predates government, its only authority consists of the powers delegated to it by civil society. This delegation consists of only those specifically-enumerated powers granted to it, as a recipient cannot receive, nor claim to have received, more than was given.

Thus, those powers not expressly granted to government are necessarily retained by civil society. For they cannot vanish but must repose somewhere; and as there was no active dispersion of them, civil society is the only possible repository. But these retained powers of civil society are only those granted to it by its members, so that all rights not affected by or subject to those delegated powers are likewise necessarily retained by the individuals composing civil society.15

Natural Rights, and the powers associated therewith, are bestowed on each individual at birth and as a birthright. They can only be vacated by the knowing, voluntary surrender by the individual. The surrender by any individual, or group of individuals, cannot vacate these rights of another.

Thus the powers associated with these rights are not delegated to civil society without the unanimous consent of all citizens of the polity; the withholding by even a single citizen of his consent vitiates the consent given by any (and all) other citizens. For Positive Law is obliged to retain the respect of the citizens and their voluntary compliance with it16; consequently it must eschew any unequal treatment as this would have the general tendency to diminish respect for its provisions.17 Therefore it must be uniform; excluding even one citizen from any particular prohibition requires excluding all citizens from the prohibition.

This framework then requires that the provisions of Positive Law have as limited an ambit as possible and that its effects within this ambit be as limited as possible; in the event of any legitimate doubt as to this question, then the promulgators must refrain from expanding it. Consistent therewith, Positive Law should never suffer any extension by implication; it should rather be construed as narrowly as possible.

Even with these restrictions upon it, there remains yet one more threat from it to consider. This now will be considered in the succeeding sub-part.

Restriction by Duration
We have in the preceding sub-part visited the formative stage of social order in order to define the inherent limits upon Positive Law. Still, as there remains an innate deficiency of Positive Law to consider, let us trod it again to reveal this aspect.

When civil society emerges and then government is formed, all individuals remain endowed with, and without any implied divestment of, their Natural Rights. Only explicit and voluntary surrender of them would allow divestment. But can a person, either individually or in concert, surrender their Natural Rights?

Natural Rights, being an integral component of the natural order, are inherited from Nature. If any person, much less all of the members of a polity, surrendered them it would disrupt the very foundation of the order. This then would inevitably lead to its collapse and chaos.

Still more central to the issue though is the attribute of the prime Natural Right, Liberty. Liberty is exercised affirmatively. Moreover, Natural Law obligations are mandatory in character; to adhere to them requires active engagement with the remainder of mankind, as well as nature.

A surrender of Natural Rights though would narrow the scope of actions which an individual could initiate — and thereby limit his powers. Since as to those surrendered rights and powers he could no longer be active, his respective potential now would necessarily be passive. This however is inconsistent with the character of Natural Rights and Natural Law. Thus, any purported surrender of Natural Rights must be deemed void.

Nevertheless, some limited reciprocal divestment of Natural Rights might be permissible. Once population concentration within a community attains a certain threshold a collision between the exercise of certain rights will necessarily transpire. The respective segment of the particular right being exercised by the affected members might then, voluntarily and with consent, be divested for transfer to the immediate government of these members so that it then could exercise them. This then would would avoid this segment of the right being deemed surrendered, as it would instead be affirmatively exercised by a different instrumentality.

However any such limited divestment would not survive the generation which transferred them — since these rights, including the divested segment, are the natural birthright of all people. As liberty is a birthright, divestment of the liberty naturally conferred upon posterity is impossible. Accordingly, any limited divestment not merely could not survive the extant generation but would have to be consented to by each member of the successor generation — as they cannot in advance be deprived of their birthrights.

Nevertheless even a purported explicit and voluntary divestment of any Natural Rights by an extant generation should be deemed void. An individual might divest himself of a material resource, and thus adversely impact his posterity by diminishing their inheritance. But Natural Rights are not posterity’s inheritance from their antecedents but from Nature.

Thus, any apparent divestment is subject to strict scrutiny as both to the volition of the polity who allegedly exercised it and as to its scope. For even though no individual can engage in a de jure divestment of the powers later naturally bestowed upon posterity, divestment of their own powers might have a de facto adverse effect upon these descendants.

Accretion is an inherent force of existence; dominant structures, until their demise, tend toward accumulation.18 Within an institutional structure, there is a gravitation toward power accretion. If there are a sufficient number of competing institutions, then this dynamic can be counteracted. However, if one institution attains a dominant status, then this dynamic will remain operative.

Accordingly, with this inertial force in institutional practice, disgorgement from it of purportedly-divested powers could be problematic. Thus, not only should surrender never be implied, it would be beyond the power of the polity to engage in any surrender that could divest posterity of a Natural Right. As liberty is the quintessential power bestowed thereby, divestment of posterity’s liberty is impossible.

Strict Construction
All Positive Law then should be cautiously promulgated and, if promulgated, strictly construed. The legislative function should only be employed as necessary and subject to approval by a predominant constituency, both of the legislature and the polity; it should be infrequently and narrowly exercised.

But if exercised, then it should be construed only as much as necessary to attain its initial objective and satisfy its expressed conditions. Rather, Natural Law should be unimpeded in performing its function of ameliorating disharmony in civil society, the use of Positive Law being the exception.

1 As elsewhere contrasted in this essay, liberty is the right to perform an act, while freedom is the right to not perform an act; Liberty then is active, and Freedom then is passive. In the natural state original man was not constrained in his actions by the choices of other inhabitants; only with expansion into the unitary family, extended family and community was there sufficient habitation concentration to result in inhibition and limitation of his choices. Liberty then was the natural state and freedom was only a bulwark erected later, to preserve a certain scope for his independence in choice. Thus, liberty is the prime right.
2 Admittedly this unused or misused energy will not be destroyed, but it will instead migrate to another person.
3 As they channel this conduct in particular directions, they are also restrictive in that they channel conduct from certain directions. However, as Liberty remains the prime right and it is affirmative in character, emphasis should remain on the mandatory nature, rather than prohibitory results in the application, of Natural Law.
4 In the penultimate sentence it is demonstrated that Natural Law is essential to the social order. In this sentence it is demonstrated that Natural Law is essential to the natural order: the world existed before human life; the world in that stage of existence did not expire or devolve into destruction, but rather thrived; a natural order then must have sustained the world; the natural order then must have been sustained by Natural Law; and thus Natural Law predated the social order.
5 These standards were not developed, but rather only identified. For they are not the invention of human intellect but formed by and preexisting in nature, the only function of human intellect being to discover them.
6 While potential surrender is posited here, the theoretical possibility thereof is more complex. This question will be explored later in this Appendix.
7 While Natural Rights are the birthright of every person, they do possess a latent potential toward disorder; this is not their inherent quality but only a product of misuse as the system itself tends toward entropy. The inherent quality of Natural Law is order and, when not obstructed by human intervention, thus operates in tandem with Natural Rights to maintain the integrity of these rights. Therefore the relationship between them is symbiotic, each enhancing and effectuating the other.
8 As each person is imperfect, as well as complex, his various choices will frequently themselves be of disparate quality and effect. This inconsistency will itself produce a certain degree of disorder; but it would be of relative insignificance when the person is operating in isolation. It is when the orbit of the effects of an individual’s actions intersect the orbit of another — and particularly when the orbits of multiple persons intersect — that a propensity to systemic disorder is present. (Despite the deprecation in the first two sentences of this footnote of the significance of disparate individual choices, yet, when isolation ceases, they would have the potential to exacerbate systemic disorder.)
9 Even independent of the influence of randomness, some of the vectors proceeding from a certain point will necessarily intersect some of the vectors proceeding from another point; it is impossible for all vectors from multiple points to be parallel to each other. Therefore, intrusion is an inevitable condition.
10 The term “precepts” is used here in a limited sense, as Natural Justice is applied contextually and thus is inherently relational. Consequently, a set of elaborated, prescribed rules would be an aberration as the contexts are theoretically infinite. Rather, “precepts” contemplates a certain framework for the recognition and application of Natural Justice.
11 The term “Positive Law” is appropriated from, and employed in the same sense as used by, St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae. While St. Thomas’ hierarchy of laws included numerous additional layers, only Positive Law and Natural Law are utilized herein.
12 Acting rightly may or may not yield material benefits to the actor. A direct, personal ramification is not the standard by which to determine righteousness or unrighteousness.
13 It has already been posited that Natural Law is mandatory in character; it directs all people to perform righteously; it only sanctions righteous conduct. A tacit corollary, though, is that it refuses to sanction unrighteous conduct. Therefore, there is an implicit prohibition against unrighteous conduct — even though its explicit principles remain mandatory.
14 This was deemed prudent for, as explained in the text of the essay, the members of the polity — as a result of the deluge upon the community of a profuse volume and novelty of interactions — were suffering increased alienation from the traditional methods of dispute resolution and courses of interaction; more formal tribunals were established, and the persons with whom they interacted were often no longer immediate and direct but rather were often now physically separated.
15 It is to be remembered that a right is the power to initiate or to refrain from action of some type; liberty is the power to initiate, and freedom is the power to refrain. Thus, implicit in and a component of any right is a power. Therefore, even when reference may only be made to a right, it also acknowledges the corollary power.
16 Liberty is the prime Natural Right. Compulsion is inherently anathema to it. Accordingly, for a just society, adherence to Positive Law (excluding consideration of any inveterate malefactors who, by their own actions, have excluded themselves from society) must be voluntary.
17 Different treatment of different classes of citizens could still be consistent with this principle, depending upon the structure of the government. If it is composed of multiple levels with more-extensive powers being exercised by those levels in more-direct proximity to its citizens — such as in the neighborhoods discussed in the text, where there would be greater homogeneity — then acknowledging unique classes within those discrete communities, and exercising different authority over them would not conflict with this injunction against unequal treatment — as the citizens combinations into those discrete communities would be voluntary.
18 If an area has numerous equivalent objects, they will tend to accumulate unattached-substances equally. However, if one of these objects attains an appreciably-greater size, then it will tend to accumulate a disproportionately larger share of these substances. By this,is meant the term “dominant”.

Forester Twp, Michigan USA
08 September 2018

Freedom or Liberty?

Freedom and Liberty are frequently used as interchangeable terms. In this those who do so err.

It is true that both constitute Rights. But these rights are each of a different character, with different ramifications.

Freedom is a passive state, one in which the person has the right not to be circumscribed by external duties, at least within described spheres of action. Those duties to which the individual is not subject can be either mandatory duties, viz, you shall do, or prohibitory duties, viz, you shall not do. The degree of freedom depends upon the quantity and scope of those spheres.

Liberty is an active state, one in which the person has the right to engage in certain activities, at least within described spheres of action. Any duties to which the individual is subject are ones which are only internally imposed, by the individual himself or herself. The degree of liberty depends upon the quantity and scope of those spheres.


Freedom and Liberty can exist within the same system and be concurrently available to its member individuals. Because of their different characters, though, they are employed in different contexts and for different objectives.

Freedom is an essential right. It consists of the right to chose what not to do. For certain activities can be detrimental to the individual, either by their immediate material impact or persisting moral impact.¹

However, in comparing it with Liberty, as we shall see, it is more important for the emphasis to be upon Liberty than it is upon Freedom.


This is demonstrable since Liberty is not only the right to choose what to do, it also consists, as with Freedom, of the right to chose what not to do. Like as with Freedom, it consists of the opportunity to determine the range of activities in which to not engage — since being compelled to engage in certain activities will obstruct the opportunity to engage in different activities of one’s choice — but also the range in which to engage.

But in what range of activities should one engage? For it is not Liberty to engage in all activities within one’s capacity.

On a reflexive level, some activities appeal to the individual and some don’t; some appeal to certain impulses, some to others. To engage in those which are anomalous to the person and to which he would have a propensity to offer resistance would be to abandon one’s identity and, perhaps, one’s own self. Thus, if one is induced by external influences, rather than one’s own character, to engage in such an activity, the result would be the loss of the person’s liberty.

However, there remains an aspect of Liberty more profoundly significant. It is in the symbiotic relationship of it with Freedom.

For we have already recognized that some activities can have a detrimental effect. These effects can be immediate or persistent. In those which are persistent does danger most lurk.

For engaging in some activities can constrain us from embarking toward other theaters of participation. If then a certain activity or activities are so preoccupying that they captivate a person, one then suffers a loss of their Liberty.

All people are endowed with a certain potential for attainment of productive objectives. The criterion then is whether a certain activity constrains or expands the exercise of the potential for successful attainment of them

While some activities liberate us by activating us toward engagement in further ones, what we choose out of liberty might instead enslave us. The question then is recognizing whether doing something particular harms or inhibits an individual, since if the answer is in the affirmative it is not the exercise of Liberty to do it.

Therefore, True Liberty is refraining from those activities, and rejecting those objectives that can restrain or inhibit us. Thus, a rejection of certain activities or objectives, and a refusal to engage or embrace them, can be Liberty in action.

¹ While the spurned activity is an election by an autonomous consciousness, the impact to be avoided may be one perceived as detrimental not to this particular individual (or at least not solely) but instead to other persons. However, if the danger is the latter, the detrimental impact would concomitantly impinge upon the range of activities otherwise available to these other persons. In this it would potentially impact both their Freedom and their Liberty. Consequently, it would seem that, in order to rigorously distinguish between these two rights, it is suggested that restricting application of Freedom to its impact upon the particular individual is more prudent.

² While the endeavor is usually of an active nature, it can occasionally be of an inactive nature.  For in appropriate situations observation or simply rest may in the aggregate yield expanded constructive attainments.

Forester Twp, Michigan USA
20 November 2017

Discrimination — ANOTHER Misused Word

This will be just a brief comment, parallel to my criticism in other posts of certain “popular” words (such as “common sense” and “hate”).

When I was young, “discrimination” had at least one positive meaning, that when used in the sense of a person with discriminating taste. In this sense it indicated an ability to distinguish being various competing choices and to select the alternative with the superior attributes. This favorable sense of the word seems now to have been wholly abandoned; now it is almost exclusively used to refer to malevolent behavior.

Now it certainly is proper to use this word in a pejorative sense in certain situations, as when it references illegal and, perhaps, immoral, discrimination; in those classes it would be most improper not to use it. But it appears it now usually is used in a much broader sense, to castigate actions of someone who makes any distinction between various persons or classes of persons.

Yet we, in minor and major manners, beneficially or injuriously, discriminate daily. We do this in selection of food, roads or areas to travel or not, items to purchase or not and a myriad of other choices. We do this also in imposing restrictions on particular persons or classes of persons, be they convicted felons, minors at certain ages of 16, 18 or 21, nonresidents for voting and a plethora of other examples which it would be too exhausting to catalogue. Still, these pervasive instances of appropriate and necessary discrimination are ignored by certain people who prefer use of a broad brush in application of this term to selected situations which offend them.

It is my assessment that there is a current prevalent propensity for a substantial proportion of the populace to make superficial and precipitate assessments — to ignore, or even fail to perceive, nuances. This is a most dangerous proclivity, for it constitutes an abandonment of the discipline, and perhaps even capacity, to employ discernment in evaluation and decision.

I acknowledge it may be facile to compare the frequency of absence of discernment and the prevalence of use of the term discrimination. Yet might there be a connection?

Thought frequently (or should) involves the development of mental systemization, to a certain degree at least, in observing and assessing various objects or actions. Methodology economizes analysis. The rub is when the methodology is defective. One more fatal is when methodology is absent.

Precipitate categorization is an absence of methodology. But cannot this become a methodology itself? — a systematized rejection of discernment. For the converse of studied analysis is the failure to engage in it.

Broad use of the term discrimination to critique and admonish any distinction by someone between persons or actions is but one instance of this failure. It is a rejection of the methodology of discernment which must be reversed. If we continue to fail in this regard I can only regrettably project an intensifying polarization with catastrophic results.

Forester Twp, Michigan USA
16 October 2017

The State of Primordial Mankind

[This is to be considered a “work in progress”. As indicated by the designation of chapters, it will be supplemented and possibly be the basis of a more-extended work. However, as its development has been in progress for awhile, it was deemed preferable to publish the initial portion, with which the writer is presently sufficiently satisfied, and then to supplement it as he becomes satisfied with the later chapters.]
[Subsequent to my posting of the above explanation, the following text has been revised and incorporated into, as well as expanded by, my Interstice Amid the Fabric of Life / Volume 1 : The State of Primordial Mankind, published in both paperback and Nook® ePub or Kindle® ePub formats. Accordingly, no further additions will be made herein to the following.]



At its origin Civil Society was circumscribed and defined, but these attributes have long since dissipated.

As Civil Society developed it became less circumscribed and more complex, albeit with definitions within the complexity. Eventually though — as with all complex systems operating within every sphere of existence and experience — it was doomed to suffer deterioration. This essay is an endeavor to trace this development.

While it is possible with justification to assess that Civil Society is now spiraling into chaos, by necessity no record exists of it at the outset; therefore much of this survey must be a matter of speculation. Yet not infrequently it is possible to arrive at sound conclusions by relying upon and utilizing rational hypotheses emanating from a background of knowledge, sufficient in breadth and depth, of behavior and propensities despite the absence of verifiable data with which to pursue a deductive methodology.

The following then is consequently believed to constitute a fair, defensible outline of these processes. Civil Society emerged, evolved and metamorphosed. During this process Government emerged and interposed between the factions of Civil Society to ameliorate the consequences of friction, and itself evolved and metamorphosed. And while some benefits were yielded during these processes, neither metamorphosis now constitutes a specter to behold with anything but trepidation.

Perhaps this review will assist in identifying those attributes that should be reinvigorated or, if necessary, restored and those features which should be jettisoned.





Initial Habitation

Every geographical region on Earth is composed of numerous localities. The original locality is theoretically occupied first by a single individual. However, leaving aside the question of the origin of the occupation by the earliest individual, the reality of his presence would have been extinguished but for the production of progeny through the presence also of a mate; for without the production of progeny, or the presence of other persons upon whom he could have had an impact of some nature, his status would be as if he had never existed. Therefore, each inhabitable locality is necessarily populated initially by a single family.

However, unless the family produces, and becomes the core of, an extended family, it will suffer extinction; therefore, expansion of the core family is requisite. The expansion of the family requires introduction of external members by one of two methods: one, a solitary individual or individuals who voluntarily or involuntarily depart from another locality and encounter a core family; or, two, the migration of another unitary family from its own locality and its immigration into the habitat of and its fusion with the core family. (These scenarios ignore the possibility of a hostile, forcible invasion by a predominantly-superior extended family or group of extended families, since the resulting displacement would require tracing the invaders’ posterity rather than that of those who were invaded.)


Extended Family Development

The differences in the occasion for development of the extended family betokens potential differences in whether its culture remains static or experiences mutation. In general, though, it would seem the tendency should be similar.

The solitary individual or individuals will be expected to be subject to psychological insecurity, at least to a certain degree. Even if he has certain aggressive tendencies, regardless of whether this condition resulted in his expulsion from his previous locale or provided the motivation for his voluntary departure due to vexation with a contentious environment, he nevertheless is in a state of isolation; thus, he will necessarily be susceptible to real or perceived threats. An individual or individual without these tendencies will even more be in such a state and even more be susceptible. Moreover, by virtue of being solitary, he will be in a numerically-inferior position.

Further, by virtue of the same solitary status, he is unsupported. Consequently, the capacity to secure his necessary resources and perform the essential support functions is less than that of a unitary family. Thus, he will be expected to be subject also to material insecurity.

Consequently, the normal tendency will be for him to be susceptible to and subscribe to the culture, mores and support of the inhabiting family. For by doing so he will escape those insecurities.

While not as consequential, it would seem an immigrating unitary family will tend to be subject to the same influences. Their wandering and consequent lack of a home locale will engender a similar sense of psychological insecurity, though offset somewhat by the recognition of being supported by the other family members; contrariwise, if each member of the immigrating unitary family exhibited this sense, then it could reinforce that of each other and thereby magnify the group insecurity. Confrontation by a residential family could accentuate such a sense, as the latter might be more apprehensive of the immigration of a unitary family than by an individual, express a greater degree of hostility (or, at least, a less degree of receptiveness), and thereby induce a reciprocal anxiety and trepidation.

By virtue of being a unitary family, it would have a presumptive capacity equivalent to that of the residential family to exploit the resources of the locality. However, due to its lack of equivalent familiarity with the nature or location of those resources, the residential family would still prevail in this regard. The level of confidence then would reside with the latter rather than the strangers.

Further, as the residential family might have already experienced the immigration of an individual or individuals and the absorption of it or them therein (though, by definition, this would be the residential family’s first encounter with a unitary family), the residential family might well be more numerical than the migrating family and thereby impose a defensive posture upon the latter. Therefore, similar to the immigrating individual, the new unitary family would be inclined to be submissive toward the residential family, and thereby more inclined to adopt its culture and mores.

There would be instances in which the culture and mores of the immigrating unitary family would predominate. One prominent circumstance might be if the members of the immigrating unitary family had inordinate strength and skill capabilities; this might compensate for the potential numerical superiority of the residential family. It might also have latent aggressive tendencies, which while negative for an individual’s success, could be positive for the larger family assemblage, and could allow it to prevail over the residential family. And the latter, by being sedentary, might have developed greater passive tendencies.

Accordingly, the immigrating family might have the capacity to impose its culture and mores on the residential family. But this would be as a result of force rather than suasion; and such a result would produce an intense environment that could well lead to the destruction of the new unit and its ultimate replacement in the locale by a more durable unit. Therefore, in most situations of continuity in the inhabitation of a particular locale, the general propensity would be for the residential family to enlarge, retain its original culture and mores, and, by protraction, reinforce and perpetuate them.


Geographical Expansion

Initially, the flora and fauna in the locality should be sufficient to support the residential family, and, in fact, may flourish and increase. As the family expands, it necessarily initiates the depletion of both flora and fauna resources in the primary locality, though for awhile it may remain in equilibrium with the extended family. Eventually, though, the degree of depletion will be insufficient to support all members of the extended family. Consequently, its geographical range, through the expansion of the periphery of the extended family, then will radiate into a contiguous locality.

The rapidity of this expansion is a function of the wealth of resources in the appended localities, the velocity thereof being in inverse proportion to the volume of those resources. In the event of substantial resources, there is a propensity toward greater extended family density due to the availability thereof. In the event of inadequate resources, there is a propensity toward dispersion into further additional localities.

These expansions then are the result of two (2) factors: one, the physical need for sustenance and materials for shelter from the elements; and, two, an intellectual disposition to investigate and explore. All species have an inclination to utilize the unique capacities with which they are endowed, as these are features with which they are innately familiar, have experienced success in employing, and therefore are motivated to exercise. As mankind is endowed with greater mental capacities than other species, there is an enhanced propensity to utilize this capacity. Thus, curiosity alone would motivate their investigation and exploration of further localities and of what they might consist. This conclusion that primary mankind is endowed with innate curiosity is demonstrable, with his exploration of and expansion into these contiguous localities being just one indicator thereof.

Moreover, the extended family has become accustomed to, and developed habitual practices of, investigation, even if albeit of a rudimentary rather than systematic character. Thereby is its disposition to investigate and explore reinforced; for the influence of an inherent quality can be supplemented by a parallel cultural trait, and thereby enhanced. These dispositions will soon become most material and crucial.

For this expansion by the extended family ultimately results in it advancing into contact with other unitary families or extended families. Whether the latter is a unitary family or extended family will depend upon the longevity of the unit, with both its volume and the resilience of its culture being in direct proportion to its longevity.

In the event of an extended family encountering a unitary family (and hence a unit of relatively-short longevity), there will be a tendency for the unitary family to be assimilated by the extended family, for the same reasons an individual is incorporated into a unitary family. In the event of an extended family encountering another extended family, no such dynamic is likely to operate, either initially or even after an extended duration; for by virtue of their extended family status they each will have acquired longevity and hence display resilience.

These extended families, rather than being repelled by the strange and unknown, are disposed to tentatively interact and familiarize themselves with each other; this process results in each becoming aware of differing, or the possibility of the reinforcement of their equivalent, capabilities. Either would benefit both, since differing capabilities will expand the scope of their commodities whereas equivalent capabilities will increase the volume of output. In the event of such complementariness, recognizing then their mutual self-interest through combination, these families potentially become a symbiotic community.


Emergence of Neighborhoods

The extended families begin cooperation by virtue of recognizing, and upon the basis of, mutual self-interest. Otherwise they may remain, except for those areas of cooperation, relatively-isolated. However, if they have or begin to develop sufficient self-identifying characteristics, they might become a neighborhood; this would not cause or betoken the elimination of all cultural or mores differences, but rather only an identity upon those cultural or mores characteristics that would be present in those instances of regular interaction.

Upon first contact it would be expected that the extended families each would establish or maintain secure perimeters for their separate territories: if the contact was by virtue of each expanding their peripheries into new localities, then the effect would be for each to arrest those perimeters at contact; whereas if the contact was by virtue of a migrating extended family encountering a residential extended family, then the former would sequester its settlement, around which it would establish its perimeter. Preliminary contact would only be through envoys, after which more general intercourse might become regular.

Inquiry by the envoys enables a preliminary assaying of similarities or complementation of cultural and mores. However, since the envoy is necessarily limited in the scope of his knowledge and the time which can be expended in observation, general intercourse is requisite for proper appreciation of the possibility of compatibility. The inherent trait of intellectual curiosity will be expected to result in such general investigation, as the members of each extended family will be aware of the presence of the other unit and will not be restrained in pursuing their own efforts simply because of the inquiries of the envoys. However, if the envoys, or one of them, are firmly convinced of patent incompatibility, then this has the capability to obstruct and even bar any general intercourse.

A determination of such incompatibility then can be expected to generate an attitude of hostility between the extended families, each (or at least one) fearing for its safety. Such an attitude likely would have the general tendency to produce conflict and the destruction or assimilation of one of those families. The prevailing extended family would generally be the most aggressive one thereof.

However, if the extended families, through these regular interactions, displayed common or complementary characteristics, then there would be a propensity for them to together form a discrete neighborhood.


Chapter 2

Elaboration of Neighborhood Structures

Introduction of a family into a locality, and then its growth into an extended family, has already been discussed. We concluded with recognizing the potential formation of a neighborhood from these extended families. Let us now begin to explore the nature and development of such an incipient neighborhood, its encounter with another neighborhood, and the interactions — some constructive and some destructive — between them.

Isolation Stage

Each neighborhood is initially compact and discrete. However, each will regularly experience population accretion, whether internally or from migration or both.

The usual impact from internal accretion will be to maintain the cultural homogeneity of each extended family therein, as the characteristics of each will tend to be adopted by its new members. This ought not to affect the cohesion of the neighborhood since any potential conflict due to differences between the extended families were already resolved at the time and by virtue of the formation of the neighborhood — and thus the addition of new members to one of them would not insert dissonance.

Nevertheless, the propensity to maintain cultural homogeneity will usually apply also to migration accretion as the normal tendency will be for the migrants to adopt and embrace the characteristics of the original population rather than for the latter to adopt those of the former. This is projected to proceed from two causes: one, the inertia of the original population, resulting from its longer tenure, and its inherent property of resistance to change and adaptation; and, two, the greater numerical size of the original population and the inclination of the migrants to adapt to avoid conflict.

However, there is a different dynamic in operation in the case of migration accretion than in internal accretion, or at least in the case of migrating extended families. The resident extended families already occupy the physical terrain of the neighborhood. Therefore, the migrating extended family will be required to occupy territory along and outside the current periphery, thereby also expanding the neighborhood’s periphery. By necessity this new territory would be adjacent only to one or a limited number of the resident extended families and isolated from the balance.

As noted, the migrating extended family, for many reasons, is in a less-advantageous and less-secure condition. Therefore it will normally select territory adjacent to the extended family whose culture and mores it deems most compatible. This then will potentially cause a latent disequilibrium in the median culture of the neighborhood. And in the formative years of the neighborhood, when it is composed but of a few extended families, it would seemingly have a disproportionate impact and could then lead to dissonance. Yet, since by definition there are but few extended families, the likelihood of irreconcilable discord is reduced as the heads of the extended families then have the greater opportunity for constant communication and thus the greater capacity to directly resolve any possible strife.

In either event, there will be a constant expansion of the number of members of the neighborhood and consequently of the territory occupied by it. Thus the periphery of the neighborhood will be in constant flux and constantly expanding.

This dynamic will occur in all neighborhoods. Ultimately, then, the peripheries of a neighborhood will impinge upon those of another.

Cluster Stage

At this early stage of inhabitation there will be few non-natural obstructions to a given neighborhood in its quest for additional resources. Therefore, the density within each neighborhood will be low. And, as this is but the early stage of inhabitation, the density in the locale in which a given neighborhood is located also will be low. Thus, the inertial force of the neighborhood is toward expansion. Contact then with other neighborhoods is consequently inevitable.

These neighborhoods to which a neighborhood eventually would become adjacent might be ones which display minimally-varying, or might instead display radically-differing, culture and mores. It is indisputable, though, that they will vary and be different.

However, because of the low density in the locale and within each neighborhood, they need not impinge upon each other nor initiate intercourse — even though there accordingly would be minimal obstruction to infiltration into these adjacent neighborhoods. Therefore, there will be minimal perception of challenges or threats to a neighborhood by one in proximity to it even if their respective culture and mores are radically different.

Still, because these neighborhoods would be contiguous, various interaction between them, by virtue of, and upon the basis of, mutual self-interest would be present. This would occur despite the existence of those differing culture and mores that are observable in cases of regular interaction; other differences would abide but would not be revealed in the course of common interaction, and thus would be isolated from corruption and rather preserved. Rather, curiosity being an inherent trait, the interaction would be enhanced because of these differences, as the members would each be stimulated to explore these differences. The existence and maintenance of these differences then would not only not inhibit but would intensify these interactions.

The existence and maintenance of these differences would yield a further benefit. Recognizing their distinctness would imply the value thereof. This should then result in an enhanced self-esteem of the respective members. Such then would lead to greater psychological self-confidence. And such self-confidence would enable greater interaction with other families and neighborhoods, including those, who by definition, would display differing characteristics. All of these factors would reinforce and perpetuate the distinctive culture and mores of each.

As the neighborhoods increase in population density, there would be proliferation of the variety of skills that could be employed in each neighborhood. Further population density would result in specialization within each of those skills. However, in the primitive stage of development, the absence of technological sophistication — technology being used here in its broadest sense, including learning how to start fire with sparks or friction, sharpening stone to form an ax head, identification of edible flora, and the like — would impose a limit on the extent of specialization. Rather, the advance in specialization would be gradual, with each development reaching a plateau at which it would repose for an extended period until a new technological introduction would allow it to advance to a new prolonged plateau.

Thus, during this primordial state, there would eventually be intense, or even fierce, competition between the contiguous neighborhoods due to these conflicting and limited skills. As only limited production from each’s efforts was possible in this primeval state, the resources available would be limited and the relationships between the neighborhoods would be inimical. Disputes would be constant and numerous, and mechanisms to resolve them or propitiate the participants necessary.

Yet the neighborhoods would still be of a limited geographical breadth as well as formed of a limited number of extended families. The most influential extended family in each, and the head thereof, would be known to the other, or at least known by the head of the leading family of each. Therefore, contact, communication and discussion between them would be without complication. Since these competitions and disputes would be adverse to their interests, these extended family heads would form an informal council, to meet sporadically or regularly (depending upon the size and extent of their neighborhoods), to resolve these disputes and eventually set policies to minimize or avoid them in the future.

If this council was successful in these efforts, then a Community of these neighborhoods might be formed. Such a community would not necessarily result in a blending of the culture and mores of the neighborhoods. Rather, since they would be liberated, to a greater or lesser extent, from disputes and animosity between them, they would be free from external aggravation and free to focus internally.

A peaceful relationship between the neighborhoods in the community would tend to result in an enlargement thereof as resources on contests between them would be redirected toward more constructive use, and thus a more attractive locality within which to reside; regardless, the peaceful environment would encourage, or at least eliminate an obstruction, to the greater integration of the community. Thus, an evolution of the council into a formal governmental structure, consisting of separate dispute resolution and policy making bodies, might transpire; such an evolution would be expected to normally occur since any body once formed tends to be possessed of an expectation that it has functions to perform and an obligation to deliberate upon the institution of additional mechanisms to perform those functions.

Eventually, perhaps as a consequence of the elimination of strife as a distraction, technological sophistication would proceed to a “takeoff point” where periodic prolonged plateaus would no longer be necessary or occur. The types and quantities of improvements would proliferate on a geometric basis. Further, as a result thereof, the resources available to the community, and each of the neighborhoods thereof, would likewise proportionately magnify.

As a consequence the conflict between the neighborhoods would diminish, as each (or the majority) of the families would have virtually sole recourse to their own specialized technology, and derivatively greater household resources. Conflicts likely would persist for the most affluent extended families, with each head thereof seeking prestige from his material acquisitions, but these would seem to be beyond the purview of the conflict resolution or policy making mechanisms, would be of little moment to the vast majority of families, and would be resolved again on a bilateral basis. Thus, many of the mechanisms for resolving conflict might be capable of being abandoned and the governmental structure shrunk.

We have in brief considered the development of a neighborhood, its encounter with another neighborhood, and some of the impacts upon and consequences to each as a consequence. Now it is appropriate to explore further neighborhood interaction and possibly consider a different focus.


Chapter 3

A Macrocosm Perspective:

Cooperation and Conflict between Neighborhoods

Treatment has been given to neighborhood formation and development, focusing on the microcosms of neighborhoods. These developments though did not occur within a vacuum, but rather as but one component of activity within the larger framework of an entire region. Thus, since those neighborhoods would be impacted by parallel activity within the region, it is necessary now to embrace a broader vista, from a macrocosm perspective.

Cooperation or Conflict are the polar dynamics for interaction between neighborhoods in contact.¹ The direction to be adopted by these neighborhoods will be a function of their respective cultures, resource environment, and neighborhood mores.

Cultures / Diversity or Homogeneity

The peripheries of contiguous neighborhoods will necessarily ultimately experience collision. And because of the likelihood of clash between the cultures of each, there will be a likelihood also of conflict. Nevertheless, after the initial collision, as a consequence of the separation in distance of each periphery from its core, there will be a propensity of these contiguous peripheries to homogenize. This will be the usual result regardless of whether there has been homogeneity between a periphery and its respective core. Thus, viewed solely from the perspective of the peripheries, there exists a dynamic toward reduction of cultural diversity.

Restricted Geographical Region

However, this dynamic would preponderate only in a region that is constrained and confined by peculiar geography. Because of those constraints, only a limited number of neighborhoods would be possible and their separate origin generally would have developed in relative close proximity to each other. As a consequence there would exist a tendency for parallel cultural development and a narrower diversity range.

In addition, as the region would be limited in size, it would also, except for extraordinary circumstances, be limited in resources also. Consequently, the earlier-noted potential for radical cultural adaptation due to enhanced, and aggressive, migration accretion would be minimized. Due to both of these factors there would remain a predilection to stability, both in cultures and cooperation.

Open Geographical Region

In a region of greater geographical expanse, there would be a greater likelihood of neighborhoods developing with sufficient separation between each other. In addition, because of this greater expanse, there would exist the potential for a constant increase in the number of independent neighborhoods being developed. Both factors would enhance the possibility of broader cultural diversity.

A possibility would exist for at least some of these neighborhoods being developed without great separation between them. Yet, as each neighborhood expanded, there would be a necessary greater demand upon the resources available to it. When the resources would become too scare for the population of the neighborhood, then there would occur emigration of some of the families from it to new areas. And, as the scarcity of resources was the catalyst, there would be a predilection for the emigrants to locate themselves at a sufficient distance from any other neighborhood by utilization of the unoccupied expanses, thus also being a propulsion toward exploiting and realization of this potential for a proportionately larger number of neighborhoods.

Admittedly, the potential for homogenization when neighborhood peripheries collide would still be present. But inherent in the larger volume of neighborhoods is also the necessary corollary of a larger volume of neighborhood cores. And as the cores are intrinsically separate from each other core, there would be minimal external forces toward adaptation. Therefore, since a constant increase in the number of neighborhoods would yield also a constant increase in the number of cores, there would result both a greater variety of different cultures, these being maintained within each additional core, and the maintenance of the diversity of these different characteristics.

Resource Environment

The effect of the scarcity or abundance of resources has been briefly mentioned. It should now be more fully considered to identify any possible aberrations from this effect.

If a particular neighborhood was rich in resources, it could experience a dramatic migrant accretion, thus reversing the inclination toward cultural inertia. This could proceed from the expectation of the enhanced aggressiveness of the migrants, due to their avidity for these resources, and the corresponding greater numerical volume thereof. Thus, the homogenizing influence from the original population — or, stated differently, the strength of the inertia effect — will be in inverse proportion to the volume of the migrant accretion or the enhanced radius of the neighborhood due to this accretion.

Nevertheless it would seem that such a scenario would only likely develop if the resources of the neighborhood were uniquely rich, relative to those of the contiguous localities. For in this primordial state where there is low density of inhabitation, any locality would tend to have sufficient resources for one or a few extended families. The incentive then for aggressive migration would be minimal.

In the unusual event of any undue scarcity, this would result in migration, with the migrating individual or family, who would be subject to the aforedescribed dynamics, being in a passive posture. Accordingly, the norm for the aggressiveness of these immigrants or emigrants would usually be inconsequential.

Avidity for the resources of another, then, would require either a more-advanced state of development or a patently-demonstrable substantial disparity in resource allocation. One or the other is a precondition for greed.

Absent one of those conditions, any desire by the migrating famil(ies) for the enhancement of their current resources would present two conflicting factors: their coveting of the resources of another; and the abhorrence of potential destruction, given their (by definition) inferior power, and hence aversion to conflict. This being so, it is to be expected that in the usual context the latter consideration would be of greater weight than the former, and that the migrating family(ies) will experience cultural assimilation.

From this we can conclude, then, that as long as the aggregate resources within and between localities remained of a sufficient volume to satisfy the necessities of the various neighborhoods, then the dynamics toward cultural diversity would continue to exert their influence. However, once these aggregate resources became sufficiently depleted or the population too large for them, then a clash of the cultures would unavoidably ensue. Such a clash would result in the destruction of some of these cultures or at least a radical reduction in their strength. Also, as history demonstrates, once cultures clash there is a lamentable tendency for each to adapt to, and often incorporate the worst characteristics of, the other. From both influences there would now be a potential for diversity to suffer.

There seem to be some conclusions that could be deduced from the foregoing. Since a restricted geographical expanse would seem, at least initially, to be an anomalous environment, there would be default tendencies toward:

  • conscious efforts toward segregation of the neighborhood from those in proximity
  • increased inhabitant density of the neighborhood as a consequence of the segregation policy
  • an above normative level of cultural disputes
  • a below normative level of economic disputes
  • a below normative level of technological development
  • an above normative variety of mores structures

The grounds for those conclusions are:

  • the disparity between the cultures of the respective neighborhoods, resulting from their independent development, would motivate each neighborhood to insulate itself as much as possible from the perceived possible corruption by the other neighborhood
  • as the neighborhood would endeavor to secure an enhanced insular status, it would as much as possible avoid expansion that would result in closer proximity, thereby necessitating increased inhabitant density
  • due to the disparity in cultures, there would be an increased tendency toward cultural conflict
  • both because of their early stages of development and the effort to avoid geographical proximity, there would be reduced appropriation of or at least immediate access to the localities within which are deposited the region’s material resources
  • as there would be less interaction between the neighborhoods, technological development would not have the benefit of efforts in concert but would be independent
  • due to the below normative level of interaction, there would be less occasion or reason for adaptation of a neighborhood’s mores structure

For awhile these tendencies, particularly because of the fourth (4th) and fifth (5th) influences, would be extended in time. The differences in mores structures and above normative level of cultural disputes would reinforce the disinclination for resource exploitation and reduced economic development. Eventually, however, this persistence would dissipate.

For expansion of the neighborhood peripheries would be inevitable, as would be the necessity of utilization of an increased volume of resources. Concomitant with these circumstances would be accelerated technological development.

Accordingly, there would be resonance of these conditions with the propensity of diversity to suffer as a consequence of physical clashes between the cultures. Yet, the potential for abbreviation of cultural diversity could also be instigated by other causes. One concluding instance of those causes should now be considered.

Neighborhood Mores

During the early stages of occupation the inhabitants of each neighborhood in a region are isolated from the other neighborhoods in the region. Even after augmentation of the inhabitants of the neighborhoods they nevertheless remain in relative isolation. Therefore, their behavior, and the mores that are the foundation of this behavior, of each set of inhabitants develop independently without restriction upon or impact by the behavior or mores of proximate neighborhoods.²

As the neighborhoods expand into contact with their proximate neighborhoods, then occasion arises for critiques of the behavior and mores of one by the other. These critiques are the product of the mores of the observer being offended by what is perceived to be the aberrant behavior of those being observed. Their expression of their resentment both promulgates and reinforces their own set of mores, and has the potential to impart a reforming influence by compelling the offender to analyze and reexamine the justifiability of their set of mores and, if necessary or appropriate, the refinement and embellishment thereof.

Nevertheless, since only an accumulation of these critiques will instigate such a possible reformation — due to the effect of psychological inertia to maintain tradition and accepted norms — occasional conflict results therefrom. If the conflicts become sufficiently frequent or contentious, then the neighborhoods are induced, as alluded to in the preceding chapter, to form a council composed of the heads of the largest families to resolve these conflicts. Thereafter, of which brief allusion has likewise been earlier made, further elaboration thereof would be expected to occur.

Those anticipated developments are then to be treated in the next chapter.

¹ While this contact is usually due to, and almost always requires, intimate physical proximity, there theoretically could be a significant geographical distance or obstacle between them if there nevertheless is sufficient functional interaction.

² Mores refers to a unified set of group values, manifested by their interactive, group behavior. In contrast, Culture refers to a compounded set of overt behaviors, combining a variety of solitary behaviors.


Forester Twp, Michigan USA
28 September 2017

Preservation or Removal of Confederate Memorials — or More?

The issue of Confederate Memorials appears to be a controversy that just will not go away. My perception of the danger in the issue is the potential indirect ramifications of the “methodology” of those proposing their removal.

In one sense, perhaps all statues should go. All three religions of the Children of Abraham eschew envisaging, be it vocally and/or visually, the Divine. Is it not the definition of hubris to apprehend that any mortal is more entitled thereto?

Yet certain mortals have registered a sufficient impact on the past, and possibly even continue to do so during the present and will so into the future. This impact might be for good, for ill, or for a combination thereof. In this event, recognition of this impact, if it is accompanied by genuine analysis and assessment, is salutary. And a visual image of those mortals can be beneficial as providing an occasion or catalyst to do so.

In warranting this determination, we should consider two premises which seem justified: one, there is in knowledge, as there are in all capabilities and capacities, inequalities, with certain persons necessarily having more knowledge than another in certain areas; and, two, (I am becoming satisfied) one of the qualities in the human psyche is an innate curiosity and propensity for investigation (albeit of differing sophistication and value). Accordingly, certain persons can be concluded to have an enhanced ability to recognize the virtue or value of certain persons and ideas in history. If they then have memorialized them in some tangible fashion, should we too casually disregard and discard their decision and expression? Further, hypothesizing the existence of these memorials, an observer (be it many, some or few) will at least occasionally have an inclination to investigate farther its subject to determine whether it represents good, ill, or a combination thereof.

Regrettably many now appear to be too addicted to impulsiveness in assessment, the expression of opinion on complex issues in 140 (or even 2000) characters, or, occasionally, the hysteria of the crowd. If some too frequently and unconsciously employ — or, worse, countenance an inclination by others toward — such an approach, will this “methodology” not, by persistent repetition and reinforcement, become the acceptable routine and common perception?

Instead we should be attuned to the nuances in the behavior or ideas of another. And the aforesaid context certainly is not conducive to appreciation of those nuances, as assessment requires intensive and objective examination.

Enter the controversy about statues of Robert E. Lee. ¹ (While some may question my following claims, I am sufficiently confident, based upon my studies (beginning in the 1950s) of the Civil War, its prelude and its aftermath, of the justification therefor.) While there is little doubt Lee was no Abolitionist, it is more than specious to claim he was an advocate of Slavery, much less (as one misguided journalist asserted) a “White Supremacist”. In addition to the potential anachronism in attributing the latter characterization to General Lee — as well as the amorphous nature and metamorphosis of its definition — there is a paramount difficulty in applying an accepted definition here since, in a paramount sense, the vast majority of Americans, both North and South, during the Antebellum period likely could be so characterized. (For example, could not the support of Abraham Lincoln for policies encouraging colonization by freed slaves be deemed a form of White Supremacy? And certainly the attitudes and policies of much of the Antebellum North, as described by de Tocqueville, were consistent with such an arguable designation.)

Rather, then-Colonel Lee’s anguished decision to resign from the U.S. Army, and throw in his lot with the Commonwealth of Virginia, were a product of his paramount loyalty to his native soil. For we must recall, in appreciating this dynamic, that despite occasional earlier egregious flaunting in observation of the U.S. Constitution, the Antebellum United States still generally recognized that default sovereignty resided in the States rather than in the limited general government, possessing only enumerated powers. Hence, loyalty to one’s State, as opposed to a distant government of less than seventy-five (75) years vintage, was not abnormal if not rather expected.

Thus, was there not an issue here that bears relevance to the current day? Is not the question of Federalism, and the proper allocation of powers and functions between the respective governments, still a salient issue? Ought not those interested in this question — and particularly those who deem excessive accretion of power by the general government — consider that, among other reasons and incentives of course, remembering and studying Lee could attune people to an extended and productive dialogue thereon? ²

Regrettably the addiction to impulsive and superficial assessment seems rampant and endemic. Rather than careful examination, there is frequent mischaracterization and misstatement. (But one of these, noted more than once, is that Lee was the “commander of the Confederate Army”, a claim that would have been news to, among others, P.G.T. Beauregard, J.E. Johnston and A.S. Johnston. By doing so not only is there an effort to more inextricably, and inaccurately, link Lee with the primary cause of the Confederacy’s existence, viz, slavery, but to conceal his confinement to the Virginia Theater and thereby the very factors of State loyalty and the Federalism issue.) By these corrupted narratives the authors, intentionally or innocently, tend to drown out legitimate conflicting considerations and arguments.

One might limit one’s objections to this treatment by an unjustified focus on the blemishes of a certain person of history — for all mortals have had, do and will always have blemishes — rather than considering also their virtues, or to the subordination of the ideas which they espoused. But, in addition to remembrance of those virtues and ideas by these memorials, there appears to be an additional reason justifying their preservation, though perhaps of a counterintuitive nature.

It has been commented that some, perhaps even many, of these Confederate memorials were raised for ulterior motives such as buttressing a White Supremacy environment or glorification of “The Lost Cause”. Thus, with discrediting of these motivations, then, it is argued, there is justification for removal of them. With the premise of the reasons for erection I could concur, at least to some of those memorials, but with the conclusion I cannot.

For some of the persons represented deserve to be remembered. More importantly perhaps, the existence of these memorials provides evidence of the sentiment behind their raising and consequently the state of mind of at least a significant amount of the populace at the time thereof — for they were raised in the context of their times and they provide evidence of this context. Therefore, preservation of them allows the occasion for conservation and studying of the public perception at the time, and thus enhances understanding. To the extent that it is believed, justifiably in many cases, that their negative impact be ameliorated, solutions exist, such as literature, placards or other devices to objectively describe and discuss the environment at the time, reasons and sponsors for the memorial, to minimize any honor to their subjects that might be undue.

[Critics have suggested a parallel between the unanimous or near-unanimous support for the absence or removal of statutes remembering persons identifiable with evil, such as Adolph Hitler, Josef Stalin and Saddam Hussein. While Evil may be an intangible difficult to describe (similar to the problem with defining and ascribing Hate in certain situations), there can be little dispute that it exists and can be justly attributed in certain situations and to certain persons; certainly those individuals qualify.

Other situations and persons are more questionable. How would one distinguish? Perhaps it would be on the basis whether a monument was raised in an actual or tacit public support environment or instead, in a dictatorial-command environment. Yet, even in the latter environment, perhaps preservation in some instances could be justified since they still would evidence the state of mind of these individuals who commanded their raising. And similar devices, such as above suggested, could ameliorate and counter any perceived honor being afforded them.]

I believe the above suggests a variety of reasons that justify opposition, at least in selected situations, to a possible juggernaut for removal of these memorials. But the primary reason for opposition is the objective of obstructing and arresting the mentality of the juggernaut itself. For I perceive this mentality, as opposed to its immediate objectives, to constitute an existential danger.

Many perceive, in an unreflecting way, change to be a virtue, a progress away from vice. I do not.

While the social implications of the Second Law of Thermodynamics are not irrevocable, as conscious effort can temporarily reverse decline, the tendency, especially in concentrated polities, is toward disorder and ultimately chaos. Only conscious effort, in carefully examining what has proven to be valuable and worthwhile and what can be projected to be dangerous in its replacement, can reverse it.

Regrettably, what we seem to have presently, at least as demanded by the most vocal and most publicly reported to the exclusion of contrary voices, is the opposite of careful examination and consideration. And history has frequently demonstrated that hysteria can develop a momentum of its own, destroying all in its path. Current technology unfortunately simply accentuates this potential.

Certainly not all who hold a position contrary to mine are unreflective or have positions without some merit. But a mob mentality can override and crush even those who seek to direct and control it. And here I perceive that there is a demonstrable herd mentality that, feeding upon the current horrendous polarization, can lead to a destructive stampede, trampling ideas and institutions which deserve preservation.

¹ The focus of these comments are limited to Robert E. Lee. At the other extreme is, say, Nathan Bedford Forrest, for statues of whom I would find opposition to removal highly-difficult to justify. (While a superior military tactician, I am unaware of any other qualities about him to admire.) As to other political or military leaders in the Confederacy, I would find it necessary to analyze them on a case-by-case basis as to whether they had any “socially redeeming qualities”.

² Moreover, the virtues of Lee’s private character justify study and, in many cases, emulation. I have however focused here on the public facets and perception.


Forester Twp, Michigan USA
21 Aug 2017

Limitations of Science

[The below consists of a comment by the writer on The Volokh Conspiracy blog on a posting about today’s “March for Science”.]

While I have no essential difficulty with the concept of “evidence-based policy” — ignoring for the moment the intractable problem of capacity limits on apprehension of evidence, the accurate measurement thereof, and the interpretation of this data — it seems to me the real questions consist of:

One, what policies ought to be addressed, and,

Two, if it is decided that a particular policy ought to be addressed, how is it to be implemented; a subsidiary question to the latter is who is to implement it.

A wide swath of issues and problems are a constant feature of existence. However, does this mean that a uniform policy ought to be formulated to address any specific one? Ought not some be deferred or avoided simply because they are beyond the capacity of mortal minds, or as they involve such conflicting values or considerations that any policy is unfeasible?

Even if there is sufficient concord that a specific problem ought to be addressed by a particular community, there remains the question of which facet of the community ought to address it. Climate Change might be a good example. While I fully concur that excessive human activity necessarily has a deleterious effect, might not the best solution be individual, rather than concerted, behavior to restrict one’s unnecessary activities? A perception that the existence of a problem automatically necessitates the formulation of a policy to solve it is the threshold for oppressive centripetal interference in all areas of life.

Finally, there always remains the issue of the hubris of certain science advocates. It appears to me that many may be excellent technicians but are unaware of the very nature of science, perceiving it as some vehicle for identifying Reality or even Truth. (While announced in a different context, with a different meaning and for a different purpose, Pilates’ famous question of “What is Truth?” is a thought of continuing relevance.) Even Reality is a chimera subject to constant metamorphosis.

It seems that many of these proponents have forgotten that the scientific process is to constantly search for and identify new data and to formulate an hypothesis that comprehensively and accurately explains this data. It is a process, and for a purpose, that is much more humble and modest than to Discover Reality — unless one adopts a definition of Reality that is itself modest.

Forester Twp, Michigan USA
22 April 2017

Social Order — The Counter-Majoritarian Influence

Assailing government as abusive and hostile to the civil society for which it is responsible is not infrequently countered by an assertion that the government is us. This assertion is understood to suggest that the critic ought not to figuratively (or literally) topple government by reviling its essence and deeming it a counterpoint to civil society, but rather satisfying himself with only calibrating its contemporary machinery; for it seems the premise is  that the government is not the enemy, and no presumption should exist that its restrictions or imperatives should be viewed with suspicion or skepticism. With this assertion I am unable to concur.

At least three (3) reasons seem to suggest this conception is without rational support. These can be categorized as follows:

I.  “Government as Us” — The Threshold for Tyranny

First, the oppression of the body polity is a necessary consequence of such a conception. Preliminary to the discussion of the basis for this danger, an explication of the evolution and nature of the body polity ought first be examined. However, as the writer is in the process of gradually developing this thesis, the reader’s indulgence, in permitting later reference thereto as an introduction to the following, is requested. Presently, the writer will address only the state of

Civil Society and Government in Unpeaceful Coexistence

In any community there exist two (2) levels: civil society; and the government which is a creature of it.  Civil society, though, encompasses every facet and component of the activities of the lives of the persons of which it consists — civil society then being vast,  touching all elements of those lives and activities within the geographical boundaries constituting its periphery, and being inseparable from those component lives. These activities, while not technically infinite, are innumerable, consisting of every minor and major solitary action of each person as well as each minor and major interaction they might have with a constantly-varying ensemble on a daily, weekly and annual basis.

Thus, if government is us, viz, civil society, then it would follow that it should be parallel- engaged in every detail of the solitary thoughts and activities of each, and the interaction between every, member of the polity; for, if civil society is not independent and the primary forum for interaction, but rather subordinate or even tangential to a paramount influence upon the polity from government, then must it not mean government is integral and inextricable? But is not this then the very definition of Tyranny?

Such a scenario of course introduces an additional tension. The greater the scope or volume of social interaction that is impacted or regulated by government, the greater the stake in the government of the various power centers; for, in any civil society no matter how primitive or complex, there is a necessary differential in power between self-identifying sets of its members (or, at least, until the theoretical arrival of the state of entropy at the “end of history”) — as constant exact equality of power is impossible to either attain or maintain. And the greater the stake, the greater the propensity of the stakeholder to insert itself into governmental determinations and outcomes — as the greater the level of its power, the more the interest of the stakeholder is impacted by governmental operations. And the more frequent and the more intense the insertion of the stakeholder into governmental determinations and outcomes, the greater the likelihood of corruption of government thereby.

This corruption occurs in two (2) forms and senses: one, the common sense of moral contamination through favors of some sort from a power center; but also, two, the disruption of and diversion from what would have been the prescribed functioning, as measured either by process or outcome, of the governmental personnel or agency. In either sense, though, there will have been a deviation of the focus of its functions and operations toward a subset or subsets of the civil society. Thereby, will the other sets thereof be neglected and, by definition, consequently oppressed.

II.  The Breadth of Civil Society Inherently Inhibits and Restricts Governmental Competence

Second, if we do not view government as essentially isolated from, but rather coexistent with and integrated into the social structure, then it would follow — as above discussed — that it would be expected, if not explicitly sanctioned, to express judgment or opinion, either imperative or precatory, on all aspects of these interactions. But in that event its magistracy would have to be both as numerous and intensely knowledgeable as the number of members of the society. But this, by definition, is impossible.

If the magistracy was of this numerical extent, then it would consist of all members of the polity, and the civil society would be wholly subsumed within and virtually abolished by the government. But government is a creature of civil society and instituted to perform functions of which civil society is incapable of efficiently or expeditiously performing on its own. It then would not only have exceeded its mandate but destroyed the very reason and justification for its existence.

It then must be concluded that preservation of the rationale for government’s existence necessitates some restriction upon and confinement in the growth of its magistracy. In that event, though, this limit on the number of magistrates will likewise limit both its capacity and expertise in the regulation of the full scope of activities of the members of its polity. Instead, its capacity and expertise will be properly confined only to influence or regulate those activities of members that affect, or the impact upon them by, persons with whom they are not in direct contact1 — the original rationale for the creation of a government.

Thus, both by physical principles and to adhere to the purpose for its creation, the competence of government is innately limited and incapable of being treated as other than a subset of “us”.

III.  The Consensus vs Competition Principles

Third, and most significant, a civil society does (or at least should) operate on the consensus principle. Government however operates upon the majority principle. By nature, they then are wholly inconsistent with and hostile to each other. This alone renders one the opponent, rather than the associate or counterpart, of the other.

Mankind first congregated in civil society from, and to enhance and serve, mutual self-interest. Such an objective by definition requires and involves complementary interaction between those in direct contact with each other; if not then their respective actions would be in conflict and therefore not to their mutual self-interest. With complementary interaction, the actions of each benefit both. To determine how these actions will generate mutual benefit, each must express to the other which result is in their primary interest — or, rather, which of their primary interests will not conflict with a primary interest of the other. Thus, this necessitates consensus by both on which of those interests are least in conflict and the particular action that will attain realization of the respective harmonious interests.

If consensus failed, or perhaps even antagonism developed between these participants, then mutual self-interest would dissolve. As this was the reason for the formation of civil society, then as a result it would itself commence disintegration. Ergo, consensus is the operative principle of civil society.

Ideally, government would operate likewise. However, except for the occasional imposition of super-majorities, history and experience demonstrate that legislative and judicial decision-making operate upon the majority principle.2 For how else could it? While unanimity might be ideal, except in a exceedingly-small body of members — an option possible only for a equivalently-small body politic (though this factor might well be deemed to constitute evidence of the superior benefits of a smaller, rather than a larger, community) — requiring unanimity would paralyze the operations of such a council, as it would provide each member a veto on any action by the balance of the members.

Thus, to avoid this prospect and to enable the law-making or law-adjudicating body to perform whatever functions are legitimately within its purview — the performance of this function being the reason for its creation and, thus, also the very justification for its continued existence — they traditionally and generally operate upon a majority rule principle. Such a principle, though, necessarily excludes, at least in part, the interests or preferences of a portion, and sometimes a substantial portion, of its body politic.

For expedience, as well as the means to implement policies that benefit the interests and preferences of the larger portion of its body politic, such a principle is generally the better operative principle. Nevertheless, it further belies the claim that Government is Us.

1 These persons may be either internal to – as a result of, in a geographically-extensive community, being substantially removed from the respective members – or external from, the body politic.

2 Philosophically, it is possible to categorize only the executive functions as the government, whereas the legislative functions are the expression of the sovereign body politic and the judicial functions the exercise of immutable logic operating on eternal truths and positive law. Employing such a categorization should enable more comprehensive and incisive analysis of the within issues. However, a full exploration would unduly expand this discussion and is best deferred for separate consideration.


Forester Twp, Michigan USA
15 April 2017

The Entropy of Waterscapes

Some prefer a pristine, unimpeded view of a waterscape. Others prefer a more natural vista, with intervening flora merging, intermingling with and enhancing the liquid expanse; this latter ensemble would be heartened through the spontaneous birth and growth of trees and shrubs composing this augmentation. However, they risk assault by critical comments upon why they would allow this disarray to occur.

One might respond that they prefer the variety and the severing of the monotony of an unobstructed view. Possibly, though, it can be more than this.

Perhaps, instead, it might be one manifestation of a visceral revulsion toward entropy. Employing myself as an example, and reflecting now, it appears I may always have maintained such an implicit mental framework: for I have long favored and gravitated toward the maintenance of diverse and distinct cultures. And an unobstructed waterscape might be styled as bland, and thus might be a reinforcing factor; for an inclination opposed to a too banal and undifferentiated vista of existence might be distressed when confronted with such a scene.

Such a critical aversion to an unobstructed and unbridled view of a waterscape can be viewed as simply the most immediate manifestation of such a perspective. For limitless, unconfined water is the very definition of entropy. Throughout the Scriptures, the sea constituted the very definition of chaos, and the clearest, most proximate example thereof.

Such a characterization is apt regardless of whether the surface might be violent or calm. For, if the former, though dramatic, yet is the exemplification of disorder, while, if the latter, wholly lacking in any discrete structure. Thus, only the introduction of terrestrial elements into the setting is capable of providing the variety necessary to counteract this inherent entropy.

Forester Twp, Michigan USA
03 Apr 2017

Hate — Of what does it consist?

It seems there is a present proclivity to characterize many prevalent attitudes as some aspect of Phobia, just two being Islamophobia and Homophobia. Phobia of course is defined as “an extreme or irrational fear or aversion”, but it seems, in these contexts, the meaning intended by the speaker has, frequently if not generally, metamorphosized into a category of Hate.

Phobia of course is not an attribute that is to be embraced or celebrated. (Neither though is the tendency to employ it — similar to the inclination to apply the innately-innocent phrases of “common sense” and “right (or wrong) side of history” as pejoratives — in an effort to castigate or marginalize the objects thereof.) Still, an exhibition of Hate is an attribute or attitude far more malignant and intolerable.

Of what, though, does Hate consist? And how does one identify it and isolate it from attitudes that are permissible? For it without doubt would be pernicious to label the articulation of an opinion formulated within the context of a belief system that distinguishes certain behavior or attributes as good versus bad (or evil) or commendatory versus intolerable — or even as acceptable versus unacceptable — as an expression of Hate. How then do we segregate attitudes that are beyond the pale from beliefs and principles that, though rejected or refuted by certain people, are intellectually tenable?

Perhaps the initial avenue of analysis would be to focus upon certain criteria that are capable of categorization. Pursuing such an approach, we than can assert that certain expressions clearly are indisputably indicative of an attitude of Hate. These include:

  • explicitly characterizing an opinion as hatred toward an identified group of shared characteristics,
  • acts of violence, against designated individuals or groups,
  • offensive expressions with the actual intent to humiliate or injure an identified individual or group,
  • consistently intemperate, vituperative characterizations of an identified group of shared characteristics when unaccompanied by coherent reasons that are sufficiently developed and corroborated,
  • visceral reaction initiated by patent characteristics or without articulable reasons, and
  • refusal to moderate an expressed hostile attitude toward an identified group of shared characteristics despite the proffered opportunity to evaluate context or appreciate nuances after presentation of and utilizing conflicting data or argument, when provided a sufficient opportunity to evaluate the presented data or argument.


Other actions would seem to be excludable from opprobrium, such as:

  • expression of acknowledged hostility toward persons, identified or unidentified, exhibiting and manifesting generally-acknowledged malum in se conduct or opinion, and
  • expressions that might have a tendency to offend but which are directed toward particular behavior or characteristics rather than a person performing or displaying them,
  • expression of an articulated opinion, consisting of coherent reasons sufficiently developed and supported,
  • explicitly describing an opinion as hatred toward a particular concept or principle, and
  • revulsion toward conduct that violates historically-established norms of civilized behavior.


And yet other actions may be more problematic of categorization, such as:

  • assertion of a general opinion or concept encompassing an identifiable class of persons which characterizes them as morally or socially deficient, and
  • an unequivocal intemperate, vituperative antagonism directed toward identified individuals,
  • expressions that might have a tendency to offend but which are directed toward particular behavior or characteristics rather than a person performing or displaying them when combined with aggravating or egregious factors,
  • antagonism based upon opposition to a practice or behavior rather than an expression of advocacy for a differing practice or behavior.

It would seem the third (3rd) category is the one upon which we should focus, in analyzing the salient factors that might better allow us to identify what is Hate and what is not. For, if we can determine what factors there differentiate it from the first (1st) category, then this ought to enable us to better isolate the controlling factors.

Our first observation, it would seem, ought to be that hate is not per se sanctionable. For Scripture itself recognizes that it is, on occasion at least, justified, e.g. Ps. 97:10; Ps. 139:21-22. The Hate with which we are concerned is that which is censurable and sanctionable.

Unfettered antagonism toward specific individuals often can be justified and properly escape censure. For Evil does exist and certain individuals can congenitally project (or possibly even be possessed by) it. Yet, as Edward Wallis Hoch wrote:

“There is so much good in the worst of us,
And so much bad in the best of us,
That it hardly behooves any of us
To talk about the rest of us.”
(Still, a caveat remains due, as certain persons can by their overt actions project themselves into the public consciousness, or inflict tangible ill towards others — and thus justify a reciprocal expression of censure.)

What then is censurable and sanctionable is an antagonism that is intentionally blind to any redeeming virtues and qualities of a particular person.

Unfettered antagonism towards an identifiable class of persons, however, usually escapes justification by the foregoing rationale. For, unless the class is exceptionally narrow, there are few vices and negative qualities uniform to each member of it; equivalently, even if there were some reprehensible characteristics exhibited by a certain portion of the class, it would be probable that a possible equivalent portion would exhibit laudatory characteristics. Again, then, the dereliction would consist in the intentional ignoring and disregarding of palpable exculpatory circumstances and conditions that would, as a matter of usual linear analysis, necessitate, or at least suggest, a reevaluation of one s assessment of the affected persons.

One primary indicator then of censurable Hate is the conscious and intentional obliviousness to factors that are inconsistent with and rather would negate the rationalization supporting the antagonism. Further, in assessing whether the conscious and intentional element is present, we might tender as an axiom that absolute certitude is equivalent to intent.

Now, however, we should progress to the question whether fervent advocacy of an opinion or position is equivalent to this censurable absolute certitude. To answer this we have to examine the opinion or position in depth.

But this examination needs be made not on the merits but on whether the argument in support of it is an elaborated argument. And we are compelled to conclude that an argument qualifies as such when it exhibits deductive reasoning, utilizing premises that are objectively coherent and consistent, founded upon sufficient evidentiary justification; and sufficient evidentiary justification can be deemed to be present when it is acknowledged to be not a fringe assessment but rather within the range of common recognition. Concurrence in the merits is irrelevant since many disputed premises and much contradictory evidence are common; what is relevant is whether the person espouses an opinion that in good conscience can be confidently maintained — regardless of whether it is “generally-accepted” (since, both, this is a quantitative rather than qualitative measure, and as measure of the quantity can generally be subject to dispute).

Even then it is possible that an elaborated argument might wander into the territory of censurable absolute certitude in the event of persistence in an expressed opinion after the presentation of controlling conflicting data or argument. Nevertheless, since what is “controlling” frequently can be open to dispute and as all are afflicted with an inherent bias against conflicting opinions, the presumption should remain in favor of evaluating an elaborated argument as being made in good faith.

We might conclude then that the primary criterion is how obdurate is the expressed opinion as opposed to one which at least tentatively reserves judgment.

If so, then perhaps the observer who assumes the right to characterize a particular action or opinion as hateful is likewise obliged to reserve judgment until there has been an opportunity to explore the rationale thereof.

Forester Twp, Michigan USA
14 Sep 2016

A Well-Armed and Well-Regulated Militia as a Mechanism for Gauging the Presence of Tyranny

Certain semiautomatic rifles, particularly the AR-15 and similar configurations, have been characterized by some as “weapons of war”. Since there are significant differences between the AR-15 and M16, particularly in the modes and rate of fire, it is well-known the characterization is inaccurate.

However, given the similarity in general design, including its ability to accept a high-capacity magazine, let us for the moment accept the designation as a “weapon of war”.  Does this then disqualify it for civilian ownership?

Preceding posts have sufficiently demonstrated, it is believed, that a large block of civilians in this country are compelled, in certain exigent circumstances, to provide military-type services to the country or their State in their capacity as members of the unorganized militia — or at least be available and prepared to do so.  By definition, then, would they not be engaged in war-type activities?  And, if so, should they not then be experienced in and have available a “weapon of war”?  How then can they be proscribed from ownership of and familiarity with such a weapon?

Moreover, the statutory prescription of potential militia service is parallel to the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment.  While historically and contemporaneously there have been continued conflicting interpretations of the purpose and scope of the amendment, there can be no dispute it includes two (2) clauses and that at a minimum the right to keep and bear arms was to enable the people to perform militia service.  Now, by both historical and legal definition, the performance of militia service was engagement, as the circumstances might require, in paramilitary and military service.  How then is the keeping and bearing of a “weapon of war” incompatible with this capacity?  Rather, does not this capacity instead require it?

One might also analyze the question from the perspective of the purpose of a militia.  It is beyond cavil that a militia was considered more harmonious with liberty, in contrast with the greater threat to liberty that was posed by a standing army.  While not as universally accepted, there was also an understanding that a militia could potentially act as a bulwark against a standing army controlled by persons with objectives in conflict with those of the larger — or, at least, a sufficiently substantial — body of the people.

Certain critics have cast scorn on the continued viability of this function, given the geometrically-superior firepower of the country’s military forces. How can, they say, a militia equipped with AR-15s and sidearms realistically oppose a standing army with, inter alia, M16s, tanks, fighter aircraft and bombers?  This however overlooks a singularly perceptive observation (or, at least, its corollary) from our Declaration of Independence.  It is tendered that this provides the mechanism which preserves and proves the viability of such a resistance — albeit one that hopefully will never be required.

Mr. Jefferson noted that “[p]rudence … dictate[d] that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.”  Thus, even if evils are being perpetrated, they are likely to be borne by the greater body of the populace if they are not excessive and egregious.  Any rebellion by an insignificant body of the populace then allows, if not compels, a conclusion that the causes of the outrage are sufferable.

What then is the conclusion that is allowed, if not compelled, when a significant body of the populace engages in some form of insurrection?  It is tendered that it should be deemed then that these evils have now become magnified into ones which are excessive and egregious.  And it seems Mr. Jefferson concurs, as he further states that in such an instance of “… a long train of abuses and usurpations … evinc[ing] a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.”

Let us then suppose that just Five percent (5%) of the population between 15 and 54 years of age deemed themselves outraged by a “long train of abuses and usurpations”.  Nay, instead of more than 8,500,000 citizens, let us suppose that but One percent (1%) resolved to resist what they deemed despotism.  What is conceived to be the likely reaction of the U.S. military forces to a civilian force of more than 1,700,000 citizens?  Would they likely view with equanimity the slaughtering of such a large body of their fellow citizens, deeming it to be consistent with morals and the law?  Wouldn’t they instead be likely to conclude that the perceived grievances of their fellow citizens had become, consistent with Mr. Jefferson’s formula, “insufferable” and due to excessive and egregious “abuses and usurpations”?

It is tendered that out of natural and innate morality — much less and regardless of any concern for their potential jeopardy as a consequence of possible commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity — these military forces would conclude that the actions inspiring such resistance, as well as any orders to overcome such resistance, were patently illegal, and therefore would themselves resist.

It would be impossible of course to reduce to mathematical certainty what proportion of the citizenry would be required for an observer to conclude that resistance was legal rather than illegal.  Suffice it to say that there would be sufficient parameters, when viewed in the context also of any surrounding relevant circumstances, to allow a resistance by a substantial body of the citizenry to be cause for concluding the resistance was justified.  And upon a determination of such justification would instead eliminate the despotism that caused the resistance.

Consequently, a citizenry keeping and bearing arms sufficient to cause a suspension of exertion of force against them, in order to allow an assessment whether their actions were rather justified, demonstrates that the existence and interposition of a militia remains a viable mechanism for resistance to potential despotism.  And the keeping and bearing of arms compatible and consistent with their function as a militia continues to be an essential right.

Forester Twp, Michigan USA
04 July 2016

Duty of Every Citizen as Militia Member to Defend State as Nullification of Restrictions upon Means of Defense

As suggested by my three (3) postings this past February 26, I commenced work upon and intended to post the below shortly thereafter; however, other circumstances and obligations interfered with my completion hereof. Those three (3) postings provide context and reference for this posting and, in some respects, elaborate on this subject.)

The massacres over the past seven (7) months have, as is well-known, resulted in more calls for “gun control”. Unfortunately, these have to a great extent focused on the type of weapon used rather than the type of person who used the weapon or, perhaps more precisely, the deficiencies in the person who used the weapon.

In my opinion, the controversy and ill to be eradicated can be better addressed by attention to the well-regulation of persons who acquire what are deemed to be certain kinds of weapons that justify further regulation. This is further addressed at length in my ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN Memorandum, one of those postings published at this site on February 26. For prolonging exhausting and futile discussions about types of weapons, with certain exceptions of course, ignores and repudiates the reality of the right to keep, and justification for keeping, arms, the obligation to do so, and the necessary circumstances incident to the exercise of this right and obligation.

It is indisputable that there is a natural, and long-recognized common law, right to self-defense.  Nay, the writer tenders that there is not merely a right but further a duty of self-defense. The fact of birth of each living person is a given. If a person was born, then there is a reason for his or her life, be it, among possibly others, the choice of God, or the decision of his or her parents, or a role or purpose for him or her to perform, or an objective for him or her to realize or status to attain. In any event, the very fact of the person having life necessarily implies that it ought not be terminated but ought be allowed to endure, for fulfillment of whatever might have been its reason; for each person had no control over and was not the cause of his or her birth. If then he or she as it were was “impressed into duty”, he or she has no right to shirk this duty but rather a further duty to defend himself or herself from anyone who might endeavor to terminate their life and thereby prevent him or her from performing this duty or realizing their destiny.

The right to keep arms is but a corollary of that right and duty. While the circumstances under which one might have to defend oneself have not it seems been explicated, nevertheless the scope of this right of self-defense is intrinsically wide. For it must encompass at least each of the situations where a person is called upon to defend oneself against a:

  • savage animal,
  • solitary criminal aggressor,
  • band of criminal aggressors,
  • foreign or rogue domestic paramilitary force, or
  • foreign or rogue domestic military force.

All of these situations indicate that there can not be a severely-circumscribed scope of arms to which one is entitled. For an individual weapon that might be sufficient to protect oneself from a small savage animal would not be sufficient to protect oneself from a military force. Consequently, the conclusion must be that a person is entitled by right to keep arms that are sufficient to protect oneself against each of those exigencies.  [The writer of course recognizes that there are certain legal limitations to a broad rule — limitations though which are not incident to or inherent in the natural right of self-defense — as historical usage has, first, extended the entitlement to weapon types which an individual would commonly keep and personally bear, and, two, carved out weapon types that are specialized or might be usually stored in a facility such as an armory. Still, the burden should be upon the one arguing for a restriction that the type is one that should fall into the latter, rather than the former, category.]

Buttressing this line of reasoning is the insufficiently-examined significance and description of what a militia consists. The coupling of the militia phrase in the Second Amendment is frequently used as an argument that the right in the succeeding phrase should be limited.  However, this ignores what was the understanding of the composition of the militia at the time of its adoption. In addition, even the present meaning of the term “unorganized militia” — assuming that the term’s existence is even recognized, much less the significance thereof appreciated — encompasses a broader range of persons than is frequently acknowledged.  (For the succeeding citations the reader is referred to the writer’s Statutory Definitions of U.S. Militia posting this past February 26.) As a perusal of 10 USC 311 indicates, all able-bodied citizens of the United States, between the ages of 17 and 44, inclusive, are automatic and mandatory members of the militia. It would seem that the States have authority to expand the composition thereof since, for example, Michigan has expanded, by 16 years, the age group of persons who compose its unorganized militia, they likewise being under compulsion to be members of the State militia. MCL 32.509.

And what duties and in which circumstances may the unorganized militia be called upon to perform? Among them are to:

  • “… suppress Insurrections and repel invasions” US Const, art I, § 8, cl 15.
  • serve in the defense force “… in case of riot, tumult, breach of the peace, resistance of process, or for service in aid of civil authority, whether state or federal, or in time of actual or imminent public danger, disaster, crisis, catastrophe or other public emergency within this state.” MCL 32.555.

At a minimum certain of these duties, and the circumstances in which they would be performed, clearly are paramilitary or military in character. And is not some of the material with which they must be equipped well known?

If these persons are then part of a contingent military force and thus would be bearing arms in this service, is it not then incumbent upon them to have available and be trained in the use of the weapons which they might be required to employ in a hostile action? And it would seen that such a possible scenario is not simply academic, since, for example, both the U.S. Constitution and the statutes of Michigan allow the President and the Governor, respectively, to call forth the unorganized militia in exigent circumstances. US Const, art I, § 8, cl 15; MCL 32.555. If a person then is a potential military conscript, is not familiarity and training in the use of the arms necessary for them to competently perform their function essential?

Now it is perceived that an argument might be presented that the arms need not be kept by these members of the unorganized militia, but could be stored in some type of armory facility. However, in addition to this being inconsistent with the terminology of the Second Amendment, viz, a right not only to bear but also to keep, there could be a gross impracticability in the administration thereof. For in the event of some type of untoward and unanticipated emergency, might not the members of the unorganized militia require immediate resort to those arms? In addition, having the arms constantly available allows these members to frequently practice and train and perfect themselves in the use of the weapon, something that would not be as conveniently, if at all, possible if they were not always readily available.

In sum, undue restrictions upon the types of weapons available to the populace would not only be inconsistent with but would conflict with and vitiate both the rights granted to them and the duties imposed upon them. For these reasons, any effort to restrict or prohibit certain types of weapons appropriate to these potential functions would negate and interdict this right and this duty.

The writer shortly will further address a related issue in a succeeding posting.

Forester Twp, Michigan USA
03 July 2016